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Foreword 
IIASA celebrated its twentieth anniversary on May 12-13 with its 
fourth general conference, I/ASA '92: An International Conference 
on the Challenges to Systems Analysis in the Nineties and Beyond. 
The conference focused on the relations between environment and 
development and on studies that integrate the methods and find-
ings of several disciplines. The role of systems analysis, a method 
especially suited to taking account of the linkages between phenom-
ena and of the hierarchical organization of the natural and social 
world, was also assessed, taking account of the implications this has 
for IIASA 's research approach and activities. 
The conference was attended by roughly 200 scientists and pol-
icy makers from 24 countries in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and 
Asia, as well as from a number of international organizations. Pa-
pers were commissioned from fourteen authors under four broad 
themes: the environment, technology and economic transitions, sys-
tems methodology, and social forces and the unity of scholarship 
and action. These papers were the focus of fourteen workshops, 
each of which had two designated discussants, a rapporteur and a 
chair. During the plenary session addresses were given by, among 
others, Dr. Franz Vranitzky, Federal Chancellor of Austria, Dkfm. 
Ruth Feldgrill-Zankel, Austrian Federal Minister for the Environ-
ment, Youth and Family, Academician Guri Marchuk, a former 
President of the USSR Acade.my of Sciences, and Professor Godwin 
0.P. Obasi, Secretary General of the World Meteorological Orga-
nization. 
This volume is the first of two books to result from the confer-
ence. In this collection, we have attempted to select those papers 
presented at the conference that dealt with environmental issues 
and the role of science in addressing such problems, as well as to 
some extent creating them. We hope that we have been able to cap-
ture some very different styles of expression and, more importantly, 
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of thought. The second volume will contain all those papers not in-
cluded here, as well as the discussants' and rapporteurs' comments. 
It will indicate the broad range of topics covered by the conference. 
Our thanks are due to the Institute's National Member Organi-
zations for their steadfast support, to the Austrian Federal Ministry 
for Science and Research for their special grant for the conference, 
to the participants of the conference for their many contributions, 
and to all the IIASA staff members who worked so hard to make 
the conference the success that it was. 
Peter E. de J anosi 
Director, IIASA 
Vladimir S. Mikhalevich 
Chairman, IIASA Council (1987-1992) 
Introduction 
The word sustainability greatly influenced thinking on environment 
and economic growth from the moment of its use by the Brundt-
land Commission. It has caused scholars as well as the general 
public around the world to pause and reflect on where civilization 
is heading, including what the countries starting to industrialize are 
letting themselves in for. Not many words uttered by a committee 
have ever had so much resonance. 
One might think from this that the word means something -
that it draws the attention of its numerous users and hearers to 
some particular "thing". Such is not the case. It has attained 
its effect by the very fact that to each listener it brings to mind 
a picture suited to his or her preconceptions. One will hear it as 
saying that we can keep going on the present path just as we are now 
doing, with more and more goods, a better and better life for ever 
more people. Another hears it as warning that on our present path 
we are destroying the environment within which our economy and 
society sit, the way that locusts do, except that for us there is no 
moving on to another site. Between the extreme contrast of a happy 
future that nothing can stop, and its opposite of total destruction 
that it is now too late to prevent, every possible implication of the 
word comes to mind when the word sustainability is uttered. The 
one common element in the varieties of usage is that sustainability 
is good; no one opposes it. 
Not many years back such differences in the way that people 
looked at the world would have been attributed to class, but now 
that is out of style. The best we can say in its place is that the rich 
can afford to take the future into account, while the poor have to 
concentrate on eating today. However, that does not account for 
such facts as that many an Asian peasant is above all anxious to 
turn his half-hectare of land over to his son with its fertility intact, 
while the rich American lives to the limit of his credit cards. 
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Much of the variation in the meaning of sustainability arises 
through different preconceptions about trends in our ways of pro-
duction and consumption and the power of science to accommodate 
them within the natural environment. The point can be exemplified 
with fossil fuel. Will burning coal and oil prove our undoing? Yes, 
argue some; for one thing we will exhaust the natural sources of 
fuel, but long before that happens we will suffocate ourselves with 
the emissions from their combustion, as well as making intolerable 
changes in the world climate. Of course our use of energy is sus-
tainable, say others, because just as we have changed from wood 
to coal to oil, so we will continue to change: science will surely find 
a way to produce fusion power within the next 20 years, and then 
we can move into the hydrogen economy based on a practically in-
finite source of energy, and where emissions contain nothing more 
harmful than H20. 
Sustainability in the latter view does not mean standing still, 
but continuing the course of scientific progress, whose future ben-
efits we can anticipate from what it has done for us in the past: 
and if there are unintended effects they can be countered by the 
foresight of people and governments. Thus it is true that methods 
of attracting and capturing fish have become so efficient that they 
threaten the survival of fish populations, but we already see action 
on the part of governments to offset this excess of efficiency. 
Yet at least a vigorous minority of the scientists on whom this 
progress depends express limited confidence in the ability of science 
to achieve what non-scientists expect of it. Science does not auto-
matically rectify the unfortunate effects that it introduces. Mass 
tourism made possible by the world air network destroys many 
of the objects, natural and manmade, that attract tourists. The 
widespread distribution of modern firearms upsets political stabil-
ity wherever the institutions of civility are weak. Agriculture has 
attained unprecedented yields, but the reckless use of the fertilizers 
on which the farmer now depends encourages unwelcome algae. 
Both of these contrasting viewpoints are represented in this 
volume. For Guri I. Marchuk, as for Tokio Kanoh and Umberto 
Colombo, there may indeed be some temporary difficulties with 
our kind of progress, solvable by technical means that science will 
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develop or else by social rearrangements that will be readily agreed 
on. On the other hand, for Sheila Jasanoff, Helga Nowotny, and 
Andrzej Wierzbicki the power of science to serve us is less assured. 
They record the numerous questions that a public which has re-
cently become suspicious is asking. Just at the moment when they 
are enjoying more of the fruits of science than ever before in his-
tory, publics have suddenly discovered behind the facade of science 
fallible human beings. While few refuse the benefits of science, all 
seem to enjoy reading about its difficulties and uncertainties. Our 
authors give substance to public doubts when they point to discov-
eries within science that suggest some basic limitations, ultimately 
limits to human rationality itself. 
It is good to have agreement on a word, even if the word has 
a thousand meanings. The next stage beyond such agreement is to 
apply a maxim of scholasticism: never assert, seldom deny, always 
distinguish. It is not too early to look into the meaning of the word. 
That has been done before, but by no one as acutely as by Harvey 
Brooks in the introductory paper he contributed to the conference 
and to this volume. A prominent physicist, a master of science 
policy, Brooks does not indulge in assertions in which the lack of 
meaning is compensated for by the emphasis with which they are 
presented. He wants first and foremost to know what we are talking 
about. 
After this initial essay, the volume is laid out in terms of one 
aspect or another of sustainability, starting with the optimistic side. 
First come the papers by Marchuk, Kanoh, and Colombo, working 
from the premise that what we are now doing in technology and the 
economy can continue for the increased benefit of more and more 
people. The second group of papers, those of Golitsyn, Jasanoff, 
Nowotny, and Wierzbicki, perceives some less satisfying elements 
in our present and prospective condition. They are not willing to 
take the promise of the 18th century Enlightenment on faith, but 
look closely at the ways in which science has fallen short of that 
promise, or if not science itself then the way that science has been 
used. 
Every participant in the conference, the optimists as well as the 
pessimists, agrees that we need to know more. For any discussion of 
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sustainability hard data on the present is of interest largely insofar 
as it points to what the future will be like; the question is how 
the positives and the negatives of trends discernible now will affect 
our children and grandchildren. The pessimists would be relieved 
if they could be sure that the ratio of negative to positive will be 
no worse today than it was a hundred years ago. 
That needs forecasts, and these are always uncertain. To ex-
trapolate the present for the short-term future, especially when 
things are changing gradually, and where a simple causal structure 
applies, can indeed provide useful guidance. However, none of those 
three conditions apply to environmental predictions: they are long 
term, the subject of their prediction can change suddenly, and their 
causal relations are exceedingly complex. 
In short , we live in a world in which forecasting is both indis-
pensable and impossible. One of our writers is bold enough to try. 
Lawrence Klein extends the well-tested methods of econometrics to 
incorporate ecological and demographic variables. 
Oran Young faces up to the fact that scientific knowledge will 
not change matters in the world as long as it stays in the labo-
ratory. Nor is communicating with leaders sufficient. Democratic 
politics tends to punish politicians who move too far ahead of their 
constituents. Successful politicians are careful not to move too fast, 
and they are often the last to acknowledge the urgency of the need 
for action. When national leaders get together in international 
meetings, in the "anarchical society", they do what they think will 
please the voters back home. Young shows how a popular network 
can be created that will push politicians in whatever science deter-
mines is the right direction for the planetary future. 
The last of the workshop papers is by Leon Tabah on population 
growth, mostly concentrating on the Third World. Any measure for 
attaining sustainability that does not deal with the human popula-
tion, and that fails to take account of the three-quarters of it that 
lives in the developing countries, is a non-starter. The environment 
of this three-quarters is now partially protected by their being poor. 
However, no one anticipates the perpetuation of low incomes, and 
if large populations do not themselves inhibit development, then 
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the movement of the poor up the economic ladder will have a dras-
tic effect on the biosphere, the natural setting of nations and the 
world. Poverty damages the environment in one way (poor people 
overcut for firewood) while wealth damages it in other ways (rich 
people use more energy), but the rich, having more command of 
resources, can do more damage. 
Ten of the eleven papers listed above (the exception is the pa-
per by Guri I. Marchuk), along with five other papers reserved for 
later publication, were each presented in draft form to a workshop 
in which participants in the conference interested in the particular 
subject could question, comment, criticize, and point to alternative 
possibilities. Discussion in relatively intimate groups (though some 
of the workshops were chosen by as many as 50 participants) per-
mitted all to have some input. The papers as subsequently revised 
make up the main content of this and the succeeding volume. 
This book is both part of the record of the conference of May 12-
13, 1992, and a celebration of IIASA's first 20 years. It starts with 
a welcoming address by Chancellor Vranitzky of Austria, under 
whose policies IIASA's host country has gone far toward reconciling 
economic progress with measures of conservation. It concludes with 
a statement by Director Peter E. de Janosi sketching what the 
conference will mean for IIASA 's research activities in the years 
ahead. 
The remaining papers, as well as the prepared statements of 
discussants and the workshop records made by rapporteurs, will be 
published as soon as possible. 
Committee for IIASA '92 
Nathan Keyfitz (Chair) 
Peter E. de Janosi 
Alexander Kurzhanski 
Arkadii Maltsev 
Neboj8a Nakicenovic 
Roderick Shaw 
Claudia Heilig-Staindl 
Evelyn Farkas 

PLENARY ADDRESS 
Opening Remarks 
Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky 
Twenty years is a proud anniversary. In human life, but also in 
the life of organizations, it marks a point when - after inevitable 
deviations, detours, and experiences - one has reached more or less 
solid ground, has established oneself as a distinct personality and 
sees a much clearer path for future development. 
In driving out here today, I reviewed the past 20 years of 
IIASA's existence, the incredible changes which have occurred in 
this relatively short span of time, the many "ups" which gave us 
hope and perspective, the many "downs" which we had to, and 
finally did, overcome. 
When the decision on IIASA 's foundation was taken, we wanted 
to prove that intensive cooperation among scientists - irrespective 
of the constraints of political systems and ideological differences -
is possible. Today, conscious of the changes in the political map of 
the world, but also in the awareness of the problems which confront 
us, we know that it is not only possible, but that it is inevitable. 
Thus, in 1972 it was a step of great courage, but also a step 
of great political wisdom and farsightedness, that brought together 
here in Laxenburg this group of scientists of international distinc-
tion, with one objective: to work together and to pool their wisdom 
and their creativity toward the solution of global problems that are 
interlinked and affect each other. 
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Today, IIASA can look back at a proud record of achievement: 
it has firmly established itself as the central place to which govern-
ments, but also other research-oriented institutions, can turn for 
sound advice and information. The role which IIASA has played in 
the preparations for UNCED 92 in Rio de Janeiro, or, for instance, 
in the conference on the water resources of the Middle East, which 
will be convened this month in Vienna and will address an emi-
nently political issue and an issue central to any peace agreement 
in the Middle East, amply proves my point. 
We are all in agreement that we live in an interdependent world 
and that the burning questions which confront us are interlinked 
and intertwined. We know that the eruption of a volcano on the 
American continent can and will affect the European climate. We 
know that a slight deviation in an ocean stream can strongly in-
fluence a country's economy. \Ve know that the oil fires in Kuwait 
damaged the ecological balance of the Himalayas, we know about 
the importance of the rain forests and the dangers of deforestation, 
we know about the damage done to the ozone layer, we know about 
how damage to one system correlates with damage to another. 
Is it thus not surprising how difficult it still is to draw the nec-
essary conclusions from this knowledge, to arrive at a joint program 
of action, and to subordinate short-term national interests - or in-
terests that may be perceived as such - to a long-term common 
good? 
The preparatory work for UNCED 92, the international con-
ference that was called with such great hopes and such ambitious 
goals, has clearly shown that there is still a wide gap between the 
rational acceptance of scientifically established facts and the politi-
cal action needed to remedy existing damage and to prevent further 
deterioration. What was designed as a large-scale learning experi-
ence for the industrialized and the developing countries alike, as a 
joint effort of truly global scope, now runs the danger of becoming 
submerged in petty mutual accusations and reproach, in preaching 
and protesting, and in haggling over finances. The safeguarding of 
our global environment runs the danger of becoming subordinate to 
the safeguarding of narrow national interests and small-scale eco-
nomic advantages. 
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I do not want to sound unduly pessimistic, _but all the signals 
are there and point in this direction. We will all, scientists and 
politicians alike, have to join forces, work very hard, and be very 
persuasive to overcome the present impasse. 
Shortly before his death Sir Isaac Newton stated, and I quote: 
"I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself! seem 
to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting 
myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell 
than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered 
before me." We have the privilege of incredible progress in charting 
the great ocean of truth. Now it is our task to convert knowledge 
into political action and to transfer the international cooperation 
which characterizes the world of science into the world of politics. 
The concern about the global environment provides the most 
stunning and the most obvious example of how the traditional defi-
nitions of the nation state, its power, and its prerogative to exercise 
national sovereignty are changing. As a consequence, we are obliged 
to reassess many assumptions that have formed the basis of our na-
tional political institutions. 
National borders in Europe, as well as in other parts of the 
world, are losing their importance. Trans-national corporations 
span the globe, and in many cases have significant influence on 
national economies. National institutions cannot but lose political 
relevance if much of the decision making is no longer taking place 
in the various capitals, but does so jointly and in a cooperative 
manner at international conferences, or - as is the case in Europe -
in the headquarters of the European Community in Brussels. Thus, 
the very concept of national sovereignty is changing its meaning. 
Today, sovereignty is less exercised by free and independent decision 
making and more by participating as an equal partner in those 
organizations where decisions that have an unavoidable impact on 
one's own affairs are taken. 
However, national institutions are not only affected by the grow-
ing weight of supra-national institutions and the increasing rele-
vance of supra-national cooperation. They are also affected from 
below - by a growing interest in local and regional autonomy, and 
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by a growing tendency for people to turn to the communal or re-
gional context for definition and self-expression. 
We have to find a rational balance between these two, seemingly 
countervailing, trends: the need for supra-national cooperation on 
one side, the yearning for identity and the smaller scale on the 
other. Institutions like IIASA, for whom international cooperation 
is a natural fact of their existence, also have much to contribute to 
this debate. 
On this basis, I want to offer my sincere congratulations on 
IIASA's anniversary, combined with my best wishes for its future 
and my hope that it will continue to flourish and prosper. On behalf 
of the Austrian Government I can assure you that not only are we 
proud to be your host here, but that you can always count on our 
support and our assistance. 
Award 
Before I conclude, there is a very pleasant task I have to perform, a 
task for which this meeting provides the ideal background. I have 
already referred, at the beginning of my remarks, to the founding 
fathers of IIASA and their ideas, and there are first and foremost 
two names which immediately come to mind: Professor MacGe-
orge Bundy and Academician Gvishiani. Unfortunately, Professor 
Bundy is not with us today, but it gives me great pleasure to confer 
here publicly on Professor Gvishiani the "Grand Gold Decoration 
with the Star", which the Austrian Federal President has bestowed 
on him. Academician Gvishiani, in this audience it will be unnec-
essary to describe your distinguished academic record or your great 
achievements for IIASA and international scientific cooperation in 
general. Let me assure you that we are deeply conscious of every-
thing that you stand for and what you have always contributed to 
the good relations between Austria and your own country. It is 
with great personal pleasure that I give this decoration with my 
sincere congratulations and my best wishes for your future. 
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Chancellor Vranitzky presenting Academician Gvishiani with his award. 
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Current and Future 
Global Challenges 
Guri I. Marchuk 
Before the onset of every new century, questions relating to the 
science of the future always used to arise among scientists. We, the 
scientists of the 20th century, encounter the same questions. Only 
8 years remain until the 21st century begins, and if one takes into 
account that the biggest breakthroughs in science and technology 
require about 15-20 years of hard work, then one understands that 
we have to define the trends in the development of science and 
technology for the beginning of the 21st century in the very last 
years of this century. 
It seems to be an extremely difficult task at first sight. But, as 
analysis shows, forecasting trends in science is quite possible since 
we enter the new century armed with several powerful technologies. 
They represent the accumulated potential of the past and will serve 
in the future as a source of great potential for the knowledge which 
has not yet been used in practical applications. 
The second half of the 20th century brought many significant 
discoveries into our life. Examples are supercomputers and system 
robotechnology, space objects, nuclear energetics and thermonu-
clear synthesis, polymers and artificial fabrics, biotechnology for 
the production of proteins, genetic engineering, composite materi-
als, accelerators for colliding neutrons and plasmotrons, and many 
others. 
8 Guri I. Marchuk 
But together with all these, the 20th century brought into the 
world atomic and thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental mis-
siles, strategic air forces and navies, as well as the systems to de-
stroy them. Unfortunately, this is not all. The environment is 
being severely damaged due to intensive contamination by trans-
port, industrial wastes, and poisonous agricultural chemicals. The 
pollution process occurs on both a regional and global scale and 
influences the planet as a whole. It makes our current way of life 
very complicated, as well as that of future generations. These are 
the problems we enter the 21st century with. 
Up until the last decades the role of anthropogenic changes in 
the biosphere was negligible, since nature nearly always had the 
capacity for regeneration, and this fact was solidly embedded in 
the consciousness of man: man used to consider these regeneration 
capacities as limitless ones. However, fast development of science 
and technology brought completely new factors into the attitude 
of man to nature. The destructive forces of technology released 
by man proved to be of the same order as those of nature. These 
include not only atomic and thermonuclear energy, but also anthro-
pogenic changes in the environment which are caused by harmful 
industrial wastes and which destroy the biosphere. Unprecedented 
acceleration of industrial and agricultural production has already 
placed our planet in a really dangerous situation in the 20th cen-
tury. Therefore, with the 21st century approaching, it is necessary 
to conceive new ideas to solve scientific and technological problems 
in order to preserve the habitat of man. 
One could note quite definitely that the main challenge to sci-
ence in the 21st century is the problem of the preservation of the 
biosphere and the survival of man in the conditions of global change 
in the climate and biosphere: that is, all of the environment as a 
system. This system has already been subjected to very negative 
anthropogenic changes. Therefore, science and technology in the 
21st century should be applied to answer the main question: what 
are the stability boundaries of the biosphere? That is, they should 
be used to develop man's understanding of which changes in cli-
mate, pollution, and man's industrial activity will not substantially 
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change the state of the biosphere and will not cause it to evolve into 
a new, irrecoverable form. 
In order to approach this problem one needs new ideas and new 
knowledge in technology and biology. A sophisticated mathematical 
model is needed to describe the climate of the atmosphere and the 
oceans, and their interaction in the conditions of permanent changes 
in the biosphere. Ecology in this sense becomes the leading and 
uniting link in our knowledge of the habitat of all live beings on 
the planet. 
The components of this link are many-fold. First of all there 
are the problems relating to the pollution of the atmosphere by 
products poisonous to the biosphere, such as discharges of harm-
ful substances by industry. The amount of these substances has 
increased so as to endanger the very life of the planet. Therefore, 
one of the main tasks in the 21st century will be complete tech-
nological reconstruction with the goal of closed cycles in industry 
and natural biological defense against harmful insects and weeds in 
agriculture. This will result in numerous problems for science and 
technology. The development of the foundations of environmental 
protection will be the major problem of the end of the 20th and the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
Let us begin with problems in energetics. Consider global pol-
lution of the planet and how it influences the biosphere. First of all 
it is linked with the network of electric power stations, which work, 
as a rule, on coal and mazut and discharge enormous amounts of 
carbonic, sulfurous, and other gases which warm the atmosphere 
and contaminate the environment. Another big problem is fre-
ons and other nitrogen compounds: they destroy the ozone layer 
- the unique defense of the biosphere against disastrous ultraviolet 
radiation. 
Therefore, no doubt, humanity in the 21st century will move on 
to new sources of energy, absolutely new technologies, and ecologi-
cally clean energetics. These are principally new methods of com-
bustion and utilization of the wastes of electrical power stations. 
Such energetics are based on reliable nuclear stations. This means 
thermonuclear energetics based on "Tokomak" systems: these are 
powerful laser systems providing the necessary temperature for 
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thermonuclear reaction in a tritium-deuterium medium. Another 
example is muon catalysis, possibly combined with breeders (fast-
neutron reactors). 
The whole of the scientific community was astounded toward 
the end of the current century by the discovery of high-temperature 
superconductivity. Literally hundreds of laboratories attacked this 
problem in order to gain new knowledge and find practical appli-
cations. Many things became clear, many others require thorough 
and complex analysis. Nevertheless, many experts agree that the 
21st century will be the boom century in this field, which will bring 
about revolutionary transformations in such applications as the pro-
duction of superpowerful accumulators of energy, energy transfer 
over long distances with no leakage, the construction of new ele-
ments for computers, precise apparatus to study the earth's ultra-
weak magnetic fields, and many others. This new direction, no 
doubt, will influence many fields of science and technology and 
might result in an unprecedented economy with ecologically clean 
energy. 
Let us now consider the chemical industry. It seems to be the 
biggest source of planetary pollution and, together with mining 
and metallurgy, is a dominating factor in contaminating the bio-
sphere. Acid rain, ozone concentration depletion, and chemical 
aerosol poisoning in the atmosphere in the vicinity of industrial 
centers have become the norm. The same might be said about 
automobiles, aviation, and other kinds of transport polluting the 
cities of the planet and whole regions of land and aerial space. All 
these damage people's health. Therefore, the automobile industry 
and machine-building plants for all kinds of transport will be the 
subject of technical rearmament in the 21st century. Cheap cata-
lysts will appear as the basis of classical schemes to remove harmful 
wastes in transport: electromobiles and electroengines will appear 
as a result of technical revolution. 
Chemical multi-stage processes will be gradually converted into 
few-stage or just one-stage ones. Plasmotrons and lasers of great 
power will form the basis of the technical rearmament of chemistry. 
Mechanochemistry - a new science which has already had initial 
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success - will enter our life. It is capable of producing new com-
pounds with no consumption of water, which is still the basis of all 
large-scale chemistry. However, it will require thorough research. 
The first requirement is the study of the synthesis of compounds 
on the basis of mathematical modeling of chemical transformations. 
Even now these studies begin to gather acceleration. 
One may foresee that using new catalysts will result in the 
temperature of chemical reactions gradually approaching almost 
room temperatures, which are characteristic of most complicated 
chemical-biological processes going on in the cells of live organ-
isms. The catalysts will again play a main revolutionary role here. 
The studies of live organisms and optimal technological processes 
will converge. Literally, such studies, together with studies of the 
human genome and genetic engineering problems, will create new 
possibilities for the chemical and biotechnical industry of the future. 
Biotechnology, which is a colossal source of pollution, deserves 
special consideration. Classical technology for the most important 
product - protein - is based on processing organic compounds using 
bacteria. The production of protein on the basis of this technology 
is accompanied by discharges of numerous poisonous ingredients 
which get into the atmosphere and water basins and contaminate 
the environment with harmful wastes. This is a deadlock way to 
produce proteins and important pharmaceutical goods. 
The recent results obtained at the Institute of Protein of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences suggest that protein could be synthe-
sized by genetic engineering methods directly based on the replica-
tion of RN A. It is an ecologically clean technology which, no doubt , 
will dominate in the new century. This case convinces us once more 
that the ecological protection of the planet will principally stimu-
late new scientific ideas for the technology of production of proteins 
and medical preparations of broad usage. 
Microbiology will be exclusively important for "clean" tech-
nology; it will bring about the creation of numerous bacteria 
strains utilizing fine-disperse waste products as a natural process 
of metabolism. Enormous dumps of processed matter on earth will 
be the source of nutrition for such microorganisms: extracting the 
latter would give many new, valuable substances. Even now, some 
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laborious microbes concentrate fine-disperse gold, tungsten, and 
other elements. However, this is only the beginning. 
Now let us consider biological monitoring. In order to observe 
the state of biota, biological monitoring is needed: this is carried 
out with the help of a system of satellites and reliable biological 
stations. A system of simple, cheap satellites will provide us with 
the possibility of monitoring the biosphere as a whole and collecting 
information for data bases in order to establish the trends in the 
changes of biota and to be able to use this information in any place 
on the planet. This is the very exclusive role of space monitoring. 
This task will be carried out simultaneously with the accumula-
tion of global information on climate changes needed to establish 
variations in the climatic components of the whole planet and in 
separate regions . Of course, to process the data monitored con-
cerning climate change, huge computer networks and reliable data 
bases will be needed. We shall return to this question later. 
Space technologies will be of great value in the future. They 
will give mankind unique, new knowledge and products which are 
impossible to obtain in conditions on earth. These are materials 
with the extreme features of homogeneity needed for the electronics 
of the future, materials for medical preparations, composite mate-
rials, new, unique chemical compounds, and many others. The 
main problem affecting fast development of space technology is 
the source of energy needed for the realization of large-scale space 
projects. Science and technology must make provision for this: 
100-500 kWt of energy is a good beginning for space production. 
Space in the 21st century will be actively rendered habitable by 
the use of manned orbital stations. All this will weaken ecological 
stress on earth and give people new, more effective, and cheaper 
means of survival. 
Of course, space studies alone will not give the complete picture 
of biological and geophysical changes on the planet. Stationary in-
stallations are required on the surface of the earth. Scientists are 
already thinking of the construction of bio- and geophysical stations 
which will measure the biogeospheric background of the planet. It 
is important to begin by constructing along three meridians a se-
ries of five to seven such stations. It is possible to construct the 
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first series on the Krasnojarsk meridian - from Taimyr through the 
tundra, through the mountain ridges of Pamir, through India to 
Sri Lanka. The second meridian of stations could pass through 
Great Britain, France, and Africa. The third meridian of stations 
could pass through North and South America. Processing the data 
collected by these biospheric stations equipped with the same ap-
paratus will make it possible to get valuable information on the bi-
ological and geophysical background of the planet and link it with 
space monitoring. However, this requires interstate effort. 
The energetics of the future are being developed right now based 
on utilizing solar energy in space and then transmitting it to certain 
points on the earth. So, underestimation of the scope for research 
efforts in "earth" space will result in big losses for mankind. Such 
excellent projects as the investigation of remote space by missions 
of manned stations toward Mars, and possibly to other planets of 
the solar system, are not considered here. They will considerably 
enrich our knowledge of the space around us and will provide a 
powerful incentive for the development of new theories and tech-
nologies, including earth-based technologies. 
Monitoring the state of the land, atmosphere, and ocean will 
make it possible to establish the most important changes in the 
climate of our planet, taking into account anthropogenic factors. 
This means the development of a large area of fundamental and 
applied science concerning the planet Earth, global climate changes, 
the general circulation of the atmosphere and oceans, and the life 
of the biosphere. 
Finally, let us consider mankind. Man lives in real conditions 
of changes in the environment, climate, and biosphere, and is part 
of the biosphere himself. He is subjected to the influence of ultra-
violet radiation, X-rays, and 1-rays. Intensive radiation creates the 
conditions necessary for the accelerated mutation of cells and for 
the appearance of cancer cells which may lead to lethal cases. Man 
is subjected to attacks by antigens - viruses and bacteria which 
may result in considerable changes in the immune system of an or-
ganism since their influence is being enhanced by chemically active 
substances polluting the atmosphere and radiation. The immune 
system grows weak, bringing about the rise of chronic diseases and 
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decreasing the lifespan of man. This requires a lot of research to 
support man's recovery, and to correct his immune system, includ-
ing the use of artificial antibodies - we already know how to produce 
them using hybridome methods. 
On the eve of the 21st century humanity is experiencing an 
optimistic page in its history, namely, the process of nuclear dis-
armament which substantially decreases the probability of nuclear 
war. Both in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the 
USA military expenses have greatly decreased. I am sure that this 
process will gradually embrace the whole world and that military 
industry will be peacefully incorporated into the international cre-
ative economies of the 21st century. 
Now, the main question: what is the difference between the 
20th and the 21st centuries when considering the development of 
science? One may state the following. The main motivation for the 
development of science and its applications in the 20th century was 
vigorous growth of production with a tendency toward intensity and 
the preservation of resources (some countries lagged behind for var-
ious reasons) and the wish to produce more in a better and cheaper 
way. The development strategy of science in the 21st century will 
change as we approach the border where technology is limited not 
only by economy of resources and raw materials, but by problems 
linked with global changes in the biosphere - the habitat of man, 
which forms a defense against negative, natural, and anthropogenic 
factors which are close to the critical point already. All this stip-
ulates a new direction for scientific investigations and more close 
political and economic collaboration between the countries of our 
planet. Of course, the wish to discover and understand something 
new was, is, and will be an irresistible stimulus for scientists, no 
matter whether the discovery will be of practical use to people or 
whether it will open new paths for science and cognition. 
Obviously, the foundation of a culture common to all mankind 
will begin in the coming century. This process has already been 
started by the UNO and international links in the fields of eco-
nomics, linguistics, philosophy, history, the arts, music, and so on, 
create worldwide cultural space. This process is being considerably 
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enhanced by growing international economic and political integra-
tion, which leads to an increase in trust between nations: although 
Western and Eastern countries, especially, have a long way to go 
yet. However, the process has started and one should strengthen 
and protect it. Economics and culture become components of global 
processes on the planet. 
Now, let us look at fundamental science, which will support 
mankind's care for its habitat. First of all, let us consider infor-
matics. We are approaching the epoch of global computerization, 
when computer technology will penetrate all spheres of human ac-
tivity from high-level science to completely automatic production. 
Supercomputers and personal computers will increase their per-
formance and link together forming a gigantic global computing 
network on the planet based on new technologies, software, and 
knowledge bases. Computers using optical and molecular elements 
will be created and widely used. This will allow performance to be 
increased by many orders. However, this is not all. Computers with 
parallel processors have a broad area of potential: a start in this 
direction has already been made - by the creation of transputers, 
special systems of high performance. These technical advances will 
form a base for creating data and knowledge bases on economic pro-
cesses, technology, the environment, and the trends in its changes 
on a local and global scale. Satellites will provide all the necessary 
original information. 
One may postulate that considerable development will occur 
over the next decades of methods of analysis and solution of non-
linear problems in mechanics, physics, thermophysics, hydrody-
namics (including geophysics), and other important fundamental 
directions in science. In our generation non-linear problems were 
investigated, opening new roads in science. Studies of non-linear 
problems have already led to outstanding achievements: the dis-
covery of strange attractors, the formation of dynamic chaos and 
stable coherent structures on its background, the phenomenon of 
synchronizing frequencies, and others. These phenomena proved to 
be in some sense typical for different fields of physics, chemistry, 
and biology. These studies have already boosted the understanding 
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of the appearance of turbulence, which is so important for hydrody-
namics, physics, and hydrophysics. It is a problem that humanity 
has thought about for more than 100 years. 
The theory of adjoint equations will play an exclusive role in 
the solution of biospheric, geophysical, and ecological problems. It 
will help to solve the problems of minimizing the stresses caused 
by the ecological and biospheric perturbations which trouble soci-
ety. The ways of constructing adjoint equations corresponding to 
non-linear processes in the atmosphere and in oceans are already 
defined by science. They allow the precalculation of the sensitivity 
of functionals of the problems linked to life-support for one or an-
other region of the globe to perturbations of different kinds. This 
is one of the most important problems of the present. 
We stand on the threshold of many discoveries in all fields of 
science and our task is to implement them, where possible, in mod-
ern technologies and in ways which support economic, ecological, 
social, and other programs. Through these programs people will 
appreciate the role and meaning of science in society. 
Each field of science already has a huge potential of knowledge. 
Without doubt, the powerful progress of science will pass along the 
road of interdisciplinary links, which will provide unprecedented 
acceleration of those studies which are of principal importance to 
people's lives and to the planet itself. Of course, this will require 
a thorough reconstruction of education, which will become one of 
the fundamental links in such progress, since education in the 20th 
century was mainly directed toward narrow specialization. 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis may 
play an outstanding role in this integrating process. 
PLENARY ADDRESS 
Science and the Challenges 
of Environmental and 
Developmental Issues 
G.O.P. Obasi 
This conference will focus on the relations between environment 
and development, particularly on the challenges they pose to the 
present and future generations. For my part, I wish to address the 
particular linkage between environment and development, on one 
hand, and science and technology on the other. 
Environment and Development 
Today, humanity is very much aware that we live in a world that 
is poised on the threshold of a new epoch in which the survival of 
human existence, as well as that of other species on the planet, is 
threatened and endangered. Nations have to cope with many issues 
like droughts, desertification, flooding, natural disasters, depletion 
of the ozone layer, environmental degradation, and a possible cli-
mate change. There is increasingly disturbing evidence that man's 
activities are rapidly changing life-sustaining balances. We have 
gone beyond the point where sustainable use of the atmosphere as 
a highly mobile dump for man's waste is possible without serious 
consequences. We are now more aware of possible implications of 
the stratospheric ozone layer depletion, a looming major change in 
climate, and the concomitant projected sea level rise. Furthermore, 
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we are more conscious that failure to protect the environment can 
lead to the degradation of the natural resources base necessary for 
continuing development. 
In an effort to maintain the quality of the environment and 
achieve environmentally sound and sustainable development, we 
need to address the protection of the atmosphere, land resources, 
including forests, freshwater resources, oceans, seas, and coastal 
areas, conservation of biological diversity, environmentally sound 
management of biotechnology and hazardous wastes, prevention of 
illegal traffic in toxic products and wastes, and improvement in 
quality of life and human health. We must take these into account 
as environmental concerns which also have to be considered in re-
lation to the socioeconomic development efforts of many countries. 
In this connection, basic changes will be needed if we are 
to move toward nationally and globally sustainable development. 
Among others, in the industrially developed countries, there will 
be a need to construct economic systems that use resources more 
sparingly and efficiently, as well as minimizing waste discharge. In 
developing countries, it will be necessary to ensure socioeconomic 
growth to meet the rising expectations of growing populations and 
to ensure that this takes place in a manner that will minimize re-
source depletion and environmental stress. 
Indeed, issues relating to poverty, increasing world population, 
concerns for special groups like women, children, and indigenous 
people, financial resources, and technology transfer are important 
considerations for environmentally sound and sustainable develop-
ment. It is estimated that about 125 billion US dollars per year 
is the order of magnitude of the international financial resources 
required for the full implementation of the Agenda 21 programs 
proposed by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). It may be noted that this is 70 billion US 
dollars more than the annual official development assistance cur-
rently being made available by industrialized countries. Nonethe-
less, this is less than 1 % of the gross national product of principal 
donor countries. Financial mechanisms, such as those similar to the 
Global Environment Facility, will have to be established to meet the 
requirements. These will also be necessary to facilitate technology 
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transfer to developing countries in conditions favorable to those 
countries. In addition, suitable institutional structures should be 
in place to ensure the implementation of the necessary activities. 
Role of Science 
In citing these various areas of concern, it is readily apparent that 
these issues relating to environment and development are very much 
linked to science and technology. The current issues relating to 
environment and development can be seen as requiring responses 
to questions which are within the domain of science and technol-
ogy. For instance, the increased consciousness of the subject of 
global environmental changes has been brought about through the 
painstaking efforts of many men and women of science. 
Humanity has now reached the stage, both in terms of the mag-
nitude of the earth's population and the sheer weight of its activi-
ties, where it makes its impact felt on the planetary scale. Demon-
strating the existence of such global environmental impacts, for 
example, the depletion of the ozone layer or increase in the global 
greenhouse effect of the atmosphere, and showing their connections 
to specific human activities, has been a major achievement of envi-
ronmental sciences in the last decades. As a result of the work of 
the world's meteorologists, hydrologists, oceanographers, and ecol-
ogists, a new awareness has been created of the role of man and the 
influence of human actions on a finite planet; one whose limited 
resources are being subjected to escalating demands from an in-
creasing population. New scientific insight, on a broader scale than 
ever before, has given humanity a new perception of the limits of 
the resources of our planet, a recognition of the interdependence of 
all men on the planet, and an awareness of the necessity of achieving 
a sustainable balance between man's needs and nature's resources. 
Through a better understanding of the earth's system, there is 
an improved estimate of the carrying capacity of the planet and 
its resilience under the many stresses placed upon it by human 
activities. While much more still needs to be done, science has 
nonetheless provided some ways of achieving a better understanding 
through the use of improved networks of ground observations and 
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through the application of effective and efficient modern tools such 
as remote sensing instruments, modeling capabilities, and high-
speed computers. Science has helped to show the link between 
the basic significance of this earth system as a life-support system 
and appropriate strategies for development that ensure the earth's 
sustainability or continued functioning. 
Indeed, global change is upon us. The momentum of hu-
man economic development and population pressure on natural re-
sources is such that we must expect significant alterations of the 
hitherto relatively stable global environment. Science and technol-
ogy can provide effective warning of a number of future events, 
consisting of information on the magnitude of expected variations , 
the timing of these variations, and the geographical patterns of 
change. In a nutshell: how much, when, and where? 
Scientific knowledge could and should be applied to support the 
goals of sustainable development through scientific assessment of 
current conditions and future possibilities. Science should be seen 
as an essential component in the search for viable, sustainable de-
velopment pathways. For instance, science is playing an increasing 
role in improving the efficiency of utilization of renewable and non-
renewable resources. Hence, developing countries need not follow 
the high energy consumption path previously taken by industrial-
ized countries as they seek an improvement in their socioeconomic 
standing. 
In the context of the present discussion, it can therefore be said 
that a primary role of science is to enable better formulation and 
selection of environment and development policies in the decision-
making process. 
Science and Society 
The increasing concern related to environment and development 
provides an opportunity to recall the mutual and synergistic re-
lationship between science and society. On the one hand, science 
(and technology) contributes to the development of society. In turn, 
society must nurture the development of science if it is to contribute 
to society's advancement. 
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J.D. Bernal, a famous crystallographer, wrote extensively on 
the relationship between science and society. In his treatise on 
The Social Foundations of Science (Bernal, 1969), Bernal perceived 
"science as an integral part of both the material and economic life 
of our time and of the ideas which guide and inspire it." He also 
spoke of science in terms of "its application both to the satisfaction 
of human needs and to the processes of productive industry through 
which in modern society those needs can be satisfied." Furthermore, 
he considered science to be "the chief agent of economic and social 
change, and latterly, as a sure, concise and direct motive of social 
change itself." The analysis of the social transformation which had 
taken place in history led him to the view that we are witnessing, in 
the 20th century, a renewed "scientific transformation of society". 
This can be seen through achievements such as in the fields of 
energy, industry, communication, medical science, and agriculture, 
which are just part of what we now understand as representing some 
of the most essential changes of our time. Indeed, the particular 
example of the development of and ever expanding use of computers 
and satellites demonstrates clearly the pervasiveness of science and 
technology's contribution to human activities. A number of those 
human activities are closely linked to the issues of environment and 
development. 
Support for Science 
Given the symbiotic relationship between science and society, there 
is a need for society, in turn, to provide the necessary support to 
enable science to play its role with respect to the challenges of 
environmental and developmental issues. In this connection, four 
areas in particular should be addressed. These are: 
• Strengthening the scientific basis for sustainable development. 
• Enhancing scientific understanding. 
• Improving long-term scientific assessment. 
• Building up scientific capacity. 
The four areas were identified following the International Con-
ference on an Agenda of Science for Environment and Development 
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into the 21st Century (ASCEND 21), which was held in Vienna in 
November 1991 and organized by the International Council of Scien-
tific Unions (ICSU) in cooperation with the Third World Academy 
of Sciences (TWAS). 
Let us consider each of these four areas in turn. Strengthening 
the scientific basis for sustainable development will imply, among 
other things, the need to strengthen the capabilities of monitoring 
the biosphere to enable countries, especially developing ones, to be 
masters of their environment. For example, on the climatic side, 
the national Meteorological and Hydrological Services would need 
to be strengthened. As agriculture is the primary economic activity 
of many countries, and since much of the agricultural production 
is rainfed, the role of these services is crucial for taking advantage 
of climate as a resource. Furthermore, there will be a need to 
develop the capacity for installation, calibration, and maintenance 
of necessary equipment, as well as for gathering, processing, and 
exchanging the acquired data. Such data will serve multi-sectorial 
purposes, including agriculture, water resources, land use, forestry, 
conservation, and management of the ecosystem. 
The second area, enhancing scientific understanding, implies 
that full use of data and information needs to be made by un-
dertaking appropriate research, especially research directed toward 
applications for improved and sustained productivity. Numerous 
research areas could be identified, but each country, depending on 
its policies and needs, resources, and development plan, should be 
able to identify a set of priority research areas to address. In the 
agricultural sector, for instance, there will be a need to strengthen 
the link between research and the small farmer. In that sector, it 
is estimated that widespread application of scientific results and 
known technologies could expand productivity by over 50%. 
Additionally, collaborative effort among various institutions 
within each country should be encouraged. This should also be 
the case among countries within the region, as well as with those 
-elsewhere. The concept of associated agricultural research centers 
supported by the World Bank is a case already under consider-
ation (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR)]. Moreover, the impacts of research will be felt even more 
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if the use of modern technology is also taken into consideration. 
For purposes of illustration, the significance of the use of satellites 
and computers will suffice. 
With respect to the third area, improving long-term scientific 
assessment, it is clear that the knowledge acquired through data 
gathering, analysis, and research must be used to provide scien-
tific assessments. Such scientific assessments and projections are 
required at the global, regional, and local levels. The scientific as-
sessments pertinent to the global warming issue which are provided 
by the WMO /UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) are examples of how scientific assessments can provide a 
basis for policy formulation and decision making. It is recognized 
that much more still needs to be done, particularly to reduce the 
uncertainties in the timing, magnitude, and regional patterns of 
climate change. It is important that assessments should be able to 
provide a basis for mapping out manageable development pathways 
within the environmental and socioeconomic carrying capacity of 
each region. 
Regarding the fourth area, building scientific capacity, it is clear 
that this is especially important for developing countries. Activi-
ties in support of this area should provide education, training, and 
facilities for local research and development, as well as improving 
access to relevant information for scientists and decision makers. 
The scientific activities required can only be successfully pur-
sued if the required human resources, suitably trained and well 
motivated, are available. Any development program should ensure 
that manpower development is an identified priority. High priority 
must therefore be placed on investments in people to provide the 
means of reaching long-term sustainable development. The quality 
of scientific and technical staff development programs needs to be 
improved and the resources input should be increased. 
Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that the environmental and developmental issues before 
us are complex and interconnected. These interlinkages between 
the various issues have to be seriously considered. A major task, 
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then, is to understand the complex interacting processes. Such 
understanding will serve as a basis for the better formulation and 
selection of appropriate policies, decisions, and actions. 
In view of the interdisciplinary nature of the challenges relating 
to environment and development, it will be necessary to have an 
integrated, interdisciplinary, and systems approach to these chal-
lenges. Individual branches of science cannot treat the problems in 
isolation from other branches, as was done classically. For instance, 
atmospheric concerns cannot be dealt with only in terms of physics, 
chemistry, and mathematics, but will also need to consider biolog-
ical processes, among others. Moreover, the atmosphere also has 
to be studied in the light of its interaction with the hydrosphere, 
cryosphere, biosphere, and geosphere. Hence, I believe that there 
should be an increasing emphasis on interdisciplinary undertakings 
at national, regional, and international levels. 
I am aware that global investigations are not without difficul-
ties. They require the development and use of sophisticated ob-
serving systems and techniques (for example, satellites), as well 
as information management and system simulation capabilities us-
ing powerful computers. These are in addition to the worldwide 
implementation of more conventional operational observation net-
works. As industrialized countries more readily have the resources 
and technical capabilities to undertake the monitoring of the plan-
etary environment, they should take the lead and provide support 
so that the necessary information and benefit can be provided for 
all. 
At the same time, it is important to increasingly enhance the 
capability of developing countries so that they can participate 
more fully in and benefit from the relevant scientific and techni-
cal programs. I therefore wish to stress the importance of evolving 
a network of regional, specialized centers in the developing world. 
Countries with similar interests and requirements can come to-
gether to jointly address these areas of concern. Such centers may 
serve to trigger the growth of expertise that is essential to our ef-
forts to meet the challenges of environmental and developmental 
issues. Certainly, the provision of financial and other resources will 
be needed to realize these centers. 
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In addition, it is also important that the public in general are 
aware and informed of these challenges we now face together. It is 
necessary to ensure that there is widespread dissemination of the 
relevant scientific information. Scientists must not limit themselves 
to their journals but must work with non-scientists, such as those 
in the media, to promote the dissemination of information, anal-
yses, and assessments at the grass-root level. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have been increasingly active in this respect. 
Special groups, such as women and children, should be particularly 
targeted. 
I believe that these proposals form part of what should be in-
cluded in the considerations of appropriate science policies and pro-
grams. I am sure that this conference will identify others needed 
to meet the challenges. For my part, and on behalf of the World 
Meteorological Organization, I can only reaffirm our commitment 
to ensuring that the scientific disciplines in which the WMO is en-
gaged continue to be in the service of humankind. 
Indeed, many challenges lie ahead: but with great resolve and 
armed with the tools that science and technology can provide, we 
can turn these challenges into opportunities for advancement to-
ward a better quality of life for all of us on earth. 
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PA RT I 
What is Sustainability? 

CHAPTER 1 
Sustainability and Technology 
Harvey Brooks 
Introduction 
The concept of sustainable development popularized by the Brundt-
land Commission (WCED, 1987) represented a breakthrough for 
public understanding of the fact that economic development and 
protection of the environment are not necessarily ip conflict with 
each other. However, there is still a challenge inherent in how 
to translate this concept into operational criteria for the choice of 
development strategies and for the selection and adoption of new 
technologies to support these strategies in a real world ecological, 
social, economic, political, and cultural context. Some progress has 
been made in the environmental and resource sphere through the 
concept of adaptive management (Orians, 1990), but the difficulties 
are multiplied when the enormous number of possible social, eco-
nomic, technical, and cultural variables are brought into the picture, 
especially in the light of their complex interactions and interdepen-
dencies. The difficulty is further compounded by the intrusion of 
a wide diversity of implicit or explicit (and frequently conflicting) 
value perspectives from both the developed and developing worlds. 
This diversity of value perspectives, derived from different life ex-
periences and cultural histories, tends to undermine the possibility 
of any consensus on the criteria for sustainability in most concrete 
decisions even though, as Robert Solow observes, sustainability is 
something that it is hard to be against in general (Solow, 1991). 
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The term has a ring of scientific objectivity which can serve to legit-
imize various personal or group political agendas, overt or hidden, 
and thus has a rhetorical value in public discussions which is not 
matched by its operational usefulness. 
For the concept of sustainability in the process of development 
to be operationally useful it must be more than just an expression 
of social values or political preferences disguised in scientific lan-
guage. Ideally it should be defined so that one could specify a set 
of measurable criteria such that individuals and groups with widely 
differing values, political preferences, or assumptions about human 
nature could agree whether the criteria are being met in a concrete 
development program. In other words a meaningful description of 
a sustainable development process should, as far as possible, take 
the form of "public knowledge" as defined by John Ziman in his 
book of that title (Ziman, 1968). 
In such a view there may be many different scenarios that would 
meet the criteria for sustainability but would differ from each other 
in other dimensions, including many that correspond to different 
values and political preferences. In this sense sustainability implies 
an important constraint on choices of development strategies , but 
does not compel any single strategy. For example, different degrees 
of equity, democratic governance, protection of pristine environ-
ments, degrees of urbanization or other human settlement patterns, 
reliance on sophisticated technology, or levels of material amenity 
could all be compatible with sustainability but would correspond 
to vastly different political and social values. 
The discussion of sustainability is further complicated by use of 
the terms "sustainable development" and "environmentally sound 
technology" as though they were equivalent and could be applied in-
terchangeably. All forms of economic progress involve environmen-
tal modification, some much more than others. Some of this will 
be deterioration, and hence economic progress and increased living 
standards often entail some compromise between economic and en-
vironmental goals, but just how much compromise is necessary is a 
matter for intense debate. Also, to an extent not always appreci-
ated, there are many positive synergies between economic growth 
and environmental quality, especially in the developing world. An 
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important development strategy may be to exploit these synergies 
and give priority to development projects or programs that simul-
taneously improve the environment (World Bank, 1992). 
What is sustainable and preferred from a strictly environmental 
point of view may not be sustainable from a broader sociotechnical 
perspective that considers factors other than environment. On the 
other hand, what is sustainable from the broadest perspective, in-
cluding one that assigns high priority to environmental values, may 
nevertheless still not satisfy the criteria for environmental "sound-
ness" preferred by groups which favor minimum alteration of the 
"pristine" environment as a kind of moral imperative. To put the 
matter another way, many different levels of environmental pro-
tection and preservation may satisfy criteria of sustainability while 
still not being acceptable to influential constituencies in society, 
perhaps even a majority in some instances. 
Definitions of Sustainability 
One definition of sustainability is that "world conservation strat-
egy should include management of the use of a resource so it can 
meet human demands of the present generation without decreasing 
opportunities for future generations" (National Research Council, 
1991). Solow puts it that our obligation is to conduct ourselves so 
that we leave to the future the option of choosing to be at least 
as well off as we are, not in every detail but in some overall sense. 
This is inevitably somewhat judgmental, because future generations 
may have different values and expectations than we do, nor can we 
foresee today the technologies or other social capacities that may 
be available to future generations. In fact Solow (1991) emphasizes 
that leaving the world as we found it in detail is not only not possi-
ble but not even desirable. We must take into account not only the 
resources we use up but also the resources and human capacities we 
leave behind, including especially newly created physical infrastruc-
ture, new knowledge, and new capacity for technological and social 
innovation. This includes the broad notion of "social capital" as a 
development of social organization, social norms, social networks, 
and social trust or sense of community that enhance the capacity of 
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ever larger social groups for "coordinated action" (Putnam, 1992; 
North, 1990). 
Thus sustainable strategies do not necessarily always entail sac-
rificing the present for the sake of the future. To the extent that we 
can use a given quantity of presently known natural resources to 
create more wealth and more useful knowledge with which to find, 
extract, and use future resources more efficiently, or to substitute 
more abundant raw materials for those presently used in human 
artifacts, we have not only not sacrificed the present for the future, 
but we may have actually enhanced future options beyond what 
would have existed in the absence of this draft on present resources. 
Thus, whether this is so is a quantitative question that demands a 
sophisticated analysis relating to the particular circumstances. The 
demands of intergenerational equity do not automatically imply a 
zero-sum game with our descendants. If they did, the problem of 
sustainable development would be politically much more intractable 
than I think it is. Knowledge, especially knowledge that becomes 
fully internalized in the skills and capacities of many people widely 
spread around the world, and is passed on to the next generation , 
is a resource which is not depleted by more intensive utilization for 
human benefit today. 
Solow also argues that investment in environmental protection 
today contributes to sustainability only if it comes at the expense 
of current consumption, but not necessarily if it comes at the ex-
pense of investment that adds to future capacity (Solow, 1991). 
Quantitatively, this depends on the future return from the partic-
ular investment that is foregone in favor of more environmental 
protection. But there is also some ambiguity in what we define 
as investment and what we define as "current consumption". For 
example, helping the poor today could, under some circumstances, 
be regarded as an investment in "social capital" to the extent that 
creating greater equity will build a greater sense of community and 
result in greater participation in society in the future and hence in-
creased capacity for "coordinated action" by the entire human com-
munity. However, it is probable that even investments in "equity" 
will be relatively unproductive unless they are targeted at enabling 
the poor and disenfranchised to become more productive, not just 
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compensating them for their inability to consume today - which 
may even undermine their sense of self worth or of membership in 
a community with shared purposes. Too little may be known about 
what makes for community to decide with certainty whether this is 
investment or consumption. 
Thus a sustainable policy for the selection and deployment of 
technologies is one that forecloses as few future options as possible, 
compatible with any given level of present benefit. If there are 
several possible alternative choices today, each leading to roughly 
equivalent near-term benefits, then the most sustainable choice is 
the one that leaves open the greatest range of future choices. A 
minimum requirement is that today's actions do not paint the world 
into a corner from which retreat is either impossible or unaffordably 
expensive at some time in the future. As we will indicate later, 
however, this criterion is often more subtle and difficult to apply in 
practice than it sounds. 
It follows from the above that it is necessary to foresee suf-
ficiently clearly where present trends and choices are leading and 
what alternative endpoints to those projected might be possible 
through the adoption and exploitation of new and emerging tech-
nologies or policy innovations, taking into account costs, local ca-
pacities to assimilate such innovations, and the overall time scales 
required for them to have any effect. This is the essential function 
of technology assessment (TA) which must be an integral part of the 
evolution of any development strategy (Brooks, 1973a). However, 
even this poses a dilemma in that insistence on too much foresight 
prior to action could result in the paralysis of policy because of the 
fear of making mistakes (Hirschman, 1967). 
In the literature on sustainable development, as explained in a 
recent report of the National Academy of Sciences (National Re-
search Council, 1990), two poles of opinion can be distinguished, 
one of which the authors label "conservationist" and the other "pos-
sibilist". Conservationist thinking is based on an image of nature 
"in its original state perturbed by sporadic human blundering" - a 
"better safe than sorry" prescription. The possibilists, on the other 
hand, have embraced an image of space-ship earth as the creation 
and responsibility of enlightened long-term engineering. In this 
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perspective, mistakes are possible, even likely, but with sufficient 
alertness and wisdom may be detected in time and remedied be-
fore their consequences have become irreversible. Reality probably 
lies intermediate between these two images, but the possibilist view 
represents a more reasonable working hypothesis for discussing the 
concept of sustainability in the context of the requirements of a 
sustainable strategy for world development and the closing of the 
rich-poor gap. Such closure is almost certainly essential for long-
run social sustainability in an increasingly closely interlinked global 
society, and it is, quite properly, the preoccupation of virtually all 
international organizations, including the UN system. 
Scientific uncertainty, both in measurement of the current state 
of the biosphere and in inferring future trends from current data 
and understanding of fundamental processes going on therein, is a 
major impediment to operationalizing the concept of sustainable 
development in both managed and natural ecosystems - not to 
mention sociotechnical systems more broadly. In some cases the 
insurance premium (measured in terms of foregone development, 
especially in poor countries) that may have to be paid in order to 
fully hedge against current technical uncertainties may be so high 
as to be politically or economically unrealistic. Whether or not 
this premium is worth paying depends on the projected cost of re-
versing the future consequences of current decisions if the premium 
is not paid. To some degree the seriousness of this dilemma may 
be diminished by more intensive measurement, monitoring, and re-
search, which reduce the range of uncertainty earlier (Carpenter, 
1990). It is in this sense that research and new knowledge is one 
of the best insurance premiums, and one whose value tends to be 
systematically underestimated even in the light of today's large in-
vestments in research and development (Brooks, 1990). 
Some Propositions About 
the Sustainability Concept 
The preceding attempt to define the concept of sustainability more 
precisely leads to the following set of propositions. 
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• Sustainability has to be defined as a sociotechnical attribute 
of a development strategy. It cannot be formulated in purely 
ecological terms. It is an attribute of a system of which man, 
nature, and technology are inseparable parts (Brooks, 1980a, 
1980b). 
• The usefulness of the sustainability concept depends on the de-
gree to which it can be formulated in a relatively value-neutral 
way, susceptible to specifiable measurements, whether physical, 
social, or economic. This does not mean that values are unim-
portant. But, since sustainability is about the future, and we 
cannot foresee the values of our descendants, we need to focus 
primarily on those attributes of policy that determine man's 
survival as a species. Sustainability is primarily about a vi-
able society rather than a desirable society, though obviously 
the two cannot be completely separated. In that sense the pur-
pose of the concept is to reduce the debate to a more scientific 
discussion rather than a trans-scientific discussion, using the 
distinction originally proposed by Weinberg (Weinberg, 1972; 
Brooks, 1972). A future scenario which is not sustainable will 
eventually collapse (i.e., will not be viable) because of its in-
herent contradictions, but there will be many future scenarios 
that are sustainable by the "scientific" definition that might 
not be acceptable to the majority of people as judged from the 
perspective of contemporary political and social values. 
This concept of a value-free definition may be illustrated 
by considering various future scenarios in the light of different 
population projections. Higher future world populations require 
much more economic growth and much more intensive deploy-
ment of new technologies than lower future world populations 
to be sustainable. Yet, within certain limits, either population 
projection might be designed to be sustainable by the human 
survival criteria we have in mind. On the other hand, if we add 
other social values to our criteria, the lower population projec-
tion might be considered much more desirable by most people. 
• Sustainability is an evolutionary concept, confined to finite 
epochs in time and, at least historically, to limited geographi-
cal regions. It is strongly governed by previous developmental 
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history and the historical cultural context. It is unlikely that 
there is any technological and developmental scenario, even a 
"no-growth" or "steady state" one (Brooks, 1973b; Wad and 
Radnor, 1984), that could be sustained indefinitely, since the 
context is constantly changing for both external reasons and 
reasons internal to the system itself. In part this is because 
of the large number of variables involved that are constantly 
changing on different time and space scales. 
• Rates of change in demography, social structure, and technol-
ogy are important determinants of sustainability. What may 
be sustainable in a slowly changing system may become un-
sustainable under conditions of more rapid change; the rate of 
change relative to generational turnover is an important param-
eter. In the contemporary world "problematique", population 
growth and migration are especially critical variables because, 
for the present at least, they seem to be the least amenable to 
deliberate social manipulation. But that may not always be so, 
in part because the present situation is so without historical 
precedent that it has not yet had a chance to be incorporated 
into the perceptions and values of adults that have grown up in 
a different world. 
Given a sufficiently long time for adjustment, the world 
could probably adapt to a much larger total population than 
we can envision at present, though it might not be a very at-
tractive place to live in if judged by contemporary values, and 
it would probably be much more of a man-made or "artificial" 
world than we can even imagine today (Marchetti, 1978). 
Over human history on the planet there have been remark-
able upward steps in the maximum population which the earth 
could sustain. These have taken place as a result of changes in 
technology and in the pattern of human settlements and inter-
actions made possible by technology. There is some reason to 
believe that similar steps up in the future might be possible, 
but they would require changes at least as radical as the tran-
sition from hunter-gatherer societies to irrigated agricultural 
civilizations or the transition from agricultural civilization to 
an industrial, urbanized one that took place in Europe, Japan, 
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and America in the last 300 years. However, the transitions 
in population and settlement patterns in these cases occurred 
much more gradually than the changes that have occurred in 
the last 50 years and will have to occur in the next 50 if human 
societies are to remain viable. Hence the rate of adaptation re-
quired is completely without precedent in human history. The 
20th century is the first in which such radical changes in all 
the parameters of human existence have taken place within the 
life span of a single generation. In the past such changes have 
sometimes taken place locally in such short periods, but they 
have never extended over whole continents or the whole world 
so fast. It is thus the simultaneous magnitude of the changes 
both in time and space that presents such an unprecedented 
challenge to human adaptation capacities. 
However, human capacity for adaptation has also grown at 
an unprecedented speed, especially in respect of the power of 
science and technology, and it has probably never grown faster 
than it is growing today. The population of scientists and engi-
neers and other professionals continues to grow at two to three 
times the rate of the population as a whole or even of the total 
world labor force. This is even, perhaps especially, true in most 
of the large developing countries. But science and technology 
are not only the principal instruments of human adaptation to a 
changing environment; they are also one of the principal causes 
of that environmental change, either through the direct effects 
of their applications, or through their indirect effects in enabling 
much more rapid population growth and more rapid and exten-
sive systemic interactions through communications and trans-
portation. It is not clear - or at least not agreed upon - which 
side of the adaptation equation science and technology should 
be weighed in on. Furthermore, they are not the only tools re-
quired for human adaptation. To be effective their results must 
be rapidly diffused and assimilated, and must actually become 
manifest in "social learning" of unprecedented scale and depth. 
This is dependent on many factors outside the system of sci-
ence and technology itself. All of this means we cannot be sure 
whether the ratio of adaptability to the need for adaptation is 
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increasing or decreasing, nor of how it will change in the fu-
ture. Nor do we have a clear idea of the societal parameters 
that affect this ratio. 
• Activities that are non-sustainable in isolation may become sus-
tainable within a larger system, but, conversely, activities that 
appear to be locally sustainable because of the flow of resources 
and other inputs from outside can become unsustainable when 
viewed within a larger system or on a longer time scale; only 
detailed understanding of the system in conjunction with all 
its interactions and the evolution of the external systems with 
which it interacts can determine whether a local activity or 
policy is truly sustainable. 
As an example, a developed country might grow rapidly on 
the basis of either renewable or non-renewable resources im-
ported from a developing country based on an unsustainable 
system of exploitation. In this case the "slow variables" that 
affect the sustainability of the given system may be external 
to the system itself as ordinarily defined. Some would argue 
that the rapid economic development of Europe and Japan on 
the basis of cheap imported Middle East oil after World \Var 
II was an example of unsustainability of the type envisioned 
here. The "slow variables" are political evolution in the coun-
tries that control the oil and, ultimately, the depletion of the 
resource itself. Deforestation in the tropics is an example of 
unsustainability exported from one region to another in this 
sense, at least insofar as it is the result of exports to developed 
countries. 
In ancient history many local civilizations rose and declined 
because of the exhaustion of local rich resources of metals or 
forests which they were not able to replace by imports or which 
they did not know how to exploit sustainably. On the other 
hand, Britain, which at one time produced over 50% of the 
world's copper, was able to make the transition to substitute 
sources without serious dislocation (National Research Council, 
1969). Thus the sustainability of a development strategy is 
something that has to be examined on several time and space 
scales, taking into account the transferability of resources and 
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organizational capacities of different societies in both time and 
space. Account must be taken not only of present capacities, 
but of those which could be acquired by various times in the 
future, or accessed through international cooperation. 
Conversely, many primitive cultures have existed for cen-
turies, or even millenia, in excellent harmony with their envi-
ronments, only to break down when they came into contact with 
more "advanced" societies. This may not be only because the 
advanced societies consciously "imposed" inappropriate values 
on the primitive ones, but also because there is probably no way 
in which primitive cultures in today's world can be sufficiently 
insulated from external influences over the long term. 
These and other examples show that the criteria for sustain-
ability have ultimately to be defined with respect to a spatially 
heterogeneous system consisting of clusters of interacting, spa-
tially related systems, not necessarily in geographic proximity 
with each other. In fact, as the work of Holling (Holling et al., 
1974; Holling, 1986) and Forman (1989) has shown, even spa-
tially heterogeneous ecosystems can be sustainable over the long 
run when their homogeneous components are unsustainable. 
Heterogeneity itself is an important consideration in maintain-
ing the resilience of ecosystems because different elements of the 
heterogeneous system act as reservoirs for regeneration of other 
elements. Ultimately, of course, sustainability must be consid-
ered on a global scale. Because the flow of resources between 
different elements in a spatially heterogeneous system often de-
pends on political and economic relations between the people 
that inhabit these elements, the separation of the sociopolitical 
and ecological aspects of sustainability becomes more and more 
inappropriate. The behavior of people is inseparable from the 
other elements of the total system. 
• In development planning, increased attention is being given to 
local ecological folk wisdom which has accumulated gradually 
over generations on a semi-empirical basis. There is an increas-
ing realization that the complexity of ecosystems is such that 
we tend to overestimate our ability to predict the effect of in-
terventions, and that therefore a higher burden of proof should 
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probably be imposed on those interventions that are undertaken 
than has been customary in the past (Brooks, 1976). For this 
reason, as well as for reasons of political legitimacy, it is im-
portant to involve many potential "stakeholders" in dialogues 
leading up to development planning decisions. In this sense, 
such dialogues may be regarded as an integral part of the con-
cept of sustainability in development. However, the folk wisdom 
must eventually be reinterpreted in scientific terms if it is to be 
utilized with confidence. Folk wisdom may be vulnerable to 
internal contradictions which develop as a result of changes in 
the circumstances in which it originally evolved; scientific un-
derstanding is required to anticipate this. Furthermore, many 
of the potential stakeholders cannot be represented in these 
dialogues - e.g., the large fraction of the population of devel-
oping countries that consists of young children that will live in 
an entirely different world from that of their parents, as well as 
unborn generations in all countries affected by today's planning 
decisions. 
• The concept of non-renewable or exhaustible resources is prob-
ably not a meaningful or useful one in defining sustainability 
because of the constant evolution of the resource base through 
improvements in the technology of exploration, extraction, recy-
cling, and substitution. Resources are not finite or fixed because 
their availability for human use depends on technology, culture, 
and historical antecedents. So-called renewable resources are 
thus likely to pose a greater challenge to sustainability than 
so-called non-renewable resources (Brooks, 1982a). The ra-
tio of non-renewable resource consumption to output has been 
steadily declining in the developed countries, and this trend is 
likely to accelerate as the application of information technology 
increases the value added to materials in manufacturing (Ayres, 
1987). The economic value of national output consists to an in-
creasing degree of the value added by information and human 
ingenuity relative to the value of the material and energy inputs. 
It is not too difficult to envision a day when more and more 
of the materials of civilization will be synthesized from cheap 
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and abundant raw materials essentially by the use of materi-
als engineering on a submicroscopic or molecular scale (Ashby, 
1979). The modern integrated circuit is probably a harbinger 
of things to come in an increasing number of applications, in 
the field of structures and mechanical systems as well as in mi-
croelectronics (Ayres, 1986; Brooks, 1982a). 
In fact , the resources that seem to be most in jeopardy 
(water, forests, clean air, the assimilative capacity of various 
components of the environment) are almost always ones whose 
scarcity is not reflected in market prices, while resources whose 
future supply is assured are those for which scarcity is reflected 
in market prices so that substitution, technical progress, and 
structural change are motivated by adequate economic incen-
tives. In fact, whether or not the prices are right, reflecting 
the full private and social costs of availability may be a more 
appropriate way to categorize resources than whether they are 
renewable or non-renewable. This is not to imply that the appli-
cation of market principles can automatically solve all problems 
of sustainability, even if, in theory, all "externalities" could be 
fully internalized in market prices, but it does suggest that mar-
ket principles should be the first place to look for solutions, with 
other policies to be invoked only after they have been carefully 
considered and found wanting. 
The case of rural deforestation in the tropics is a good exam-
ple of where the complex interaction between social structure 
and the ecological systems in which it is embedded can lead to 
unsustainability in a sociotechnical sense. It has been shown, 
for example, that deforestation in many developing countries 
has been mostly the consequence of misguided public policies 
which, though often undertaken by government for purposes 
that were thought socially beneficial, have had the unintended 
result of fostering excessive private exploitation which would 
have been uneconomic, even in the short term, in a free market 
(Repetto and Gillis, 1988). In almost every case direct or indi-
rect government subsidies have distorted prices in such a way 
as to yield windfall profits to some entrepreneur even though 
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the project would be uneconomic if prices had reflected all costs 
even without considering externalities. 
The Ubiquitous Role of Surprise 
The tendency in assessing sustainability is to try to extrapolate 
smoothly from existing trends. However, this is more often than 
not thwarted by the appearance of surprises and discontinuities that 
are unanticipated and sometimes impossible to anticipate even in 
principle. A recent example is the rapid appearance of the "ozone 
hole" over the Antarctic, which was unforeseen despite several years 
of prior large-scale observational and theoretical research on the 
mechanisms of stratospheric ozone depletion. Other examples of 
surprise are the wide gyrations in the availability and price of oil 
(for political rather than technical or economic reasons), the serious 
accidents at Chernobyl and Bhopal, and the rapid rise and evolu-
tion of the AIDS epidemic. None of these events were inevitable, 
though the fact that the system was susceptible to them in the sense 
that they were "accidents waiting to happen" could have been, and 
often was, anticipated. But this probability was such that they 
could have happened earlier or later within an interval measurable 
in decades, and the consequences might have been quite different, 
depending on the exact timing. One of the major challenges to pol-
icy analysis for sustainable development is how to factor the possi-
bility of such surprises into planning without becoming paralyzed 
by hedging against every conceivable contingency. The dilemma 
is that the probability of any single such event is extremely small 
and the time of its occurrence almost totally unpredictable within 
a long time interval (Brooks, 1986). Advances in knowledge and 
their rapid and wide diffusion constitute one of the best forms of 
insurance against such surprises, as illustrated by the role of molec-
ular biology in dealing with the AIDS epidemic or the role of 20 
years of prior advances in atmospheric chemistry enabling rapid un-
derstanding of the physical mechanisms involved in the formation 
of the ozone hole, making it possible to prove that it was indeed of 
anthropogenic origin and not a natural fluctuation. 
Sustainability and Technology 43 
Similarly, in the case of the build-up of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere, the most important consideration may ultimately 
prove not to be the slow climatic warming predicted by the global 
circulation models (GCMs), but rather sudden discontinuous shifts 
from one climatic regime to another. Indeed, the whole subject 
of climate change is replete with possibilities for such surprises. 
Sudden release of the West Antarctic ice sheet with rapid sea level 
rise was one such surprise that was considered credible a few years 
ago, but has since been downgraded. Undoubtedly there will be 
others, some of which might be less easily discredited. Positive 
feedback effects between warming and rapid release of methane, a 
much more powerful greenhouse gas than C02 , are still not fully 
explored, for example. 
The only way that surprises of this type could be avoided would 
be to prevent the further accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere altogether. Yet present indications are that such a 
strategy would require reduction of, for example, C02 emissions 
to something like 20% of their present level, something that would 
be prohibitively costly to world development at any time in the 
near future. The present negotiations regarding "stabilization" of 
emissions at their present levels, or modest reductions like 20%, 
are aimed only at slowing the growth of greenhouse phenomena so 
as to buy more time for corrective action at some distant time in 
the future, such as the early part of the 22nd century. But the 
effectiveness of such a strategy of postponement is predicated on 
the absence of any surprises of the sort suggested above. There 
is actually no truly long-term strategy even under discussion that 
would truly "stabilize" the slowly changing composition of the at-
mosphere. 
Fortunately, surprises can be both positive and negative in their 
potential ramifications. Examples of positive surprises are serendip-
itous scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs such as 
the discovery of recombinant DNA techniques and the resultant de-
velopment of biotechnology, or the rapid evaporation of the military 
confrontation of the superpowers in the Cold War. Such events can 
present unexpected opportunities for development, and contingency 
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planning must be as much concerned with positioning ourselves to 
exploit new opportunities as to deal with unpleasant surprises. 
The importance of surprise as an integral part of IIASA mod-
eling was first introduced into IIASA research in connection with 
the "Sustainable Development of the Biosphere Program" largely 
under the influence of Holling, who was Director at the time that 
the program was initiated. A number of efforts were made to de-
velop various "surprise" scenarios for the evolution of world society 
and to assess their implications for policy (Svedin and Aniansson, 
1986). But I think it fair to say that relatively little progress has 
been made in developing a systematic approach to the exploration 
of possible surprises and developing a methodology for incorporat-
ing them into planning. One of the difficulties is that there are so 
many possibilities, any one of which has too low a probability to 
warrant much effort in the way of contingency planning. Still there 
is a need for a more coherent and sustained effort to invent possible 
mechanisms for surprises in an area like global climate change, then 
launch an effort involving both theory and field observations aimed 
at ruling them out as possibilities, and a parallel effort to invent 
possible strategies for dealing with them if only for the purpose of 
estimating the costs of avoiding or mitigating them. 
Environmental Priorities 
The initial response to the identification of environmental prob-
lems in the industrial countries, especially the United States, was 
to deal with them one by one, characterizing the problem, and then 
to design a response without much consideration of the collateral 
consequences of this response, including its costs to the economy. 
This was quite reasonable as long as the total number of problems 
was small, and the response to any one problem could be consid-
ered as a minor perturbation of the existing sociotechnical system. 
Problems were non-interacting and could be considered as indepen-
dent of each other to a good approximation. As long as response 
costs were small, the response did not have to be very efficient or 
cost-effective. Furthermore, there was a tendency to think in terms 
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of the particular medium in which a pollution problem first mani-
fested itself, and solutions which merely moved the pollution to a 
different medium were often accepted uncritically. 
However, as the number of problems identified has proliferated, 
both the assumption of independence and the neglect of inter-
medium transfers became less acceptable. In addition it became 
necessary to consider not only the cumulative effect of environmen-
tal threats - each minor by itself - but also the possible synergistic 
interactions among threats. On the response side, the cumulative 
economic costs of large numbers of relatively inexpensive regula-
tions also came to be of concern. 
An important consequence of the cumulative costs was that it 
became necessary to consider the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of 
alternative responses, not just the effectiveness. A second conse-
quence was that it became increasingly impractical to deal with 
all problems at once; it became necessary to develop some scheme 
for ranking problems in terms of their effect on people, usually ac-
cording to some combination of the number of people potentially 
affected and the levels of health or other damage experienced by 
those affected. If this were not done explicitly, it was done implic-
itly simply through neglect of all but the squeakiest wheels, devot-
ing the most attention to the most publicized problems with little 
scientific analysis or assessment of their real impacts on people. 
One recent manifestation of a greater political interest in priori-
ties has been the recent popularity of market-based mechanisms for 
environmental protection. Advocated by economists for nearly 30 
years, such ideas have received little serious attention by politicians 
or administrators until recently, when market-like provisions were 
included in the 1990 amendments to the US Clean Air Act. The 
principal argument in favor of such provisions has been that they 
lead to devolution of decisions to numerous individual private sec-
tor actors where market forces lead to the automatic concentration 
of environmental improvement efforts on those sites and activities 
where the greatest environmental benefit per unit of expenditure 
can be achieved. Thus markets provide semi-automatic priority-
setting mechanisms which are believed to be more objective than 
attempts to regulate thousands of individual polluters. My point 
46 Harvey Brooks 
here is not to advocate market mechanisms as a panacea, but merely 
to relate their suddenly emerging political popularity to the emerg-
ing pressures for priority setting in the interest of greater cost-
effectiveness of environmental controls as their number inevitably 
proliferates (Stavins, 1991; Hahn and Stavins, 1991 ). 
This effort to set priorities among environmental problems ac-
cording to the magnitude of their effects on people and to con-
sider cost-effectiveness of regulations has encountered considerable 
resistance. Indeed many people in the industrialized countries re-
sist the very notion of priorities, believing that all environmental 
degradation is bad and should not be accepted by society, once its 
existence is known or even suspected. Polluting the environment 
should be prohibited, and cost should not be a legitimate consider-
ation. Indeed, the implicit attitude toward pollution was similar to 
that toward disease. Any action to cure the problem that provided 
some benefit was justified irrespective of its benefit-cost ratio. Just 
as the cure for disease was to be paid for by third parties through 
insurance, a good fraction of the public was led to believe that the 
cost of environmental clean-up would be paid for by business, not 
fully recognizing that most of the costs would eventually be passed 
through to consumers since they were imposed on all producers and 
thereby removed from competition in the marketplace. 
Within the last few years the EPA and other agencies in the 
USA have begun systematic efforts to rank environmental and 
health and safety threats according to the harm they do to peo-
ple or ecosystems, including the number of people affected. This 
has revealed that there are wide disparities among expenditures on 
mitigating environmental problems and the ranking of these prob-
lems according to the severity of their effects on people as assessed 
by experts. The reasons for these differences are complex. Some 
arise from ignorance, but many arise from different implicit value 
judgments of experts and laymen. One of the most dramatic exam-
ples of this is the relative ranking of the dangers of nuclear power 
by laymen and experts. More generally, laymen tend to attach 
much greater relative weight to improbable catastrophic or dra-
matic events as compared with more probable statistical events, 
but this is not the only difference. 
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The effort to rank environmental threats in relation to world 
environment and development policy has recently been taken up 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 1992). It argues that local prob-
lems affecting very large numbers of people - such as unavailability 
of uncontaminated drinking water, lack of sanitation, indoor air 
pollution from cooking fires, and atmospheric particulate loading 
or lead contamination - are much more serious than things that 
are absorbing a lot more world resources and political attention 
such as greenhouse warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid 
rain, photochemical smog, or hazardous chemical waste sites. Of 
course, these threats affect different groups of people, and it could 
be argued that environmental amenities are like goods for private 
consumption: rich countries can afford more of them and more ex-
pensive ones than poor countries. Indeed, that is the way much of 
the Third World looks upon environmental discussions. 
The international debate over what constitutes equitable shar-
ing of responsibility for the mitigation of greenhouse warming ap-
pears to have reached an impasse in part because the problem is 
being negotiated among nations sensitive to issues of sovereignty. 
An aspect of this negotiation that needs greater attention is the 
idea of optimizing the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions on a global basis, i.e., securing the largest possible GHG 
emission reduction worldwide per unit of world expenditure. From 
this perspective negotiating GHG reduction targets on a country 
by country basis may be regarded as a wasteful use of the total re-
sources available for this purpose. There are several reasons for this. 
First, the advanced countries already produce less C02 emissions 
per unit of GDP than the less advanced ones, and for this reason 
the marginal cost of additional reductions is likely to be higher in 
the advanced countries than in the LDCs. It thus may be more ef-
ficient in many instances to shift investments that would have been 
made in GHG reduction in an advanced country to an LDC where 
the same amount of money would generate much more "bang for 
the buck". The argument for this is further strengthened when one 
considers that many polluting and resource consuming activities 
are growing faster in LDCs than in advanced countries, even with 
present rates of growth in LDCs which are less than desirable if the 
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rich-poor gap is ever to be narrowed. For example, electric power 
production in LDCs is growing on average two to three times as 
rapidly as in developed counties, a situation further exacerbated 
by the fact that electricity generation and distribution is generally 
heavily subsidized and therefore underpriced to the consumer in 
LDCs (World Bank, 1992). 
All this means that LDCs have more opportunity to adopt the 
most advanced, energy efficient and low emission technology on 
both the supply and demand sides. Thus, if a utility in a developed 
country could demonstrate that the money it would have invested 
in reducing its GHG emissions could buy more GHG reduction in 
a developing country by transfer of technology to and financing of 
the construction of the most modern equipment in that developing 
country, it should have the option of choosing that alternative and 
being "forgiven" by its own government for a certain amount of 
its own GHG emissions. This would work especially well if the 
host developed country had a carbon tax on which its utility could 
receive a credit for the investment it made in a developing country. 
In this way there could be an efficiency rationale for the transfer 
of capital and technology to LDCs which would not depend either 
on the altruism of firms or governments in the developed countries 
or on coercion. In effect developed countries could reduce their 
GHG emissions less than required by treaty targets in exchange 
for a greater contribution to GHG emission reduction in a rapidly 
growing LDC. This is a complex idea that would have to be worked 
out in much more detail than that which I have sketched here, 
but it illustrates a possible way of unlocking the political gridlock 
between North and South in present negotiations by restructuring 
the self-interest of private entities in the North. This kind of global 
optimization might be something in which it would be especially 
appropriate for IIASA to specialize. 
Time Discounting and Sustainable 
Development 
The question of priorities cannot be separated from the question 
of time discounting because, in estimating the costs and benefits 
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of various proposed policies, the benefits are realized only after 
some time has elapsed since the costs were incurred. In partic-
ular, the benefits of investment in clean drinking water and san-
itation are realized quite soon, whereas the benefits of actions to 
slow down global warming may not be fully realized for generations. 
In such circumstances, the conventional way of comparing benefits 
and costs at different times is to use time discounting, reducing all 
benefits and costs to "discounted present value" at a given time 
by applying a single assumed "social discount rate". Quite apart 
from choosing the correct discount rate, which involves many im-
plicit value judgments, the application of discounting to very long 
term problems such as global warming or stratospheric ozone de-
pletion assigns a weight to problems which span generations which 
makes the discounted present value of the benefits of their mitiga-
tion negligibly small. Thus, as has been pointed out by Rothenberg 
(1992), traditional benefit-cost analysis with a single discount rate 
through time could never be used to justify major action now to 
forestall global warming or many other long-term problems because, 
with weights declining exponentially with distance into the future, 
shorter term costs would always dominate the equation under any 
reasonable assumptions. Only if the future impact were absolutely 
irreversible would such effects be even worthy of consideration to-
day, but, in view of the unpredictability of advances in science and 
technology in such a long period, such absolute irreversibility could 
not be assumed. Thus, in practice, the use of social discounting 
seems to be simply a prescription for present inaction in dealing 
with any sufficiently long-term problem. Yet this is a conclusion 
that seems to violate common sense intuition. 
The difficulty is compounded by the huge scientific uncertainty 
which attends the estimation of benefits so far in the future, es-
pecially if they span more than a single generation. One way of 
estimating the benefit might be to estimate the cost of mitigating 
the damage either by progressive preventive actions (e.g., gradually 
reducing emissions through conversion to non-fossil energy sources) 
or by adaptive measures (e.g., building sea walls to ward off flooding 
of low-lying areas, or developing and deploying a method of pro-
ducing food in closed climate-insensitive environments). But both 
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scientific and social uncertainties this far into the future would be 
so great that such estimates would be virtually worthless, not to 
mention all sorts of surprises, unpleasant and pleasant, likely to 
appear along the way. Such considerations might be used to argue 
for the universal superiority of adaptation over prevention because 
the cost of adaptation tends to be incurred much closer to the time 
when the damage is imminent and therefore suffers less from the 
weighting problem described above. Taking this position might in-
volve the argument that, with the proliferation of new science and 
technology, much of it unpredictable, the estimated future costs of 
adaptation are much more likely to decrease than to increase over 
long periods of time. Of course, all sorts of value judgments are 
implicit in such a decision. 
In dealing with this dilemma, Rothenberg suggests what 
amounts to an incremental approach in which the unit of analy-
sis is a single generation and certain assumptions are made about 
intergenerational transactions only at the boundaries between suc-
cessive generations. It is impossible to do justice to Rothenberg's 
very sophisticated analysis in this summary. I will only say that he 
proposes that the use of time discounting be restricted to a single 
generation at a time and that beyond the present generation the 
discount be thought of as a very slowly decreasing step function so 
that weights applied to costs and benefits beyond the present gen-
eration decline only very slowly. The essential normative feature 
of his proposal is that each generation should pass on to the next 
generation at least the same capacity to create welfare as it inher-
ited from the previous generation. In this respect, the philosophy 
is very similar to that of Solow. I believe that an approach along 
the lines suggested by Rothenberg could be thought of as doing the 
same for a quasi-normative theory of intergenerational equity as 
John Rawls tried to do for intragenerational equity in his Theory 
of Justice (Rawls, 1971; Bell, 1972). 
Solow (1991) also points out that there is an inherent compe-
tition between equity among existing people on earth and inter-
generational equity. For example, by investing heavily today to 
forestall catastrophic greenhouse warming by the end of the 21st 
century, are we shortchanging today's poor for the benefit of unborn 
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future generations? Also, to what extent can helping the poor to-
day be regarded as an investment in "social capital" to facilitate a 
greater social capacity for "coordinated action" to deal with prob-
lems as they appear in the future? This also relates directly to 
what was said earlier about priorities for dealing with environmen-
tal and health problems that affect the largest number of people in 
the present. 
New and Emerging Technologies 
As far as the impact of technologies that need to be assessed for 
"soundness" is concerned, old technologies in long use are quite 
often more likely to present problems than new and emerging tech-
nologies (although much of the rhetoric surrounding global environ-
mental problems implicitly ascribes them to technical progress). In 
many cases these new technologies may be environmentally less 
stressful than older technologies provided that they are appropri-
ately deployed with appropriate social support systems. Since they 
are "emerging" by definition, so that large sunk costs have not yet 
been incurred, there is more opportunity to adapt the implementa-
tion of the technology and its supporting systems and institutions 
to avoid undesirable impacts. This is one potential advantage in 
principle available to developing countries, which need not be con-
demned to repeat all the costly environmental errors of the devel-
oped countries, since they are in a position to adopt the newer, less 
polluting technologies, which are not necessarily more expensive 
than the old ones. 
Furthermore, one of the most important factors in technological 
impact is its scale of application. Many of the most serious adverse 
impacts of technology, both environmental and social, are related 
to scale of use, and one of the primary functions of technology 
assessment should be to estimate in advance the limits on scale 
of use that are compatible with sustainability, and to modify the 
subsequent evolution of the technology so as to moderate the growth 
of its impact with scale of use (Brooks, 1986). Two prime examples 
of this are automobile emissions and the use of chemical pesticides. 
A technology which is perfectly sound when used on a small scale 
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or for a limited period of time until superior technologies become 
available may be unsound and unsustainable if used on a sufficiently 
large scale or over a sufficiently long period of time. In addition, 
a technology which is sound in one location may be unsound in 
another. One of the difficulties faced by developing countries such 
as China and India is that the scale of use of some technologies 
now being used in some developed countries, but being phased out, 
cannot possibly be accommodated sustainably on the same scale 
relative to population in the more populous developing countries -
chemical pesticides and personal automotive transportation being 
two examples. 
Application of the Concept of 
Sustainability to Biodiversity 
As an example of one attempt to operationalize the concept of 
sustainability, we will take the issue of biodiversity. This is of par-
ticular interest because its loss seems absolutely irreversible in a 
way that applies to few other environmental changes that can be 
in principle reversed, albeit at a prohibitive, though finite, cost. 
"What exactly constitutes biodiversity?" and what are the 
"grounds on which species and habitats should be protected, sus-
tainably managed or re-created"? (Smith et al., 1991). There is 
no authoritative forum in which this can be discussed. Timothy 
O'Riordan (1991) identifies four positions: 
• Absolutist: 
"any further species loss is a crime against creation." 
• Ecologist: 
"endangered species and habitats should be protected." 
• Pragmatist: 
"some crude cost-benefit analysis at each stage of [prospective] 
further loss." 
• Gaianist: 
"earth is a creative force that will eventually establish its own 
equilibrium of species mix, within which humans may become 
marginal." 
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Generalized pleas for the preservation of biodiversity are not 
helpful; there must be some priorities. All species are not equally 
valuable from the standpoint of possible future human benefit, but 
we have too little information on which to base choices. Each of 
the positions listed above constitutes a guideline for an implicit 
set of criteria for the preservation of biodiversity. The absolutist's 
position implies that the preservation of species should take prece-
dence over every other consideration regardless of the impact on 
the present generation of human beings. This assumes that, in 
the absence of any reasonable basis for choice, we must preserve 
everything we can - an essentially infeasible prescription, in effect 
dictated by our massive ignorance of the potential resources of the 
biosphere. 
The ecologist's position departs from the absolutist's position 
by trying to establish the danger of loss of a particular species as 
a criterion, but it makes no clear distinction in principle on the 
basis of potential usefulness to man or evolutionary position (such 
as priority of mammals over insects or insects over bacteria). Fur-
thermore, it provides little guidance on how to deal with the high 
percentage of species that have never been identified or described . 
The best we can do is to preserve certain unique habitats known to 
be unusually rich in species or to harbor unique species. 
The pragmatist's position bases priorities on usefuless to man, 
but in practice is necessarily opportunist, latching onto wild strains 
known to be related to domesticated crops. 
The Gaianist 's position is essentially fatalistic, implying that 
humans are not wise enough to decide; hence we should take no ac-
tion except with the highest degree of certainty of its consequences, 
relying on the self-healing character of ecosystems. At its worst it 
could be a prescription for full steam ahead, relying on the self-
healing wisdom of nature as an article of faith. 
As the market for cultivated food and fiber crops expands, it 
becomes more important to maintain a larger genetic pool from 
which new traits can be selected as vulnerabilities of existing culti-
vars appear. There are several means of preserving gene pools: 
• In localized natural ecosystems. 
• In artificial ecosystems (e.g., nurseries). 
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• As seed, pollen, tissue or cell cultures, isolated from natural 
habitats, but from which desired organisms can be regenerated. 
• Use of new biotechnology techniques to create, select, and 
preserve new genotypes not found in nature with desired 
properties. 
Each of these modes can be equally effective if carried out wisely 
(National Research Council, 1991 ). However, it is important to pre-
serve some genetic pools in situ in order that their genetic informa-
tion can co-evolve with that of potentially threatening pathogens 
and pests in nature. The Nigel Smith et al. article gives many ex-
amples of resistant gene pools available from wild species in tropical 
forests that have been or can be used as countermeasures against 
pathogens and pests to which cultivated monocultures have become 
vulnerable (Smith et al., 1991 ). Even this may be somewhat lim-
ited by the fact that crops often become commercially important 
in areas or environments far from the area or environment of origin 
where the variety was first domesticated from the wild. 
Perhaps the most important policy action that can be taken 
with respect to biodiversity is to accelerate the rate at which the 
species content of relatively unexplored tropical ecosystems is as-
sessed, with particular emphasis on their potential economic value. 
This is an example of the great importance of systematic knowl-
edge as a prerequisite for policy action in the future. The type of 
knowledge needed is not necessarily at the frontiers of modern sci-
ence, but may be rather routine and "boring" in the usual canons 
of research (Brooks, 1982b ). 
Conclusion 
As we have indicated, sustainable development is a simple and pow-
erful idea, which is nevertheless extremely difficult to apply unam-
biguously in concrete development decisions. Like many powerful 
ideas it has become a "buzzword" in the development literature, 
and is used by many different groups to express a wide diversity 
of value judgments, frequently disguised in seemingly value-neutral 
language, using the authority of science to enhance its political 
legitimacy. 
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One of its difficulties arises from the fact that, in its broadest 
sense, it applies to many different policy areas usually thought of 
separately and appealing to different constituencies. It involves 
technical, economic, social, environmental, and cultural factors 
which interact with each other in complex, and often unpredictable 
and surprising ways. Thus, it is a highly multi-disciplinary concept 
which it is very hard for any one expert analyst or policy maker 
to encompass in his or her thinking. Although intergenerational 
equity is central in the implementation of the concept of sustain-
ability, it does not follow from this that achieving it is a zero-sum 
game between ourselves and our descendants. The reason it is not a 
zero-sum game is that it combines resources and environmental as-
similative capacity which are finite with knowledge and human ca-
pacities which are enhanced rather than depleted by being used for 
human benefit. Knowledge wisely added to resources is the source 
of new wealth and human capacity, both individual and collective, 
which opens up new options and possibilities for the future, making 
economic and social growth potentially more and more compatible 
with sustainability as knowledge and its diffusion increase. Growth 
is in principle compatible with the finiteness of physical resources 
because of the possibility of steady and even accelerating "demate-
rialization" of GNP, in which growth of the knowledge-embodiment 
of resources substitutes for the volume of resources including the 
capacity of the environment to absorb residuals. However, we are 
only at the very earliest stages in such an evolution. Today, progress 
in "dematerialization", even in the most advanced economies, lags 
on average behind economic growth, and therefore must be accel-
erated, implying a diversion of a greater fraction of consumption to 
investment in research and development, human resource develop-
ment, and the creation of new infrastructure. It is still too early to 
say how the race between environmental and resource deterioration 
and the growing human capacity for wise "coordinated action" will 
come out in the long run. In addition, of course, there are many 
more "intangible" resources such as access to pristine nature which 
are inherently finite but may be important for sustaining the human 
spirit. The larger the human population, the more these intangibles 
have to be substituted by synthetic images and artifacts, sharply 
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circumscribing the realization of many values the present generation 
holds dear. 
Summary 
Sustainable development is an apparently simple and powerful con-
cept, which is nevertheless extremely difficult to apply unambigu-
ously to concrete development strategies and technology choices in a 
way that commands consensus among groups from widely different 
cultures and economic circumstances. This chapter sketches a def-
inition of sustainability that is less dependent on value judgments, 
likely to be widely divergent, but accommodates a wide range of 
technology choices and development scenarios. It attempts to sep-
arate sustainability as a precondition for human survival in a ma-
terial and social feasibility sense from desirability in a cultural or 
ethical sense, tied to contemporary values. 
Sustainability as used here sets limits on, but does not fully 
define, viable policies in many separate areas. It involves tech-
nical, economic, social, environmental, demographic, and cultural 
factors which may interact with each other in complex and some-
times unexpected or counterintuitive ways. Thus it is a highly 
multi-disciplinary concept. 
Although intergenerational equity is central to the implemen-
tation of the concept of sustainability, and sometimes comes into 
conflict with intragenerational equity, it does not follow that the 
search for sustainability need be a zero-sum game between our-
selves and our descendents. This is so because it uses resources and 
environmental assimilative capacities which are limited in combi-
nation with knowledge and human capacities that can actually be 
enhanced by being shared and used for human benefit. Knowl-
edge wisely imposed on material resources is the principal source 
of wealth and new human capabilities, both individual and col-
lective, and this opens up new options for the future, making 
economic and social welfare growth potentially compatible with 
sustainability within wide limits of parameters. As long as knowl-
edge embodied in material resources can be made to result in faster 
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"dematerialization" of GNP than overall growth of GNP, sustain-
able growth is theoretically possible. 
Today we are only in the early stages of such dematerialization, 
and only in the advanced parts of the world, and it would have 
to be greatly accelerated by the application of new knowledge be-
fore sustainable growth could become a reality. The acceleration 
and consequent rate of investment in new technology required will 
depend strongly upon the size and growth of population. 
Also discussed is the need for much sharper priorities in envi-
ronmental protection and improvement, governed by a more objec-
tive assessment of actual effects on people and their capacities, and 
more focus is suggested in areas where environmental improvement 
and economic and social development are synergistic rather than 
in competition. There are many more such areas than is generally 
thought, especially in the Third World. 
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PART II 
Present Trends Need Cause 
Only Minor Concern 

CHAPTER 2 
Toward Dematerialization 
and Decarbonization 
Tokio Kanoh 
Introduction 
Modern industrialized countries have achieved the prosperity they 
enjoy today by virtue of technological innovation, a market econ-
omy, and democracy. This prosperity has brought about extended 
longevity, increased incomes, sh~rter working hours, enhanced wel-
fare, broader access to information, and everything that appears to 
be humankind's dreams come true one after another. 
Today, people in developed countries are enjoying an unprece-
dented affiuence, an affiuence powered by energy derived mainly 
(80%) from hydrocarbons. How far advanced will this civilization 
and society become? Should it ever come to a halt, or even collapse, 
what will have gone wrong? 
Amid this affiuence of unprecedented proportions some phe-
nomena have emerged that require attention: 
1. Growing volumes of waste from both industry and households 
make it increasingly difficult for waste-disposal facilities to keep 
up. 
• Problems have already surfaced in New York City and 
Tokyo, exacerbated by the continued advance of office auto-
mation, a sharp increase in non-flammable, non-recyclable, 
disposable containers, and a tendency for consumers to use 
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durable goods as if they were consumables due to frequent 
model changes. 
2. Urban pollution and traffic accidents are increasing. 
• There are 10,000 people killed in traffic accidents annually 
in Japan and more than 100,000 across the world. 
3. Damage is being caused by acid rain. 
• The depletion of forests and contamination of lakes and 
swamps are advancing noticeably in Europe and North 
America. 
4. Global warming is causing concern. 
• Concern is expressed about the effects of extraordinary cli-
matic conditions on food production and ecology, rising sea 
levels eroding land area by immersion, etc. 
5. There is increased disparity between North and South. 
• Industrialized countries together account for 4/5 of the 
global energy consumption while representing only 1/4 of 
the world's total population. 
6. Social ills are spreading. 
• Drugs, crimes, AIDS, and homelessness are spreading in 
developed countries. 
All these phenomena should serve as a warning against a self-
destructive process set off by a civilization of disposables, charac-
terized by mass production, mass consumption, and mass waste, re-
sulting in depleted resources, environmental destruction, and moral 
corruption. Also, we should be reminded that it is a historical fact 
that the glorious civilizations of the past, whether Mesopotamian, 
Greek, or Roman, were all destroyed from within, not by an outside 
enemy. 
From the above perspective, there are three tasks that we face 
in the field of energy: 
1. To examine the substance of "affiuence". 
• "Dematerialization" of affiuence. 
2. To cut off the chain linking energy to GNP. 
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• "Decoupling" of energy from GNP. 
3. To maximize utilization of non-hydrocarbon natural resources 
and nuclear power generation as energy sources. 
• "Decarbonization" of energy. 
"Dematerialization" of Affluence 
From "material" to "event"; from "event" to "mind" 
A sense of satisfaction develops in three stages: "having", "doing", 
and "being", which can also be interpreted as "material", "event", 
and "mind", respectively. The first stage relates typically to the 
desire to own durable consumer goods of one kind or another. In 
the developing stage of an economy, the purchase of automobiles, 
large-size household electrical appliances, and consumer electronics 
is a dream-come-true to fulfill people's sense of satisfaction. It 
is a stage where satisfaction lies in the ownership of hard-earned , 
precious items of durable goods. 
In the second stage, personal ownership of durable items is not 
enough to provide satisfaction. People become more selective and 
personalized and seek "events" in which their selections are vali-
dated in public, as reflected in frequent model changes in durable 
goods, motor shows, Formula One Grand Prix races, home videos, 
communication antenna television (CATV), and ubiquitous expo-
sitions with ambiguous themes. 
The third stage involves creativity, peace of mind, comfort, sol-
idarity, and other such dematerialized areas of satisfaction. Take 
automobiles, for example. In the first stage, people want to own a 
car, but the kind does not matter much. The second stage finds 
consumers enjoying the speeds and distances they drive in a model 
of their choice. According to a public opinion poll regarding lifestyle 
and energy conducted by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office in 
July 1991, the personal ownership rate of automobiles has reached 
82%, and, considering the broad range of choices offered in terms 
of types, models, colors, and services, Japanese consumers are way 
past the second stage. 
The third stage finds users: 
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• Taking good care of their cars, driving safely, and developing a 
personal attachment to their own cars. 
• Enjoying automotive benefits to the fullest extent with re-
straints guarding against the adverse effects on health of ex-
cessive reliance on vehicles. 
Another example is air conditioners. At one time it was a dream 
appliance for every household. The same government survey shows 
that 66% of households are equipped with air conditioners. The 
number of units sold exceeds that of the number of households, 
which means more than one air conditioning unit for some house-
holds, possibly one for each room or individual use, ushering in a 
new era of "individualized use of electric power". 
The first stage, in this case, is to be equipped with air condi-
tioning and the second stage is to see it function properly to make 
summer cool and winter warm. The third stage, then, is to cre-
ate a living environment in which natural forces are utilized to a 
maximum extent, with due attention paid to human health. In this 
stage, utilization of solar energy becomes popular, like passive solar 
use in houses which use deciduous trees as shades against the sun 
in summer and which take in sunlight and heat in winter as the 
trees shed their leaves. It also includes better insulation to protect 
against outside heat changes. 
Excessive heating or cooling over and above outside tempera-
tures is not good for health. The guidelines of 28 °C for summertime 
cooling and 20 °C heating in winter, originally set for the purpose 
of energy conservation, are taken to indicate the most comfortable 
room temperatures. In the above-cited government opinion survey, 
61 % of the pollees said that cooling in offices was too strong. 
Proposals 
• Promote "eco-fashion". In regions of high temperatures and 
high humidity in summertime, airy light clothes should be made 
standard and permitted on formal occasions. We can learn from 
Batik of Indonesia and Baron Tagalog of the Philippines in this 
respect. It would be more healthy and fashionable to be lightly 
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clad in summer with additional clothing in winter. It also helps 
conserve energy and, for that matter, the global environment. 
• Prolong the use of durable goods. Too-frequent model changes 
should be reconsidered, while repair parts inventory and service 
systems are set up to meet the needs of any model. 
• Build attractive infrastructure be/ ore indulging the convenience 
of private cars. Instead of restricting the use of private cars or 
calling for restraint, urban and inter-city mass transit systems 
and city streets should be reconsidered to make them attractive 
enough for citizens to choose public transportation, walking, 
and bicycling over individual cars for commuting and traveling. 
• Improve school education. Pupils must be taught in school to 
appreciate the values of things , as well as of energy, resources , 
and the environment, and to take good care of them. Such a 
subject should be made a required subject for entrance exam-
inations and drivers' tests. In the same public opinion survey 
by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, 82% agreed that the 
importance of energy should be taught in school. 
Recycling 
The two oil crises prompted industries to vigorously advance waste 
heat recovery or recycling. Examples of their successful efforts in-
clude coke dry quench (CDQ) for the blast furnace in iron-making 
and the heat-recovery boiler installation in the chemical industry. 
In the paper and pulp industry, utilization of black liquor, a waste 
product from the pulp-making process, and recycling of used paper 
are advanced. 
However, the recycling of low-grade waste heat recovered from 
urban and industrial facilities is not yet fully developed, due partly 
to a decline in energy prices. In this respect, it is informative to 
discuss the district heating and cooling system using a heat pump 
which began operating in Japan recently. The system recovers un-
used waste heat and utilizes it as a power source for localized heat-
ing and cooling. Table 2.1 lists some of the district heating and 
cooling systems using urban and industrial waste heat introduced 
by the Tokyo Electric Power Company. 
Table 2.1. Examples of district heating and cooling systems using waste heat. 
Location 
Hikarigaoka 
Shinagawa Yashio 
Hibiya 
Ginza 2, 3 chome 
Shibaura 4 chome 
Shinkawa 
Ginza 5, 6 chome 
Kanda Surugadai 
Hakozaki 
Makuhari Hi-tech 
business 
U tsunomiya Chuo 
Hitachi 
Area (ha) Heat source Supplier 
185 Garbage incineration Tokyo Heat Supply Company 
41 Garbage incineration Tokyo Heat Supply Company 
5 Electric power substation Tokyo Heat Energy Company 
3 Electric power substation Toden Real Estate Management Company 
20 Electric power substation Toden Real Estate Management Company 
6 Electric power substation Toden Real Estate Management Company 
7 Public bath house Toden Real Estate Management Company 
11 Electric power substation Toden Real Estate Management Company 
23 River water Tokyo Electric Power Company 
49 
11 
13 
Sewage plant 
Electric power substation 
Manufacturing plant 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Hitachi Thermal Energy Company 
Source: Nikkei Shimbun (1991). 
Start-up date 
April 1983 
April 1983 
October 1987 
April 1984 
June 1987 
April 1988 
August 1987 
April 1988 
April 1989 
August 1991 
February 1991 
December 1989 
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Figure 2.1 is a schematic description of one such system which 
utilizes discharged water from the Hanamigawa Sewage Plant. Tak-
ing advantage of discharged water temperatures which are around 
15 °C in winter and about 7 °C less than outdoor temperatures in 
summer, the system supplies heat for a high-tech business district 
encompassing some 50 ha. It is hoped that these types of systems 
will become more common as an integral part of the social system. 
Proposals 
• Encourage recycling of returnable containers and aluminum 
cans. Introduce a deposit system in which the retrieval costs 
of containers are added in advance to product prices to be re-
funded when they are turned in. 
• Promote recycling of urban and industrial waste heat and incor-
porate cascading utilization of heat into a social system. Offer 
favored access to urban facilities and financial and tax credits 
as incentives. 
• Facilitate utilization of renewable natural energies. Strengthen 
research, development, and demonstration to reduce costs. 
• Instead of "once through" or one use only of uranium as nuclear 
fuel, promote "nuclear fuel recycling" by reprocessing spent fuel. 
Structural changes in industry for resource conservation 
The third aspect of dematerialization is structural change in 
industry. With the oil crises of the 1970s as a turning point, indus-
trial countries started striving to change the traditional resource-
consuming, energy-oriented structure of their economy and soci-
ety. This trend was given further impetus by the revolutionary 
progress made in the fields of electronics/computers and optical 
fibers/ digital communications. 
Figure 2.2 shows structural changes as reflected in the demand 
patterns of large-volume power consumers ("volume power con-
sumers" refers to industrial users contracted for 500kW or more 
of electric power for industrial use, including private power gener-
ation and consumption, but not for residential or commercial use). 
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Hanamigawa 
sewage plant 
Tokio Kanoh 
Heat-source water 
Water of 7°C - 92,000 Gcal per year 
Water of 47°C - 30,000 Gcal per year 
Water temperature: 
summer - outdoors 
minus 7°C 
winter - 15°C 
Outline 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Heat Supply Center at Makuhari 
Location: Chiba City, Nakase 1-2 chome, 
Hibino 1-2 chome (48.9 ha) 
Users : Techno-Garden, IBM, Tokyo Marine, 
JASCO, Hotel Spring Building 
Heat source: Waste heat from office buildings, 
discharged water from sewage plant 
Facilities: Water heat source heat pump 
Cold heat - 20,500 refrigeration tons 
Warm heat - 56,500 Meal per hour 
Figure 2.1. 
for Makuhari 
Company). 
District heating and cooling (DHC) system 
high-tech business district (Tokyo Electric Power 
Volume consumers used to be such raw-material-oriented, 
resource-consuming industries as steel-making, chemicals, alu-
minum refining, and cement up until the early 1970s. Starting 
in the latter half of the 1970s through the early 1980s, however, de-
mands in the steel-making, chemical, and cement industries slowed 
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Coal 
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Figure 2.2. Volume electric power demands by use (total for 
Japan: includes private power generation). Source: Electric In-
dustry Data Book 1992 (1992). Note: 'Public' includes railways, 
communications, water supply and sewage, heat supply, city gas 
supply, etc. Partly estimated by the author. 
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down and primary aluminum refining was totally withdrawn, as can 
be seen from the figure. 
On the other hand, less power-consuming sectors such as electri-
cal equipment (semiconductors, facsimile machines, color TV sets, 
VTRs, air conditioners, etc.), transport (mainly automotive vehi-
cles), and processing industries like food processing have been in-
creasing their demands conspicuously. Particularly noteworthy is 
the movement, as seen in the figure, of the "public sector", tenta-
tively compiled and so-named for the purpose of this analysis, which 
covers such services as railways, communications, water supply and 
sewage, heat supply, and city gas supply. Sharp rises in power de-
mand in this sector, namely, from 15 TWh in 1970 to 24 TWh in 
1980 and 35TWh in 1990, can be said to typically symbolize the 
tendency toward dematerialization. 
Proposal 
• The market price mechanism must be respected. A market econ-
omy optimizes the distribution of goods and flexibly adapts in-
dustrial structure to changes in the environment. It must be 
remembered that the rigidity of socialist bureaucracy led to the 
demise of the Soviet Union, once touted as a superpower. 
Separation of Energy from GNP 
Successful "decoupling" 
From the 1960s to the early 1970s, energy demand grew in tandem 
with GNP in terms of growth rates. Decoupling, an attempt to 
cut off this linkage between energy and GNP, was successfully ac-
complished by the development and implementation of energy con-
servation technology, by the reduction of unit energy consumption 
by practising total quality control (TQC), and making structural 
changes in industries to accommodate energy conservation. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show trends in GNP with energy, oil, and 
electricity demands in OECD countries and Japan, respectively, as 
expressed in indices with 1973 as 100. These figures demonstrate 
the following three points. 
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1. GNP and energy /oil demand have been successfully decoupled. 
• In Japan, for example, the GNP in 1990 was double that 
of 1973, whereas energy demand increased by only 26% 
over the same period as a result of the vigorous pursuit 
of energy conservation. The demand for oil still remains 
below the 1973 level. 
2. Electricity demand continues to rise steadily. 
• Electricity demand has been rising in a different way from 
energy as a whole, but in a similar manner to that of GNP. 
This is taken to reflect the fact that energy sources have 
shifted from oil and coal to electricity as processing-type 
industries such as semiconductors, robotics, facsimile ma-
chines, communication equipment, and cars became pre-
dominant on the industrial scene, and that the general ten-
dency for emphasis on conservation, information, software, 
and amenities is pushing up electricity demand. 
3. Prices have a significant effect. 
• Energy and oil demands are highly susceptible to price 
fluctuations. In Figure 2.4, during the first two periods 
of years shown by shading (sections A and B), prices went 
up, causing the demand to drop, whereas in a later period 
starting in 1986, as shown by shaded section C, when prices 
fell sharply, demand shot up. Otherwise, namely, when 
prices stabilized, demand started picking up gradually. 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show international comparisons of energy 
consumption per US $1,000 of GNP, and similarly of carbon dioxide 
emissions, respectively, for 1989. The figures demonstrate that both 
energy consumption and C02 emissions are highest in the USA and 
Canada, both having severe climatic changes and a large land area 
where energy self-sufficiency rates are high and costs are relatively 
low. 
In contrast, Japan is the lowest among major countries in both 
respects, with scarce resources and dense populations pushing up 
energy costs and leading to strict environmental standards. It 
should also be noted that the energy consumption rate of China 
is more than 10 times as high as that of Japan. 
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Proposals 
• A market price mechanism is powerful. Reflecting energy costs 
directly in product prices should promote energy conservation, 
fuel conversion on the demand side, and the development of 
alternative energies to replace oil. 
• Rising environmental standards are putting increasing pressure 
on industries. However, once they are endorsed by public con-
sensus, individual corporations are certain to do their best to 
meet them through whatever technological development and fa-
cility investment it may take. 
Promotion of energy conservation by the industrial sector 
In the preceding section it was stated that total energy demand 
has been successfully separated from GNP. Its impact, however, 
varies widely between sectors. Figure 2. 7 shows end-user energy 
demands over recent years in Japan, divided by sector. It is clear 
from this figure that the energy demand in the industrial sector 
remained constant at the 1973 level in 1990: this was only possible 
through all-out efforts to conserve energy on the part of individual 
businesses. 
On the other hand, the demand increased by 63% in the private 
sector covering private homes, commercial users, offices, and office 
buildings, and 72% in the transportation sector which is accounted 
for mainly by automotive fuels. This is in stark contrast with the 
industrial sector. In the private and transportation sectors, the de-
mand is expected to continue at relatively high rates, thus requiring 
appropriate measures to be taken . 
Proposals 
• A review of the existing insulation standards for housing with 
a view to taking measures to encourage better insulation. 
• Promote district heating and cooling systems which effectively 
utilize the unused energy of waste heat. 
• Expand mass transit systems. 
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• Enhance the cost efficiency of automotive fuels and improve 
traffic control systems. 
• Research, develop, and demonstrate alternative fuels for auto-
mobiles. 
• Develop a multi-purpose heat pump of the household heat recov-
ery type. 
Energy-conservation-oriented growth scenario 
In Figure 2.8, relations between per capita GNP (x axis) and per 
capita energy requirement (y axis) are plotted out for 20 countries 
(regions). Most of the countries fall in the range of scenario 1 as 
defined by: 
y = 0.25x ± 1 . 
There are two exceptions to this. One is the US/Canada. Due 
to their geographical characteristics and the availability of abun-
dant local resources, these two countries are positioned away from 
the standard scenario: they fit scenario 2 that applies to volume 
energy-consuming countries. The other exception is the former So-
viet Union. This is largely because the per capita GNP as expressed 
in dollars has nose-dived due to the sharp depreciation of the ruble 
in the exchange rate. 
Of the scenario 1 group countries, Sweden, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the UK are found along the line of scenario la, which 
means they are more energy consuming than the rest of the coun-
tries in that group, with Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, or the 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) collectively, "chasing" after 
them. 
In the same group of scenario 1, Germany, France, Japan, and 
Italy follow the less energy-consuming scenario 1 b, followed by 
Hong Kong. 
Japan's positions are overlaid as they have changed over the 
years since 1960 (the GNP is given in terms of US dollars as of 
1989). It shows Japan moving up the line of scenario lb from 1960 
until the first oil crisis, when it started swerving sharply to the 
right to change its course to energy-conservation-oriented scenario 
3 where energy demand does not increase as the GNP grows. 
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In terms of per capita GNP, Singapore today corresponds to 
the Japan of 20 years ago, Taiwan is at Japan's level of 25 years 
ago, and Korea is nearly equivalent to the Japan of 30 years ago. 
Hopefully these countries will benefit from the experiences Japan 
went through as it strived for energy conservation. It is also hoped 
that the other developing countries expected to join the NIEs soon, 
like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, will fol-
low not scenario la but 1 b, and eventually scenario 3, because 
this would help the growth of developing countries and advance 
the international competitiveness of their industries, contributing 
simultaneously to conservation of the global environment. 
Proposals 
• Set up a system for international cooperation to make energy 
conservation technologies successfully applied by developed coun-
tries available for sharing by developing countries as interna-
tional assets of the public domain. 
• Facilitate the transfer of energy conservation and environmental 
technologies to those former Soviet republics whose per capita 
GNPs are substantially low by objective standards by applying 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
• Encourage those countries with high energy requirements with 
respect to GNP to reduce their consumption by applying th e 
pledge-and-review formula. 
Decarbonization of Energy Sources 
Three regions holding the key to the successful reduction 
of C02 emissions 
Figure 2.9 shows C02 emissions from fossil fuels as related to popu-
lation sizes ( x axis) and per capita C02 emissions (y axis) by region 
(based on actual figures for 1989). It is obvious from the figure that 
the USA, the former Soviet Union, and China are the three largest 
contributors of C02 emissions, together they account for. 52% of the 
total C02 emissions worldwide. They are commonly characterized 
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as countries where large volumes of coal are produced, energy costs 
are low, and there is a lot of room left for improvement and further 
investment in energy conservation/environmental technologies and 
environmental protection. 
The developing countries are least conspicuous with respect to 
C02 emissions, with the exception of China. Their per capita GNP 
and per capita energy consumption are very small, while their popu-
lations are large, resulting in small per capita C02 emissions. How-
ever, they have tremendous potential for growth as their popula-
tions are still growing rapidly. The figure also shows an attempt 
to ascertain the extent of the impact these countries could possibly 
have under certain assumptions. 
The assumptions are: C02 emissions are frozen at present levels 
for all areas other than the four developing regions of Africa, Latin 
America, China, and "Other Asia" (Asia minus China, Japan, and 
Korea); the populations of these four regions grow 10%; and their 
per capita C02 emissions reach the level of a country immediately 
ahead of them on the chart, considering the parameters of popu-
lation and per capita C02 emissions. These assumptions might be 
realized within a decade. 
Then, due to the large sizes of their populations, the C02 emis-
sions of these four regions will jump, with China and "Other Asia" 
passing the USA and the former Soviet Union respectively. The 
resulting increase in the C02 emissions of these regions combined 
will raise the total C02 emissions in the world by 40%. If per capita 
C02 emissions in each of these four regions reach the present level 
of the C02 emissions of Korea, it will be enough to increase the 
worldwide total of C02 emissions by as much as 80%. 
What this means is not that the growth of developing countries 
is a threat to be contained, because, obviously, each country has its 
own right to development, but that any discussion on environmental 
issues would be meaningless without considering these factors in 
developing countries. 
To cope with C02 emissions, it is currently proposed to freeze 
and stabilize emissions at the present levels of industrial countries 
by 2000, and after 2000 to reduce them. However, this formula 
raises three basic questions. First, per capita C02 emissions vary 
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significantly between countries, being high above the world average 
in some and well below in others, and it is unfair to give them 
all the same starting point. The second question raised concerns 
inadequate consideration given to developing countries. 
The third question is the cost efficiency of investment to im-
prove C02 emissions. The cost performance of such investment 
varies greatly depending on whether it is made in a country with 
high per capita C02 emissions or in a country with a low emission 
level. If all regions in the world are considered equally open for in-
vestment, then investments flow selectively into the countries with 
high per capita C02 emissions. Thus, quite obviously, by letting 
them follow the principle of equalization of marginal production, 
their efficiency will be maximized to reduce C02 emissions in total. 
Efforts to control global C02 emissions should therefore focus on 
the USA, the former Soviet Union, and developing countries. 
Proposals 
• Instead of industrial countries agreeing to stabilize their C02 
emissions at the 1990 levels, a system for international cooper-
ation should be sought to promote cooperative programs to help 
countries with per capita C02 emissions high above the world's 
average to improve. 
• Countries with per capita C02 emissions well below the world's 
average should try to contain emissions at their present levels. 
• Promote the international transfer to developing countries of 
technologies for energy conservation, combustion control, and 
environmental protection. 
De-fossilization of fuels for electric power generation 
There is a marked shift toward electric power as an end-use energy 
form. It is a trend common to all countries, developed and devel-
oping, and is probably due to those attributes of electricity that 
make it a safe, hygienic, energy saving, easy-to-control, and effec-
tive (in data processing) source of power. What it means, then, is 
that while encouraging this shift to electricity, converting electric 
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power generation fuels from fossil to other, non-fossil fuel should 
immediately help to improve the environment. 
Figure 2.10 shows electricity generated by non-fossil fuels rela-
tive to C02 emissions for the electricity generated in seven indus-
trialized countries. Table 2.2 shows the split between hydro- and 
nuclear power. The figure raises three points. First, as a matter 
of course, there exists a reverse correlation between them (i.e., the 
more power generated by non-fossil fuels, the less C02 emissions 
there are). Among the seven countries, France and Canada show 
an outstanding performance. This is due to the fact that in France 
nuclear power accounts for 75% of the total power generation and 
hydro-power resources also abound: these combine to push up the 
percentage of power generation from non-fossil fuel to 87%. In 
Canada the figure for non-fossil fuel electricity is 74%, which is 
attributable to a high percentage of hydro-power generation, i.e., 
58%, reflecting Canada's plentiful hydro resources coupled with uti-
lization of their CANDU reactors for nuclear power generation. 
Secondly, similar percentages of electricity from non-fossil fuels 
do not necessarily mean similar levels of C02 emissions. This is 
because the latter depends largely on the types of fossil fuels in use, 
which varies from country to country. In the UK, the USA, and 
former West Germany, for example (all coal-producing countries) 
more than 50% of the total fuel used for power generation and over 
75% of fossil fuels are accounted for by coal, a source of higher C02 
emissions. Hence their positions above the trend line L. On the 
other hand, Italy and Japan, where coal forms less than 20% of the 
fossil fuels in use, are below the same trend line. 
Thirdly, the figure suggests the directions of policies for each 
country. In order to shift downward to the right along the trend 
line L, renewable natural energies should be fully utilized where 
such resources are available. In countries lacking in natural energy 
resources, peaceful utilization of nuclear power should be positively 
pursued. 
Moreover, there is a need to shift the trend line down from L 
to L'. There are two ways to do it. One is to replace coal with 
natural gas where coal is a predominant source among fossil fuels. 
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Table 2.2. Break-down of power generated by non-fossil fuels. 
Non-fossil fuel power (%) 
Country Hydro Nuclear Total 
France 12 75 87 
Canada 58 16 74 
Former West Germany 4 34 38 
Japan 11 26 37 
USA 9 19 28 
UK 1 23 24 
Italy 16 0 16 
This should reduce C02 and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from 
power generation by half and eliminate most sulfur oxides (SOx)· 
The second approach is to raise the efficiency of thermal power 
generation. Remarkable progress has been made in this respect, 
but there remain two problems. One is that the heat efficiency of 
steam turbines has peaked, even in the most modern power plant. 
The second problem is the low heat efficiency of old power plants, 
which still exist in large numbers in many countries. With respect 
to the latter problem, what is needed is the modernization of plants 
by encouraging investment and replacement of equipment. In the 
following the first point is discussed in some detail. 
To break through the barrier of heat efficiency, combined-cycle 
thermal power generation is necessary. In Japan, as shown in Figure 
2.11 and Table 2.3, heat efficiency increased substantially from 19% 
in 1951 to 38% in 1970, but for many years since then 39% appeared 
to be the limit. However, the barrier has been broken dramatically 
by the combined cycle, a combination of gas turbines and steam 
turbines. 
At the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Futtsu Thermal Power 
Plant, by applying such a system, a total heat efficiency of 43% has 
been recorded, with the temperature at the gas turbine entrance 
set at 1,100 °C. A further effort toward improvement is planned 
for Nos. 7 and 8 units (1.4 million kW each) soon to be built at 
the company's Yokohama Thermal Power Station by setting the 
temperature at 1,300 °C at the gas turbine entrance, aiming at a 
total heat efficiency of 48%. They are fueled by natural gas. 
Toward Dematerialization and Decarbonization 
54 
52 
50 
~ ~ 
>. g 48 
CP ;g 
'$ 
'; 46 
CP 
::r: 
44 
42 
Table 2.3. Pa.st records of heat ef-
ficiency at thermal plants (9 electric 
power generators). 
Year 
1951 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1988 
Efficiency (%) 
18.9 
31.7 
37.8 
38.1 
38.6 
A: past records (Futtsu Thermal Power Plant, etc.) 
B: present target 
C: advanced combined - cycle generation 
(planned for Nos. 7 and 8 
at Yokohama Thermal Power Station) 
D: future target (ceramics) 
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Temperatures at gas turbine entrance (°C) 
89 
Figure 2.11. Gas turbine entrance temperatures and heat effi-
ciency in a combined-cycle power generator. 
An increase from 39% to 48% in heat efficiency does not simply 
mean 9 percentage points of improvement. There is more to it. A 
9 percentage point increase from 39% translates into a 23% saving 
in fuel consumption, which in turn means a 23% reduction in C02 
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emissions. Indeed, the technology goes a long way to help both 
energy conservation and environmental protection. 
Proposals 
• Positively explore and develop natural energies such as hydro 
and geothermal wherever possible. 
For those developing countries where plentiful water re-
sources remain untapped, a system for international coop-
eration should be built to help develop such resources. 
• Countries without natural energy resources are urged to pursue 
safe and peaceful utilization of nuclear power for electric power 
generation, depending on their levels of technological maturity. 
To ensure it is peaceful utilization, international cooper-
ation should be confined to developing countries that are 
signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and open to full-scale international inspection by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear power 
should be provided within the framework of the IAEA 
and the World Association of Nuclear Power Operators 
(WANO), thus giving due consideration to safety. 
• With respect to the power generation which still remains fossil 
fueled, shifting from coal to natural gas in fuel structure should 
be encouraged and efforts toward improved heat efficiency by 
using a combined-cycle heat supply should be continued. 
Weaning from oil as an energy source for transportation 
Figure 2.12 shows end-use energy forms in OECD countries. After 
1973, fuel conversion from oil products to non-oil sources such as 
electricity has been accelerated in both the industrial and private 
fields. However, in the transportation sector, there has been no 
change in the share of oil products, which stands at 99% of all fuel 
types in this sector (mostly gasoline and diesel fuel oil, some jet 
fuel and heavy oil). Growing energy consumption in developing 
countries is mostly of oil for almost exclusively transportation. 
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Oil products have been the best power source for automobiles 
throughout the past 100 years, leaving no room at all for any other 
types of fuels to replace them. But the situation is changing dra-
matically. In view of the finite reserves of oil resources, enormous 
potential demand in developing countries, and its impact on the 
global environment, it is time to consider in all seriousness 'wean-
ing from dependency on oil' for transportation. 
Specifically, there are two actions required: improve public 
transportation systems and develop alternative fuels. 
Proposals 
• Mass transit systems in developing countries should be given 
priority for international assistance. 
As part of the international assistance for developing 
countries, priority should be given to the construction of 
mass-transit systems, with the emphasis on subways (for 
example, Singapore) and monorails for urban intra-city 
transportation, and long-distance railways for inter-city 
transportation. 
• Use a hybrid freight transport system. 
For long-distance freight transport systems in industrial 
countries, a hybrid system is recommended that combines 
freight cars that run short hauls within city limits and 
long-haul freight trains. 
• Operate a rapid (railway) transit system as an alternative to 
airlines and automobiles. 
In Japan, with the introduction and the convenient and 
reliable operation of the Shinkansen rapid railway services, 
medium-distance freight is being increasingly carried by 
rail instead of air. This shift in modes of freight carrying 
is now occurring in long-haul freight. 
• Research, develop, and demonstrate alternative fuels. 
Research into and development and demonstration of al-
ternative car fuels to gasoline and diesel oil should be ex-
pedited. 
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Candidate alternative energies include electricity, com-
pressed natural gas (CNG), and methanol. Solar cars re-
quire some more research and development time. 
A new electric car model, IZA, unveiled at a motor show 
held in Tokyo in October 1991, attracted much attention. 
However, its present costs need to be reduced. (The specifi-
cations were as follows: nickel-cadmium batteries; "wheel-
in-motor"; maximum speed 176 km/h; start-up accelera-
tion, 18 seconds from 0 to 400 m; a record distance of 500 
km covered by one charge. 
CNG-powered cars also drew attention. In New Zealand, 
100,000 CNG cars (53 of all CNG cars) are operating on 
the road. 
A hybrid system combining different power sources, i.e., 
electricity for intra-city transport and gasoline and diesel 
for inter-city transport, merits positive consideration. 
Summary 
To summarize, the following proposals are put forward. 
Proposals 
• Dematerialization of affiuence. 
Promote eco-fashion, prolong use of durable goods, build 
attractive infrastructure before indulging the convenience 
of private cars, and improve school education. 
Recycle returnable containers, introduce a deposit system, 
promote the recycling of urban and industrial waste heat, 
the utilization of renewable natural energies wherever pos-
sible, and nuclear fuel recycling by re-processing spent fuel. 
• Separation of energy from GNP. 
Reflect full energy costs, including the environmental cost, 
directly in product prices, which should promote energy 
conservation. 
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Upgrade insulation standards for housing, fuel cost stan-
dards for automobiles, and promote district heating and 
cooling systems which effectively utilize the unused energy 
of waste heat. 
Set up a system for international cooperation to make en-
ergy conservation technologies successfully applied by de-
veloped countries available for sharing by developing coun-
tries as international assets of the public domain. 
• Decarbonization of energy sources. 
Promote cooperative programs to help countries with per 
capita C02 emissions well above the world's average to 
improve. 
Set up international transfers to developing countries of 
technologies for energy conservation, combustion control, 
and environmental protection. 
Encourage the development of hydro and geothermal en-
ergies wherever possible, and nuclear power where mature 
levels of technology exist. The advanced combined-cycle 
system using natural gas would be advisable. 
Mass-transit systems and fuel conversion in the transporta-
tion sector should be promoted. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sustainable Energy Development 
Umberto Colombo 
Future Energy Demand 
Predicting our energy future is indeed a difficult task. Major mis-
takes have been made in the past by using more or less straight-
forward extrapolation. The procedure for forecasting future energy 
demand that is generally followed at present is based on demog-
raphy and per capita consumption. In order to take into account 
the large variations in per capita energy consumption in various 
categories of countries, some distinction is made in the analysis ac-
cording to the level of development and the gross national product 
(GNP). 
Demographic forecasts for the next 10 to 15 years are believed 
to have a high degree of accuracy: current conditions determine 
quite strictly the evolution of population for some time to come, so 
much so that some demographers are prepared to say that up until 
the year 2000 or 2005 we are talking about history, not predictions. 
However, small differences that appear from now on in the general 
trends (including action taken to curb the birth-rate) can result in 
significantly different scenarios for the long term (UN, 1991). 
Even with the most optimistic, low-growth scenario (Table 3.1), 
the world population will exceed 7.5 billion in 2025, twice as high 
as in 1970. We cannot count on stabilized population levels much 
below 10 billion people by the end of the next century. Most of the 
increase will take place in the less developed countries (LDCs ). 
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Table 3.1. UN population scenarios (millions). (Key: W denotes 
total world; D denotes developing countries; and I denotes indus-
trialized countries.) Source: UN (1991). 
Year 
Scenario 1990 2000 2010 2020 2025 
Medium-growth w 5292 6261 7205 8092 8504 
D 4086 4997 5895 6750 7050 
I 1206 1264 1310 1342 1354 
High-growth w 5327 6420 7563 8802 9444 
D 4117 5134 6204 7372 7978 
I 1210 1286 1359 1430 1466 
Low-growth w 5261 6093 6813 7375 7590 
D 4858 4847 5547 6111 6336 
I 1203 1246 1266 1264 1254 
Constant fertility w 5312 6462 7891 9782 10977 
D 4104 5194 6574 8429 9606 
1208 1268 1317 1353 1368 
Today, per capita energy consumption is vastly different from 
country to country (Figure 3.1 ): it can vary by a factor of 10 
for "commercial" energy use between the average inhabitant of an 
industrialized country and that of a developing country. This factor 
is much larger if we consider extreme cases (for instance it is 90 
between Canada and Bangladesh). 
Non-commercial energy sources (self-collected fuel wood, agri-
cultural residues and animal dung) constitute an important con-
tribution for LDCs, accounting for more than 50% of the available 
energy in the poorest countries. Under the pressure of increas-
ing population, fuelwood collection is rapidly depleting forests and 
timber resources, especially in semi-arid and mountainous regions, 
contributing to major environmental problems such as deforesta-
tion, land degradation, and desertification. 
Although, as we shall see, energy consumption is not rigidly cor-
related to GNP, large amounts of energy are required in the indus-
trialization phase. If developing countries are to emerge from their 
current poverty, the gap between their energy consumption and that 
of industrialized countries will have to be reduced substantially. 
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Figure 3.1. Per capita energy consumption (in tons of oil equivalent per person). (ENEA elaboration 
from different sources.) 
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Starting from these considerations, most current projections of 
world energy consumption in the next decades indicate quite con-
spicuous increases, both in the south and in the north of the planet. 
For example, a group of 30 experts which carried out a study for the 
1989 World Energy Conference in Montreal (World Energy Confer-
ence, 1989) predicted a rise in global energy consumption of be-
tween 50 and 75% for the year 2020 compared with 1988 (Figure 
3.2). Thus, even in the lowest economic scenario (one which as-
sumes a yearly rate of economic growth of 1.5% in the north and 
2.8% in the south), the global energy demand is estimated to reach 
12 billion tons of oil equivalent (toe) by the year 2020. Energy 
experts seem to have worked quite independently of environmen-
talists and to have taken little account of constraints imposed by 
the environment and climate. 
Finiteness of Fossil Fuel Resources 
The finiteness of resources (for non-renewable energies) is not going 
to be a major constraint in the short and medium term. Fossil fuels 
are by far the most prevalent source of commercial energy today. 
They are derived from a transformation process on a geological time 
scale, so that they can be considered finite and non-renewable on a 
human time scale. These resources are therefore being depleted by 
mankind. This obvious consideration is apparently contradicted by 
the fact that proven reserves of fossil fuels are not decreasing but, 
up to now, have actually been rising [British Petroleum (1991): see 
Table 3.2]. Oil reserves have never been so high, having reached 
(in 1989) an all-time maximum of 44 for the ratio between reserves 
and yearly consumption. For natural gas, the increase in proven 
reserves has greatly exceeded the rising trend in consumption, and 
the reserves-to-consumption ratio is up to about 60 years. As far 
as coal is concerned, the situation is even less alarming: proven 
reserves could guarantee more than 230 years of energy supply at 
present levels of consumption. 
The increase in reserves has been faster than their depletion. 
This is due only in part to the discovery of new deposits. More 
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Table 3.2. Evolution of oil and natural gas reserves from 1960 to 
1990. Sources: Oil and Gas Journal (1990), The British Petroleum 
Company p.l.c. (1991). 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Oil 
(billion tonnes) 
43 .0 
50 .0 
77.7 
87.4 
90 .6 
95.2 
121.2 
123.8 
136.8 
136.5 
Natural gas 
(billion toe) 
15.3 
22.4 
33 .3 
55 .0 
69.8 
86 .9 
91.4 
95 .2 
96 .2 
107.5 
importantly, the use of improved, computer-assisted reservoir en-
gineering and geophysical methods has led to substantially higher 
estimates of the recoverable reserves in the oil and gas fields already 
known. Furthermore, resources that were considered inaccessible 
because of the then lack of economically viable technologies or in-
frastructure to exploit them have now become usable. 
If proven reserves have increased, the evaluation of resources 
has not changed significantly [resources include proven economic 
and subeconomic reserves, as well as recoverable deposits not yet 
discovered but believed to exist on the basis of geological evi-
dence: resources represent the ultimate limit of reserves (Gabor 
and Colombo, 1978)]. It is to be expected that, at least for oil , for 
which exploration has been carried out in a large part of the globe, 
the trend of continuing increase in reserves will peak in the not 
too distant future, and that the ratio of reserves to production will 
then start to decline. The present estimate, however, only concerns 
"conventional" resources. If, in addition to the actual discovery of 
uncertain but expected crude oil deposits, only 15% of the reservoirs 
of heavy oil and bitumen can be exploited, this would correspond 
to 120 years plus at present rates of consumption (Watson, 1992). 
Full utilization of tar sands and oil shales could extend this time 
limit beyond that expected for coal (Holdren and Pachauri, 1992). 
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The prospects for gas are more uncertain and potentially big-
ger, since exploration for natural gas has been limited in the past. 
Natural gas is also known to exist in the form of hydrates (methane 
trapped within water molecules under deep oceans and permafrost). 
No viable technology for the utilization of hydrates is available to-
day, but hydrate reservoirs are estimated to contain 10 times as 
much gas as conventional natural gas reservoirs (Watson, 1992). 
On the whole, the finite character of fossil fuel resources does 
not involve any real danger of depletion for the foreseeable future, 
although production costs will presumably increase as less favorable 
deposits and more sophisticated technologies have to be employed. 
Anxieties about the security of supply and the price stability of 
hydrocarbons are more likely to influence energy policies, bearing in 
mind the ever-present instability potential in the geopolitical areas 
where the majority of hydrocarbon reserves are located. Political 
uncertainties and the difficulty of reliably forecasting future energy 
prices may discourage new investment, especially that which has a 
long-term pay-back. This might, in turn, generate conditions for 
future shortages of supply and consequent price rises. 
Effects of Energy on the Environment 
and on Climate 
The most stringent limit to the growth of traditional energy use, 
however, now appears to be the environment. The production and 
use of energy affects the environment in many ways. The impact 
of the emissions of certain pollutants (particulates, carbon monox-
ide, non-methane hydrocarbons, and, to a certain extent, nitrogen 
oxides) is mostly local and can be dealt with at the national or 
subnational level. Acid rain is another matter. The formation of 
sulfuric acid from S02 emissions and, probably to a lesser degree, 
of nitric acid from the emission of NOx, are the causes of acid rain. 
This has a regional character, requiring concerted action by more 
than one country. An even wider impact is the possibility of global 
climate change triggered by increases in average temperature as 
a result of the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) . .This could 
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Table 3.3. Basic facts on greenhouse gases. Source: IPCC (1991 ). 
Gas 
Carbon dioxide 
Methane 
Nitrous oxide 
CFCs 
HCFC-22 
Othersa (ozone) 
Relative contribution to 
the greenhouse effect over 
a 100-year period (%) 
61.0 
15.0 
4.0 
11.0 
0.5 
8.5 
Lifetime 
(years) 
50-200 
10 
150 
65-130 
Short 
Short 
0 These values include the indirect effect of these emissions on other greenhouse gases 
via chemical reactions in the atmosphere. Such estimates are highly model-dependent 
and should be considered preliminary and subject to change. 
have the severest consequences, as climate affects all human activ-
ities. Furthermore, it is the most difficult to avoid, involving the 
biggest uncertainties, and is the impact for which worldwide action 
is essential. 
Such impacts have reinforced the need to apply the concept of 
"sustainable development" to the energy cycle (World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 1987) as a way of internalizing 
external costs relative to the conservation of finite resources, the 
protection of the environment, and the prevention of disruptive 
changes of climate. Our energy future also has to be sustainable in 
economic and social terms, and for the preservation of world peace. 
Energy production and use are considered to be the major con-
tributors among human activities to greenhouse warming through 
the release of GHGs, mainly carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is the 
most important GHG, estimated to contribute about 60% of the 
man-produced greenhouse effect (Table 3.3). The energy cycle, in 
turn, is responsible for about 75% of C02 emissions from human 
activities, although it contributes only marginally to the emission 
of other GHGs (mainly methane) (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1991). 
The increase in the atmospheric concentration of C02 since the 
beginning of the industrial age is well documented by measurements 
taken over a period of several decades and is not disputed. An in-
crease in average temperature, estimated to be between 0.4 and 
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0.5 °C since 1850, has been worked out from the analysis of histor-
ical data [Kelly and Wigley (1990): see Figure 3.3]. A majority of 
scientists now agree that there is enough experimental evidence to 
support the linkage. Others (Jastrow et al., 1989) point to discrep-
ancies which still need solving: in particular, no increase in mean 
global temperature was recorded between 1945 and 1970, a period 
of rising energy consumption. It is true that the measurement of 
such small temperature variations could be strongly affected by 
the "background noise" produced by a variety of other phenomena, 
such as emissions from volcanic eruptions. However, a close corre-
lation between the C02 concentration in the atmosphere and the 
average temperature for the last 160,000 years has been observed 
from geological data obtained from measurements on ice cores in 
Antarctica (Figure 3.4) (Barnola et al., 1987). 
The correlation between average temperature variations and cli-
mate change is even more uncertain and difficult to predict. The 
global climate pattern arises from a complex interplay among many 
interconnected phenomena, providing both positive (destabilizing) 
and negative (stabilizing) feedback mechanisms (Figure 3.5) . They 
include such phenomena as variations in solar radiation, evapo-
ration, precipitation, the effects of clouds, winds, ocean currents, 
plant cover, and biological fixation and release of C02 on earth and 
in the oceans, variations in albedo, ice caps, and floating ice, chem-
ical reactions at the bottom of the oceans, and many others. The 
climate may have a limited stability with respect to changes in the 
forcing parameters (such as solar radiation and transparency of the 
atmosphere to different wavelengths), if for no other reason than 
because large global climate variations have been associated in the 
past with relatively small variations in these parameters. 
Even without dramatic changes in the climatic pattern, rela-
tively small temperature variations may have important effects, for 
example, on agriculture. Extreme values of temperature brought 
about by fluctuations may be more important than average tem-
peratures. In the assessment of food security, the impact of cli-
matic fluctuations will have to be studied for different crops and 
production areas (Sinha et al., 1988). Most climate models predict 
increased oscillations in the presence of global warming. Effects will 
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vary with geographic distribution and with seasons. Precipitation 
will be affected: dry regions could become drier, and humid regions 
more humid. The sea level is expected to rise as a consequence of 
both the thermal expansion of water and melting of ice in Antarc-
tica, but even this has recently been challenged by the observation 
(based again on geological evidence) that an increase in snow fall in 
polar regions may actually override the effects of an increased thaw 
(Miller and De Vernal, 1992). Computer models, while in agree-
ment on some basic conclusions, often obtain contrasting results 
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for the details, especially regarding the geographical distribution of 
impacts. 
Research in the field of global climate change has made great 
progress in the last several years. Problems have been identified, 
clarified, and sometimes solved. No definitive solutions, however, 
seem to have been arrived at, given that each step forward in our 
understanding of how these processes work discloses new problems 
and the need to investigate new areas. The problematique is so 
complex, its various aspects so interlinked, the results of calcula-
tions so critically dependent on the details of the representation 
and on the precise input values, that scientific certainty is unlikely 
to be reached. 
This is presumably not a unique situation (Colombo, forthcom-
ing). Environment and ecosystems are extremely complicated. Now 
that the global effects of human activities can no longer be ignored, 
and it is obvious that the self-regenerating capacity of nature is 
endangered, it will be increasingly necessary to take important de-
cisions in conditions of uncertainty. 
In the case of global climate change, there is broad agreement 
in the scientific community, even if not yet consensus, that theory 
and evidence point to a non-negligible - in fact to a fairly large -
probability that important adverse effects will occur in the future 
if the present trend of releasing GHGs continues. The combination 
of this probability with the expected magnitude of the effects is 
enough to induce concern and to call for preventive action - at 
least as an insurance policy. 
Such preventive action must include all GHGs in a global ap-
proach. It may, however, be misleading to place the various GHGs 
on an equal footing, for two reasons. The first is that they have 
different residence times in the atmosphere, and therefore the ben-
eficial effects of reducing them appear on a different time scale (see 
again Table 3.3). The second is that there may be interactions 
between the different GHGs. In particular, this is the case with 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (UN, forthcoming). Chlorofluorocar-
bons contribute to the greenhouse effect. However, international 
agreement has been reached on their progressive elimination be-
cause they deplete the stratospheric ozone layer. The cut back in 
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CFC emissions, however, may have a less positive impact than first 
anticipated in terms of containing greenhouse warming, because on 
their way up to the stratosphere CFCs destroy tropospheric ozone 
(itself a powerful GHG) by catalytic action. 
Limiting C02 Emissions 
The scenarios developed by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 1991) consider that the risk of sizable climate 
change is low as long as the atmospheric concentration of C02 re-
mains below 400 ppm (Figure 3.6). This is a useful reference point, 
although somewhat speculative, given the uncertainties of the com-
putational models used in prediction. In order to reach this goal, 
bearing in mind the inertia of the system, it would be necessary to 
curb C02 emission levels worldwide. If a reduction of 2% per year 
were implemented, starting from now, the increase in temperature 
would be confined to a comfortable 0.4 °C. However, if we wait until 
2010 for such a reduction, then we start to enter the risk zone. 
Action to reduce C02 emissions can be costly and produce neg-
ative impacts on industrial competitiveness and the world econ-
omy. If taken by any given country in isolation, there would be 
only a marginal effect on climate, at the same time generating se-
vere disadvantages in terms of international competitiveness for the 
country concerned. There is thus little wonder that many govern-
ments are reluctant to introduce such measures. The guiding rule 
to be adopted in deciding on suitable energy policies must therefore 
be the "no-regrets" principle. This means taking all those actions 
which would be beneficial, even if only over the long term, for rea-
sons other than climate change. Should our worries about global 
climate eventually turn out to be exaggerated, efforts will not have 
been wasted. In fact, no-regrets policies anticipate what is bound 
to be the long term response of the market, given that we are deal-
ing with non-renewable resources that sooner or later are going 
to be exhausted and that, well before then, will become increas-
ingly expensive. No-regrets policies include such considerations as 
the reduction of indirect environmental costs, social advantages (in 
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Figure 3.6. Proposed targets for absolute temperature change 
and equivalent C02 concentrations. Temperature targets refer to 
committed (inevitable) warming expressed in global mean temper-
atures above pre-industrial levels. Concentration targets refer to 
stabilized equivalent C02 concentrations. Source: Rijsberman and 
Swart (1990). 
particular, cuts in unemployment), balance of payments benefits, 
higher energy security, etc. 
In order to reduce C02 emissions 
courses of action can be contemplated. 
in the energy cycle, four 
The first consists of sub-
stituting alternative energy sources for fossil fuels; the second in 
improving the efficiency of energy production and use; the third in 
fuel-switching within fossil fuels; and the last in sequestering and 
storing C02 after combustion. The last two options offer limited 
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or uncertain opportunities. The substitution, for example, of nat-
ural gas for coal is advantageous from the point of view of C02 
emission by a factor of almost two, provided gas losses are negli-
gible (methane is a much more powerful GHG than C02 ). Such 
substitution is partly taking place, as a result also of the other en-
vironmental advantages of gas, but it is constrained by the higher 
price of gas with respect to coal and, in a long-term perspective, 
by the smaller reserves. The last option - separation and storage 
of C02 - could be contemplated for large plants (Marchetti, 1977), 
but is expected to be very expensive. It has never been tested on 
a significant scale and has uncertain long-term environmental im-
pacts and safety problems (especially for deep sea storage). The 
important courses of action are therefore to replace fossil fuels with 
other forms of energy, and make more efficient use of energy. Both 
will be examined in the next two sections. 
Nuclear and Renewable Energies 
Fossil fuels can be replaced by nuclear and renewable energies, nei-
ther of which over their cycle of discovery, exploitation, and disposal 
produce large quantities of C02 , even considering plant construc-
tion. Nuclear fission energy today generates some 17% of world 
electricity and accounts for over 5% of total primary energy at the 
world level. Availability of uranium is not a problem. Although 
proven reserves of uranium that are at present available at a low ex-
traction cost would be sufficient for only a few decades of operation 
at the current level of installed nuclear capacity, the contribution of 
uranium forms only a small percentage of the cost of the kWh. Us-
ing uranium that costs three times as much to extract as at present 
would increase the per kWh cost by only 10%. In this case, much 
bigger uranium resources would be viable, allowing operation at 
present levels of nuclear capacity for over 1,000 years, or at a much 
larger capacity for over 100 years, and this without having to switch 
to breeder reactors (Holdren and Pachauri, 1992). With breeders, 
no foreseeable limitation on uranium resources would apply, even 
in a very long time frame. 
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Nuclear energy is at the moment in a quasi-stalemate situation 
due to concerns about safety and environmental impact, worries 
about nuclear proliferation, and poor economics. A new wave of 
nuclear investment could occur if a new generation of reactors em-
bodying enhanced passive safety features are developed, if waste 
problems were satisfactorily resolved, and if economic prospects 
were to improve. Solutions for all these problems are being inves-
tigated at present. 
Nuclear fusion still has a long (and costly) way to go before it 
can become a realistic commercial option. Short-cuts and break-
throughs, although possible, are unlikely. Furthermore, it is im-
probable that either fission or fusion could play a significant role in 
developing countries for a long time to come, given the high capital 
intensity and the extreme complexity of the related technologies, 
not to mention the need for a sophisticated societal organization to 
cope with the issues of safety and risk. 
Renewable energies do have many of the characteristics required 
to become major components of future energy systems. They do 
not lead to net carbon dioxide emissions and have few environmen-
tal problems, so that they fully qualify as sustainable. They are 
distributed in nature, and are therefore well adapted for a pattern 
of development which is not heavily concentrated in urban areas. 
Renewable energies do not require costly infrastructure, which is 
generally lacking in, for example, LDCs, when compared with the 
transportation and distribution systems needed for electricity and 
natural gas. They are not yet economically competitive with con-
ventional energies, although they offer the best (if not the only) 
solution for many specific applications, in particular in remote or 
isolated areas. They may become generally more competitive if var-
ious non-technological obstacles are removed (including subsidies 
given to conventional energy generators, which are especially com-
mon in Third World countries) and if external costs are taken into 
account. Furthermore, a massive effort in research, adaptation, and 
demonstration supported by public funds (as was the case decades 
ago for nuclear energy) could produce a breakthrough in use. 
Renewable energies are diluted in nature, they require (and im-
ply) a bottom-up approach, with many actors taking small decisions. 
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This may cause long lead times for their penetration. Furthermore, 
in the north, where big investment has already been made in cen-
tralized infrastructures and where space is in many cases a problem 
(given the high cost of land), they are generally less competitive 
than in the south. In an increasing number of cases, however, even 
in the north, situations are being identified for which renewable en-
ergies provide the most cost-effective solution, and at today's low 
energy prices. 
Improving the Efficiency of Energy Use 
The last course of action for reducing C02 emissions - improvement 
in the efficiency of energy use - also represents the most important 
area of action for no-regrets policies. There is no doubt that present 
efficiency levels, even in the most advanced countries, are far below 
what is theoretically achievable. This is particularly true when 
considering the quality of energy (i.e., exergy). The use of electricity 
or of a gas flame at 1,000 °C to heat water for a bath, even if 
sometimes practical, is a very poor application of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. An important part of the potential for increasing 
the efficiency of energy use is not only achievable with existing 
technologies, but also makes economic sense today, especially if the 
indirect costs of energy are taken into account. Institutional and 
attitudinal obstacles have to be removed, opportunities diffused, 
and technologies adapted to particular applications. 
Reducing the amount of energy needed to obtain the same 
product or service is not the only way to conserve energy. In 
advanced societies there is a spontaneous trend toward demate-
rialization (Colombo, 1989). This process involves a trade-off be-
tween material goods and information, the substitution of services 
for goods, a reduction in size and weight of goods (that is, minia-
turization), and the substitution of traditional materials by new 
functional materials. Dematerialization applies to energy as well as 
to the materials themselves (see Chapter 2 by Tokio Kanoh which 
deals with this issue in more detail). 
An insight into these aspects can be obtained by considering 
the energy intensity of the GDPs of various countries and their 
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evolution over time. In a primitive stage of development, energy 
(including both commercial and non-commercial sources) is used 
very inefficiently, and the energy intensity is high. Studies carried 
out at IIASA (Nakieenovic and John, 1992) indicate that, at least 
in these early stages, the total energy intensity of GDP decreases as 
development proceeds; in particular, commercial energies tend to 
be used with a much higher efficiency than non-commercial ones. In 
the following discussion, however, we shall consider energy intensity 
only as the ratio of commercial energy to GDP. This is because the 
evaluation of the contribution of non-commercial energies is affected 
by large uncertainties and also because this parameter seems more 
meaningful and does not overemphasize the effect of the very low 
efficiency in the use of self-collected fuelwood or residues. 
In Figure 3. 7 the energy intensity of GDP is given for several 
OECD countries over the last 20 years. All these curves show a 
decrease in the energy intensity of GDP with time. It should be 
noted that in any given country undergoing economic development 
up to and beyond the stage of full industrialization, the energy in-
tensity of GDP evolves over time (and, hence, with the growth of 
GDP itself) and follows the path of the various curves in Figure 
3.8 (Colombo, forthcoming). In an early stage of economic devel-
opment, the energy intensity of GDP rises because a country needs 
to build its basic infrastructure, which demands a large quantity of 
material goods, and also because of the shift in agricultural prac-
tices toward energy-intensive inputs and technologies. Continuing 
along the path of economic development, once the need for basic 
goods and infrastructure is saturated, demand is diverted toward 
goods with a lower materials (and energy) content per unit value 
and toward services. 
As might be expected, a country undergoing industrialization 
later than others will have better technologies at its disposal - re-
flecting progress in the efficiency of use of materials and energy -
and thus will exhibit a lower peak on the curve. This is confirmed 
by observing, in Figure 3.8, the curves representing the real situa-
tion in selected OECD countries, starting as far back as the early 
19th century. We see that the United Kingdom, the first coun-
try to have industrialized, exhibits the highest value at its peak 
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point in the curve representing the energy intensity of GDP versus 
time. Then, in order, come the USA, Germany, France, Japan, and 
Italy. All curves, obtained from actual statistics, are in remarkable 
agreement with the expected performance. 
Now, as one would expect, for the aggregate of Third World 
countries (the LDCs) the curve in Figure 3.8 is still rising steeply, 
indicating that they are still (on average) far away from industrial-
ization. What is worrying in this curve is that the energy intensity 
of GDP has already reached values higher than the peaks in the 
curves of Japan and Italy, that is, of those countries in the north 
that reached full industrialization most recently. This situation 
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indicates that modern, high-energy-efficiency technologies are not 
generally available in developing countries. This, in turn, is due 
to the lack of capital for the acquisition of these technologies, to 
an insufficient technical background, to inadequate education and 
training, to different priorities set by governments, and, last but not 
least, to the fact that aid programs run by the North have given 
higher priority to the transfer of conventional plants and technolo-
gies than to the development of energy technologies appropriate to 
the conditions and needs of the developing countries. 
An even worse situation is that of the former centrally planned 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and, in particular, the 
former Soviet Union. For these countries (Figure 3.8), the energy 
intensity of GDP curve peaked only in the 1980s. However, the 
peak value corresponds to a situation that would have been normal 
in the West with the technologies available in the 1920s or 1930s. 
In other words, there is no sign in this curve of the use of the 
modern, energy-efficient technologies then available which would 
have allowed a lower peak. The Soviet Union and, to a large extent, 
the other Comecon countries were not open economies exposed to 
market forces and competition, a situation which clearly did not 
favor innovation. The artificial, top-down nature of the pricing 
structure and the fact that the energy sector was highly subsidized, 
also explain the exceptionally high values for the energy content of 
the GDP. For further details see Chapter 4 by Georgi Golitsyn. 
Finally, the attainment of ambitious goals for a reduction in 
fossil-fuel consumption is difficult in market economies when the 
international price of these fuels is low. The free market has proved 
indispensable in optimizing the short-term allocation of resources: 
but the market is short-sighted and its myopia must be corrected by 
introducing longer-term signals and accounting for external costs. 
This is the task of government. 
Conclusions 
Climate change is a global problem, and as such it requires global 
solutions. We must invest most in those measures for GHG emission 
reduction where the return for the investment is highest. Today, 
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this indicates priority for such actions as: improving energy effi-
ciency in the successor states of the Soviet Union and in Central 
and Eastern Europe; introducing more modern ways of burning coal 
and other fuels in the still-primitive plants common, for instance, 
in China and India; reducing methane emissions to the atmosphere 
in oil fields and leaking gas pipelines. Tradable emission rights 
may enable the market to direct investment more easily where the 
returns are greatest. The need is to ensure that all new energy 
infrastructures are based on technologies that give high efficiency 
in energy conversion and use. 
Although advanced countries in the West are relatively more 
efficient in their use of energy, this cannot be grounds for com-
placency. These countries are also much more affiuent, and their 
per capita energy consumption is high. Credibility is inevitably 
lost when they suggest possible courses of action to LDCs, unless a 
genuine effort is made in the North to put its own house in order. 
Action is needed to ensure that decreasing per capita energy con-
sumption can become an element in continuing economic growth. 
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PART Ill 
Present Trends Give Cause for 
the Most Serious Concern 

CHAPTER 4 
Environmental Aspects of 
the Transformation of 
Centrally Planned Economies 
Georgi S. Golitsyn 
Socioeconomic Background 
During the last two or three years the European countries that for-
merly belonged to the so-called centrally planned economies ( CPEs) 
started to undergo a rapid transition to, as they declare, a market 
economy. The state and fate of the environment is a very direct 
consequence of the state, history, and fate of the economy, public 
awareness, education, and determination. Thus, we should briefly 
look at these conditions before we start to discuss ecological prob-
lems and possible ways to solve them. 
We will consider Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , which 
has now separated into various different countries. On 21 Decem-
ber 1991 many of these countries formed what is now called the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The biggest of these 
states, the Russian Federation, is not itself immune to further dis-
integration because of the many nationalities populating it, the fast 
deterioration of the economy, and the living conditions of the vast 
majority of the population. These processes have a lot of positive 
feedbacks. However, here they are acting in the negative sense by 
enhancing the processes of deterioration in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU}, and also to some extent in the other former CPEs. We will 
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not consider here the former German Democratic Republic: this 
problem may be left to the Federal Republic, which has enough 
resources, determination, and expertize to solve its own environ-
mental and economic problems quickly and efficiently. Also, we 
will not consider former Yugoslavia in detail because of its woeful 
disintegration and the current war, nor Albania where reforms are 
just starting but where no data are available to the author. 
The basic problems are common to all the countries but there . 
are some differences which may result in future in their environ-
mental problems evolving and being solved in different ways and 
on different time scales. Most of the data and information pre-
sented here will be for the former Soviet Union, not only because 
the author is from that country and thus has first-hand knowledge 
of some of the data, but also because the range and extent of the 
problems there are larger than in all the other countries together, 
and the present economic situation is much worse than in any of 
them, which will make the improvement of the environment more 
difficult and problematic. 
In preparing this chapter the main reference materials used 
were: the materials of the IIASA Task Force Meeting entitled "The 
Environment in Eastern Europe: Common Problems and Correc-
tive Actions in the Region", held in Laxenburg, 19- 23 November 
1990 (IIASA, unpublished); the National Report of the USSR to 
UNCED (Ministry of National Resources and Environmental Pro-
tection, 1991); and Environment of the Czech Republic (Blue Book, 
1990). 
Let us consider the common factors among CPEs, the countries 
under discussion. In the late 1940s these countries began to follow 
the development path of the Soviet Union, which had started some 
20 years before when it became a fully totalitarian state. It was 
the path of industrialization, in which the state planned industrial 
development causing grave consequences for the environment. One 
should remember that until about the late 1960s environmental 
problems were not a topic of discussion, at least in the part of the 
world under consideration, but they were also not discussed much 
in other parts of the world. The peculiarities of industrialization in 
CPEs are listed below: 
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• Most investment, up to 85% in the USSR, went to production 
group A, which involves mining, transportation, energy, and 
the production of manufacturing systems. Only about 15% of 
investment went into the production of consumer goods. A 
similar situation occurred in the other countries with CPEs. As 
a result, most production was carried out for its own sake, not 
to supply a consumer need, and at the same time it increased 
the stress on the environment. 
• Centralized planning and governance (I am reluctant to use the 
term management here because the poor economic performance 
resulted from mismanagement rather than management!) was 
based on state property which meant that people lacked real re-
sponsibility for the environmental, and very often the economic, 
consequences of their actions. 
• Extreme degrees of industrial monopoly developed when a par-
ticular product was produced at just one plant. Obviously the 
manufacturers were interested only in a quantitative increase in 
production, not in qualitative improvement. The lack of com-
petition from the world market did not help to improve the 
situation. This was the main reason for the growing retarda-
tion of industries in CPEs in comparison with their Western 
counterparts.[!] The uniqueness of a plant producing a partic-
ular item, or part of it , makes it impossible to close the plant 
in the event of it causing an ecological hazard, even for a rel-
atively short period of time. For instance, during 1989-1990 
many pharmaceutical factories which were damaging the en-
vironment were closed down by local authorities, but a drug 
deficit quickly developed so the central authorities ordered the 
factories to re-open after supposed quick repairs, or installa-
tion, of cleaning facilities. Here, a real dilemma arises if we 
care about public health: which is more damaging - the ab-
sence of drugs or a bad environment, which is also bad for the 
biosphere as a whole? 
• A much larger proportion of GNP was allocated to military 
purposes in CPEs, especially in the USSR where it was esti-
mated to be about 25%, while in the USA it is currently 5% 
of GNP, and in Japan only 1 %! Therefore, there was always 
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a preference for military production before civilian production, 
and as a result there were chronic shortages of capital for the 
renovation of the infrastructure, and other parts, of industry. 
This is especially noticeable in Russia and other parts of the 
CIS, but also in Georgia and the Baltic states, which are not 
members of the CIS. The average equipment life-time in these 
countries now is 26 years, while in the developed countries it is 
only about 10 years. 
• There is a lack of concrete information about the state of the 
environment available to the public in general and concerning 
particular regions and cities. Only in 1988 was the mark "For 
in-service use" removed from the yearly "State of Environment" 
reports issued by the then State Committee for the Hydromete-
orology and Control of the Environment of the USSR (now dis-
solved, reorganized, and hidden within the Ministry of Ecology 
and Natural Resources of the Russian Federation Government). 
However, less than a thousand copies of even these unclassified 
reports were printed. Similar attitudes concerning the conceal-
ment of information on the state of the environment by gov-
erning authorities could be found in all the CPE countries of 
Europe [see, for example, Blue Book (1990)]. 
All these peculiarities had, and still have, very grave conse-
quences for the economies and environments of CPEs, especially 
for the former USSR. First, their products, as a rule, are of no 
competitive value today in international markets due to their in-
ferior quality, hence there is a bad shortage of hard currency and 
growing foreign debts. Large foreign capital investments are needed 
to make production competitive, but the social, economic, and le-
gal conditions required to attract such capital exist only in a very 
few places (like Hungary), certainly not in the CIS yet! Coun-
tries within the CIS are rich in raw materials but exporting these 
without exporting value-added products would only increase their 
industrial retardation and increase the stress on the environment, 
causing its further degradation. 
Second, because of the age of most of the equipment and tech-
nologies used, production in CPEs is very inefficient in comparison 
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with modern systems. In the CIS the amount of intermediate prod-
ucts produced per final product is about 2.5 times larger than in 
developed countries. The main reasons for this are: a much lower 
amount of useful substance is extracted from mined ores with much 
greater energy expenditure; a lot more material is wasted at the 
production stage (e.g., more than 20% of metal is wasted as shav-
ings during its treatment in machine construction); poor production 
system quality creates a necessity for an enormous amount of spare 
parts, and the lack of such parts was (and still is in the CIS), to-
gether with many other deficits, the main headache (and source of 
corruption) in countries with CPEs. Old equipment, and its very 
slow replacement, requires an enormous repair industry which di-
verts financial and human capital, thus aggravating the situation 
(this is a case of one of the many aforementioned "positive" feed-
backs worsening the situation). 
Third, as a consequence of all this the discipline at work is 
very slack, as well as the workers' awareness and basic care for the 
environment. This, together with old and unreliable equipment , 
causes many more accidents than in other developed countries. In 
many cases, these accidents harm not only people, but also the 
environment. The most notorious is the case of Chernobyl. The 
CIS newspapers quite often publish stories about how a particular 
plant , usually on a Saturday night, opens its containers of liquid 
waste, which they are supposed to refine and clean, and lets the 
waste, often toxic, go into the local stream, river, or lake. The 
local environmental control authorities may charge the plant , but 
the charge is usually much smaller than the damage, or the price of 
installing the proper cleaning facilities, or even making the facilities 
work properly. 
Fourth, there is one especially shameful item which is more spe-
cific to the former Soviet Union than to the other CPEs. It is the 
loss of agricultural products during all stages of production from 
harvesting to the transportation of crops and products, their stor-
age, treatment, and distribution. Nobody knows the exact figures, 
but they range from between 20 and 30% for meat, eggs, and grain, 
to between 50 and 70% for vegetables and fruits. Here is just one 
official example. In the book People's Economy of USSR in 1988 
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(The State Statistical Committee, 1989) one reads that a sampling 
inspection in state stores found 40% of eggs, 15% of fish, 11 % of 
bread, 10% of cheese, and so on, unsuitable for sale (nobody knows 
how much was lost before that, or stolen - though theft is just an-
other, uneconomic, form of distribution). This situation is not only 
one of the main causes of poor living conditions in the CIS, but 
also a large source of stress on the environment because agriculture 
in the CIS is more harmful to the environment than in any other 
developed country. 
The state of the food industry and food distribution in the for-
mer Soviet Union is the greatest disgrace and failure of the socialist 
system in its Soviet variant. It is a continuous source of public dis-
content and humiliation, of large-scale corruption in the storage 
and distribution systems, and the cause of an increasing national 
debt due to the necessity of buying an increasing amount of food 
abroad instead of conserving home produce. As a result, citizens of 
the CIS view the further deterioration of the environment and the 
waste of human, financial, and natural resources as only a minor 
nuisance. 
The History and Current State of 
Environmental Problems in the Region 
The nature of environmental problems is the same everywhere, dif-
fering only in relative and absolute magnitudes from place to place. 
The first, and the oldest, environmental problem was the air pollu-
tion encountered by prehistoric people when they started to make 
fires in their caves. Incidentally, they may have experienced en-
hanced levels of radon (considered now as one of the greatest en-
vironmental hazards in the USA today) in some of those caves. 
Mankind was unaware of air pollution until complaints were made 
in the 19th century in Great Britain, where soot and acidic emis-
sions started to cause real harm in and around industrial cities. 
In the regions we are discussing here, air pollution first became 
noticeable after World War II. In 1949 the USSR Council of Min-
isters adopted the resolution "On measures against air pollution 
and on improvement of hygienic conditions in populated places.n 
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The resolution required local authorities to take measures to reduce 
emissions of harmful substances into city air basins. In the 1950s 
many republics, now independent states, adopted laws on nature 
protection. Similar laws were adopted during the 1950s and 1960s 
by all European countries with CPEs. From the beginning of the 
1970s some real action was taken in the prevention of first air, and 
then water, pollution. 
Of course, what has been done during the last 20 years is seri-
ously inadequate and the state of the environment is continuing to 
deteriorate for reasons we have described in the previous section. 
Nevertheless, one must also confess that without the measures taken 
during those 20 years the situation would be considerably worse 
than it is now. The professionals from the former USSR Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment Protection told the author 
that before about 1985- 1986 the deterioration of the environment 
in that country was considerably slower because real action was 
taken to protect the environment. It is difficult to present precise 
numbers here, or to give exact causes for this , but one thing is cer-
tain: there has been a deterioration in technological discipline in 
industry since the start of perestroika. People working in indus-
try explain this by saying that it results from the introduction of 
the election of the directors at manufacturing plants, and from the 
process of democratization without an increase in public social re-
sponsibility. Many people in the CIS consider the decline of social 
responsibility to be one of the dangers of the transition period. In 
the history of Russia there is a very perilous precedent of the result 
of a decline in social responsibility: this is the February 1917 revo-
lution when growing anarchy, social apathy, and the disintegration 
of nationalities in what was the most democratic society of the time 
cleared the way for the bolshevik coup d'etat of October 1917.[2] 
Air Pollution 
Air pollution is still one of the main environmental problems in 
the whole of the region in question. It consists of carbon monox-
ide, CO, sulfur dioxide, S02 , and nitrogen oxides, NOx, emissions 
from burning organic fuels , together with some heavy metals, soot 
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and particulates. Table 2.1 in the National Report of the USSR 
to UN CED by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
Protection of the USSR (1991) gives the dynamics of total emissions 
from 1981 to 1989. It reached a maximum of 108 Mt (megatons= 
million tons) in 1983 and went down to 95.5 Mt in 1989. The con-
tribution of automobiles to the total emissions is estimated at 39%, 
although in the 150 largest cities of the former USSR it reached 
75-80%, or more. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 from the same source present 
data on urban air pollution in large cities in the USSR in 1989 and 
1990, for dust, S02 , NOx, CO, NH3 , H2S, phenol, formaldehyde, 
HF, benz(a)pyrene, and some other substances. The number of 
cities monitored was about 70: for some substances the number 
monitored reached almost 500. 
For most of the substances the average levels reached the lim-
iting allowed concentrations (LACs) adopted in the USSR, or ex-
ceeded them by up to as much as three times , as in the case of 
benz(a)pyrene. Anthropogenic emission was estimated to be about 
130 tons/yr in the USSR, while the natural source is about 20 
tons/yr. Benz(a)pyrene is produced when fossil fuels are burnt and 
in metallurgy: in Russia, and elsewhere, it is considered to be one 
of the most powerful cancerogenic substances, much more danger-
ous than radioactivity from Chernobyl for many sites (Izrael, 1992). 
Comparison of data for 1989 and 1990 gives an increase in emissions 
of 5 to 10% for most of the substances monitored. 
Sulfur dioxide is a substance which is required to be reduced by 
30% by the Helsinki Protocol. The aforementioned tables reveal no 
change in its average concentration in 1989 and 1990. The Protocol 
requires a 30% reduction in S02 emissions and its transboundary 
transfer until 1993. Table 2.2 from the report of the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment Protection of the USSR (1991) 
informs us that in the European part of the former USSR the goal 
had been reached: in 1981 the level of S02 emissions was 12.6 Mt/yr 
and in 1990 it was only 8.7 Mt/yr, i.e., a reduction of 32%. The 
chief reason for this was the replacement of coal by gas as the main 
fuel. No data are available yet for 1991, but one may expect some 
further decrease in emissions simply because of the general decrease 
in production. For example, on 7 February 1992 Moscow television 
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announced that in January 1992, compared with January 1991, coal 
excavation had decreased by 12%, and oil production in Russia by 
11 %. In comparison, one may recall that many EC countries have 
decreased S02 emissions by more than 50% without decreasing their 
GNP. 
Among the worst cities and regions for air pollution in the for-
mer Soviet Union are Kemerovo, Bratsk, Norilsk, Apatity, and sev-
eral others in the Russian Federation, and Yerevan and Alma-Ata, 
capitals of Armenia and Kazakhstan. The first four have such bad 
conditions because of heavy pollution from industry (chemical , met-
allurgical, etc.), the last two have very severe pollution mostly be-
cause of cars and bad ventilation due to being situated at foothills 
or in a valley. Quite often, LA Cs are exceeded by factors of a dozen, 
or even a hundred, in those cities during a period of stagnation. 
Although the total amount of emitted substances has decreased 
from its maximum of 108 Mt in 1983 to 96 Mt in 1990, the decrease 
is mainly in S02 and dust, while the amounts of NOx and many 
other minor, but harmful, substances are increasing. One of the 
reasons for this, as noted in the report from the Ministry of Nat-
ural Resources and Environment Protection of the USSR (1991), 
was the system which existed for planning the reduction of air pol-
lution in the industry of the USSR based on the total amount of all 
substances. Specific substances, such as NOx and several others, 
were not highlighted in many cases. To reduce these emissions it is 
necessary to carry out special studies and design work, reconstruct 
existing production lines, and apply new technologies, i.e. , incur 
large capital investment, something which is in short supply in the 
region. Therefore, one may expect further deterioration in the en-
vironment due to specific air pollution if production is kept at the 
current level. If production levels were to shrink further, as we have 
already observed for two or three years, one may see a decrease in 
air pollution.[3] 
The practical work to control the environment is carried out by 
city and regional Committees for the Protection of Nature and by 
Sanitary-Epidemiology Stations in the CIS. They have the power 
to impose charges on polluters, but often the charge is of symbolical 
value only and it is, in any case, passed on to the state or consumers. 
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Quite often during this process corruption flourishes. Meanwhile, 
state investment in gas-cleaning facilities and in research and devel-
opment in this field are virtually absent (Barinov, 1992), and the 
plants and factories causing the pollution have no incentive, deter-
mination, or capital to build new purifying facilities. The plants 
which produce filters and other gas-cleaning equipment make only 
a few kinds which are out of date, and also have no interest what-
soever in diversifying, specializing, and improving their products. 
Unfortunately, this lamentable situation may be preserved for the 
whole of the period of economic reforms in the CIS. Fiscal and legal 
incentives and requirements, and norms and standards, have not yet 
been adopted for many substances in many independent states, so 
a real improvement in the situation can hardly be expected, unless 
the current deep recession were to end. 
The former European CPE countries appear to be in a worse 
situation at present regarding air pollution than the CIS. The worst 
problems are in the triangle of southeast Germany, Polish Silesia, 
and North Bohemia in the Czech republic. In the latter, S02 emis-
sion exceeds 100 tons/km2 yr [also in Prague, see the Blue Book 
(1990)] . To be specific, per unit area, the level of emissions in 
Czechoslovakia in 1988 was the second highest in Europe after the 
GDR. This is also true for sulfur deposition. Almost half, about 
47%, of the sulfur deposition in Czechoslovakia comes from other 
countries, mainly from the former GDR (14%) and from Poland 
(11 %). Due to the complicated relief of the country, there are of-
ten very bad episodes of air pollution, e.g., the maximum daily 
average of the S02 concentration in Prague in 1990 was registered 
at 3.2 mg/m3 , which is 80 times the LAC according to the So-
viet standards of 1990. Attempts to reduce sulfur emissions in the 
country are failing, both in the installation of desulfurization units 
at coal power plants and in the replacement of the coal plants by 
new nuclear plants. Therefore, the required 30% reduction in 802 
emissions compared with 1980 levels will not be met in 1993, as 
it was supposed when the country signed the "Convention on the 
Long-Distance Transport of Atmospheric Pollution Across National 
Borders", or in 1995, the postponed date. 
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With NOx, prospects are more favorable in Czechoslovakia than 
with S02 • There have already been some reductions in noxous emis-
sions by optimizing the combustion regimes of the main polluters: 
also, a large-scale introduction of catalyzers in the car industry and 
in existing cars will occur in the near future. 
A similar situation can be found in Poland, especially in the 
southwest. In both countries, as in Germany, such emissions are 
causing great damage to forests, making soils acidic, and badly 
damaging historical monuments. In 1986, the amount of sulfur 
emissions was 4.3 Mt and in 1989 it was 3.9 Mt [which may be 
compared with 3.7 Mt for the UK , 2.3 Mt for the FRG, and 5.0 Mt 
for the GDR, all 1986 figures; see Russel (1990)]. One may expect 
some reduction in sulfur emissions in Poland due to the severe in-
dustrial and economic recession. Again, such improvements in the 
state of the environment do not give much cause for satisfaction. 
The situation is better in Hungary. For many years its main 
energy source was domestic brown coal, and S02 emissions at the 
end of the 1950s reached 12.3 Mt/yr (or half of that for pure sul-
fur). In the 1960s there were extremely bad cases of pollution in 
Budapest, with heavy smog and darkness for several hours. Serious 
measures were undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s to replace coal 
by oil and gas, to introduce scrubbers in coal power plants, and to 
construct nuclear power stations. As a result, 802 emissions halved 
in the 1980s, air particulates were reduced significantly, and, conse-
quently, air quality was considerably improved. Further reductions 
in S02 emissions which have occurred since 1989 are due to the 
industrial recession. The main cause of air pollution in the country 
is now cars. As a result of all this, NOx emissions fluctuate and 
those of CO and volatile organic compounds (VOC) are increasing. 
However, the beginning of the introduction of catalytic convert-
ers, lead filters, and electronic ignition regulation gives hope for an 
improvement in the NOx situation also. 
The situations in Romania and Bulgaria are similar to the one 
in Poland, but on a somewhat lesser scale. However, these coun-
tries are poorer than Poland, and without substantial investment 
of foreign capital it would be difficult for them to significantly im-
prove their environmental conditions. These are especially bad in 
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a few particular places due to a combination of heavy industry, 
unfavorable topography, and meteorological conditions. 
Water Pollution 
The former Soviet Union is very rich in water resources but they 
are distributed very inequitably. The southern and southwestern 
parts of the country, where more than 200 million people live and 
which have 80% of the industrial and agricultural production , have 
only 15% of the total river run-off. It is no wonder that the pol-
lution problems are much heavier here than in Siberia. The most 
serious water problems are in the Middle Asian states and in Kaza-
khstan: in these states water is also scarce and most pollution is 
caused by improper agricultural practices (the overuse of fertilizers, 
pesticides, defoliants, etc.). Almost all the water from the Amu-
Darya and Syr-Darya rivers is used in agriculture: the Aral Sea is 
catastrophically shrinking causing the demise of ecological systems 
in the sea, around it , and near the rivers. Drinking water shortages 
and the low quali ty of t he polluted water used for drinking lead to a 
huge increase in infant mortality, the widespread occurrence of spe-
cific diseases and, in general, to what is called the Aral ecological 
crisis (Glazovsky, 1991; Izvestia, 1991). 
Most of t he water resources, including underground waters, in 
the former USSR are polluted, but the level and character of pol-
lution vary greatly from place to place. The main polluters are the 
industrial and residential sectors, which have inadequate, or totally 
absent , purifying systems, and the agricultural sector. The per-
centage of surface waters polluted by the following substances in 
excess of the LAC is: for oil and oil products, about 45%; organic 
substances, 35%; detergents, 7%; zinc, 35%; copper, 75%; nitrites, 
35%; etc. For some substances the most polluted river in the former 
USSR is the Danube (Donau). In the National Report of the USSR 
to UNCED (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Pro-
tection of the USSR, 1991) there is a very detailed survey of the 
pollution in all regions, their rivers, lakes, and water reservoirs, and 
of the adjacent seas of the former Soviet Union. 
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Two great Russian lakes require special attention. First is Lake 
Baikal, which has the greatest volume of freshwater in the world. 
Among the main polluters are two pulp and paper mills. Near 
the estuary of the River Selenga in Baikal a stable area of about 
30 km2 has formed which is polluted by sulfates, chlorides, and 
organic substances. In this area during the last 10 years 17 out of 
27 species of benthos organisms have disappeared, and the biomass 
of zoobenthos has decreased by a factor of 3. 
Much more serious changes can be observed in Lake Ladoga, 
the largest lake in Europe. Around the lake there are seven paper 
mills, a large aluminium plant, and intensive agriculture. Only 15 
to 20 years ago it was one of the purest lakes and the Neva river 
supplied Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) with good quality drinking 
water. The largest increase in a polluting substance was observed 
for phosphorus, which has increased by a factor of 3 over the last 
30 years: the nitrogen level has increased by about 30%. There is 
a noticeable decrease in pH because of acidic depositions. At the 
beginning of the 1980s the lake changed its state from oligotrophic 
to mesotrophic and serious changes in its ecological systems can 
now be observed. The water supply of the 5 million inhabitants of 
St. Petersburg is now in jeopardy. 
Many other water reservoirs and lakes are in a state of eutroph-
ication or in danger of becoming eutrophic. Another very large 
environmental problem and source of controversy is the Leningrad 
dam (I do not want to call it the St. Petersburg dam). The purpose 
of the dam was to save Leningrad from floods which arise due to 
wind fetches from the Bay of Finland. Every year there are sev-
eral floods in which the water-level rise in the Neva river is about 
2 m, occasionally the water spills over the banks, but about once 
in a hundred years there is a major flood affecting large parts of 
the city. There were intense discussions about the dam in the late 
1970s but comments were suppressed and it was decided to build 
the dam in two parts: from the north coast of the bay to the island 
of Kotlin where the city of Kronstadt and the Kronstadt naval base 
are situated, and from the island to the south coast. The northern 
part of the sand dam was ready at the end of 1984, without any 
passages, and building started on the southern part. Since 1985, 
136 Georgi S. Golitsyn 
perestroika and glasnost have initiated a very large public debate 
about the dam. This was fueled by the obvious deterioration of 
the water quality in the enclosed parts of the bay behind the dam, 
by the prohibition of swimming or entering the water at the long 
beaches of the north coast, by the disappearance of fish, and many 
other signs of ecological deterioration (blooming algae, etc.) 
One of the main reasons for the deterioration was the almost 
complete absence of sewage-purifying facilities in the city. These 
facilities were supposed to be built before the dam: however, the 
first part of the construction, treating only about 60% of the city's 
sewage, was ready only in 1987. Of course, the dam changed the 
circulation in the separated, shallow part of the bay. The debate 
is still continuing and there is no clear plan for the next step. It 
is estimated that the destruction of the dam will be much costlier 
for the city than its construction, and the city does not have the 
funds. The inhabitants believe that the city was fine without the 
dam and that they could live without it altogether, but the First 
Party Secretary for Leningrad in the 1970s, G.V. Romanov, decided 
to commemorate himself by erecting the dam. Now the inhabitants 
are uncertain as to what action to take: meanwhile the ecological 
conditions are steadily deteriorating. This is one of the striking ex-
amples of the voluntaristic decisions of totalitarian society creating 
new ecological problems which have (almost) no solution. 
The water pollution problems which occur in the other coun-
tries under consideration are similar to those just described. That 
is, water pollution by sewage, industrial liquid waste, and water 
works in small streams, rivers, and wetlands which badly impair 
their capacities for self-cleaning and enhance water erosion of soil. 
Pollution from oil products, heavy metals, organic substances, ni-
trates, and nitrites is common everywhere. Insufficient purification 
of waste water and sewage is the main cause of bad quality drinking 
water, impaired water ecosystems, and restricted recreational wa-
ter activities. The worst water pollution problems occur in Poland; 
this is not only because of agricultural malpractices and acid rain, 
but is mostly due to seriously inadequate treatment of industrial 
and municipal waste water. In most cases, for example, in War-
saw, sewage is simply not treated and is deposited raw into the 
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Visla river. In 365 other Polish towns, in 1990, there were also no 
sewage treatment systems (IIASA, 1990; Russel, 1990). All this 
causes neighboring countries with better environmental practices 
to demand an improvement in the situation. 
The water pollution problem in the USSR attracted consider-
able attention during the 1970s and 1980s. Purification and the 
reuse of water in industry became common practices. In 1990, the 
percentage of industrial water needs covered by this was 72.5%, 
while in 1976 it was only 56.9%. In 1979 only 63% of sewage and 
industrial waste water was purified and in 1990 the figure rose to 
77%. A low rate of introduction of purifying facilities and enhanced 
requirements as to the degree of water purification all led, in 1990, 
to the situation where the required level and amount of water purifi-
cation had not been reached and only 30% of treated water matched 
up to new purification standards. Unfortunately, again in the late 
1980s, one could also observe an increase in the discharge of pol-
luted waters into natural systems and a considerable decrease in the 
rate of construction of polluted water treatment facilities [see Fig-
ures 1.14 and 1.15 in the National Report of the USSR to UNCED 
(Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Protection of the 
USSR, 1991)]. This was probably due to the recession, the lack of 
funds, and the decline in social responsibility. 
Soil Degradation, Deforestation, 
Desertification, and Biodiversity 
The area of land used for various kinds of agricultural activities 
in the USSR in 1990 was 600.1 Mha, or 6 million km2 (about 11 
times the area of France, or 70 times that of Austria). This was a 
7.7 Mha reduction compared with 1985. The area of ploughed land 
was 225.0 Mha in 1990 and 227.8 Mha in 1985. There was a related 
increase in the area of forests and bushes from 819.4 to 826.8 Mha, 
and a decrease in wetlands (mires) from 117.1 to 113.0 Mha, for 
1990 and 1985 respectively. 
The area of agricultural land (in 1990) was estimated to be 
about 500 Mha, including 220 Mha of ploughed land·. Most of 
the land, 300 and 150 Mha respectively for total and ploughed 
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land area, has a heavy or light mechanical soil composition and 
is therefore unfavorable for many crops. Salinized soils, or partly 
salinized ones, cover 97 and 19 Mha respectively of the total and 
ploughed land areas, acidified ones with a reduced pH cover 68 and 
52 Mha, overwetted ones cover 16 and 3.6 Mha, and areas with an 
excess of boulders take up 62 and 12 Mha. 
Between 1976 and 1990 the quality of ploughed land decreased 
considerably due to the use of new land of low quality and the use of 
fertile land for other non-agricultural purposes, and also because of 
bad agricultural practices. All these processes are still continuing. 
Water and wind erosion of the soil are the main causes of its 
degradation and of the loss of humus. During the last 15 to 20 years 
the loss of ploughed land is estimated to have reached 8-30% in 
various regions, and the area of eroded land has increased by about 
6 Mha, reaching 475 Mha and 177 Mha for the total agricultural and 
ploughed land areas respectively. The area of ravines had reached 
10 Mha in 1990 and their total length was more than 1 million km. 
Water erosion leads to the loss of useful substances from the 
soil at a rate equal to twice the rate at which they are introduced 
into it by mineral fertili zers. The eroded material contains about 
30% of the fertilizers and pesticides applied to the soil and enters 
water reservoirs, thus badly polluting them. The damage from this 
kind of pollution is of the same, or of an even higher , order as that 
from industrial waste or sewage. The production loss of eroded 
land is estimated to be between 36 and 47%. The measures which 
can be taken against water and wind erosion are well known, even 
at a regional level. However, their mass introduction is delayed by 
the absence of real owners of the land. In those places where such 
measures are fully implemented, erosion has been suppressed and 
production has doubled, or even tripled, with a return on invest-
ment taking from one to five years. 
The other shortcomings in agricultural practices which lead to 
serious ecological consequences are also common to all former Eu-
ropean CPE countries (see Blue Book, 1990), though they vary in 
scale and extent. One of these is soil compaction due to agricul-
tural machinery which is too heavy. This leads to a decrease in the 
ability of the soil to keep moisture, to a decrease in soil ventilation, 
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to an increase in run-off of melted and rain waters, and, hence, to 
soil erosion and degradation. Crop losses due to compaction are 
estimated to be between 5 and 25%. The problem is now well un-
derstood in the CIS and prototypes of much better machinery have 
been constructed and tested; but, again, the disintegration of the 
country has delayed the mass production of such machinery for an 
uncertain time. 
There is rapid deterioration of many arid pastures. The state 
of the pastures with sandy soils, especially in Kalmykia, the au-
tonomous republic on the northwest coast of the Caspian Sea, is 
close to an ecological catastrophe. The cause of this is the overuse 
of the pastures by sheep, insufficient fulfilment of measures for the 
restoration of grass cover, etc. In the Kalmykia and adjacent Dages-
tan republics the area of moving sands on pasture land has increased 
since 1954 from 15,000 ha to 1 Mha, and it is continuing to grow 
by 40- 50,000 ha annually. This is the first anthropogenic desert in 
Europe! 
Similar processes are observed in many places in Kazakhstan 
and the Middle Asian states. The Academies of Science of Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan have a wealth of experience in fighting 
desertification and transforming desert lands into productive pas-
tures: they share this with many developing countries which have 
arid and semi-arid zones. The time needed for a return on the in-
vestment of making pastures in arid zones is four to five years. Their 
productivity will be preserved for 20 to 25 years without additional 
investments if they are correctly exploited. Again, to apply such 
measures ubiquitously requires someone to have real responsibility 
for final production, i.e., making the land private property. 
In the tundra desertification has occurred as a result of large-
scale mining activities, geological reconnaissance work, and the 
overuse of reindeer pastures. During the last 20 years about 40 
Mha of such pasture was destroyed, an area greater than Germany! 
There are good plans for the conservation of the tundra, but the 
question is how and when will they be implemented. 
There is also soil degradation in areas of irrigation and drying 
wetlands. During the period 1970- 1990 in the former Soviet Union 
the area of irrigated land increased from 9.3 to 18.4 Mha. At the 
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same time, 4 Mha of irrigated land was excluded from agricultural 
use because of salinization and loss of fertility, a shortage of water in 
the irrigation networks, or degradation. The new area of salinized 
land is 6 Mha. Huge losses of water from irrigation channels and 
the enormous overuse of water are the main causes of the ecological 
catastrophe in the Aral region. The fast decrease in the Aral sea 
level, about 1 m per year, denudes its bottom, and winds blow salt 
and dust to distances of more than 500 km away, which increases 
the salinization of soil. 
The area of drained land has increased during the same 20 years 
from 3. 7 to 9.3 Mha. However, about 1 Mha lost its fertility due 
to overdrainage, especially in Belorussia and the Ukraine where 
moving sands have formed on the site of some former wetlands, 
fortunately on a small scale as yet. The useful role of wetlands is 
now being recognized, and in some regions, for example, Estonia, 
they are now protected. 
During the period 1972- 1989 the FSU lost 13.5 Mha of ploughed 
land due to the growth of bush and low-value forest, use of land for 
non-agricultural purposes, etc. Most of the losses due to the latter 
were because of the low financial value of the land as a result of it 
still being state property. 
Intensive acidification of soil is observed in many regions due 
to acid rain and overuse of acidic mineral fertilizers. Another kind 
of soil degradation is related to liquid manure from large pig and 
chicken farms. The manure is removed by hydrosystems and its 
total liquid volume now exceeds 1 km3. Only about 30% of it is 
used for fertilization and the rest is just polluting the environment, 
especially rivers and streams. Again, there are plans for the re-
construction of existing farms and the construction of new farms 
without hydrosystems but with other cleaning systems. How and 
when these would be implemented is very uncertain. 
Concerning the forests, there was a slow increase in their total 
area from 780 Mha in 1970 to 800 Mha in 1980 and 815 Mha in 1990 
in the USSR. However, the quality and total biomass of the forest 
is decreasing, the mature coniferous trees are being replaced by 
young birch, aspen, and bush. The increase in forest area is related 
mostly to the abandonment of agricultural lands, but the decrease 
Environmental Aspects of the Transformation of GP Es 141 
in quality is due to overcutting good, mature timber forests and 
increasing forest fires. Massive forest dieback is observed due to 
air pollution caused by chemicals, as well as the general worsening 
of the state of forests in many places. The official data are that 
between 1970 and 1990 about 0.6 Mha of forest died due to air 
pollution, and more than 1 Mha of forest was damaged. However, 
satellite data revealed that these figures were reduced by a factor 
of two or three (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
Protection of the USSR, 1991). The most striking examples of 
dieback are: in the vicinity of the Norilsk nickel complex where 
300 kha of forest has died; the Bratsk aluminium plant, 140 kha; 
the area near Irkutsk, 70 kha; and the North Nickel Combinate at 
the Kola peninsula, 50 kha. Most of the forests , especially in the 
European part of the CIS, are influenced by a variety of regional 
pollutions. 
The weakening of the forests makes them prone to pests and 
diseases, which are observed every year over areas of up to 2 Mha. 
Forests situated around cities are also badly damaged by recre-
ational activities, which lead to the degradation of forest ecosys-
tems in an area of radius 20 to 100 km, thus ceasing the natural 
restoration of the forests. The degradation also leads to the spread 
of pollution and disease, and, finally, to forest dieback. 
Deforestation leads to a decrease in carbon dioxide extraction 
from the atmosphere, an increase in the surface albedo, and, there-
fore, to changes in the radiation budget of ecosystems. It increases 
the climate continentality and causes a deterioration in the hydrom-
eteorological conditions needed for forest restoration (Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment Protection of the USSR, 1991). 
In reality it leads to the spread of tundra at the northern boundary 
of forests (contrary to expectations for undamaged ecosystems), or 
to the spread of steppes in the south. Deforestation decreases evap-
otranspiration, which changes the water regime of ecosystems and 
leads to the spread of mires. 
Desert and ·semi-desert areas cover about 10% of the former 
USSR (this includes 193 Mha of pasture, more than half this land). 
At the end of the 1960s the percentage of pasture with open and 
moving sands was only 5 to 10%: in 1990 it had reached 20 to 30%, 
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which is close to the potential ecological catastrophe of the full loss 
of pasture. Only about 15 to 20% of pasture is in a satisfactory con-
dition with the flora close to its natural, unaffected state. This leads 
to an increase in albedo and the worsening of hydrometeorological 
conditions, which makes the restoration of pasture ecosystems even 
more difficult and stimulates further desertification. This is another 
example of a positive feedback acting to enhance a negative effect. 
Similar processes are occurring in the other countries under 
discussion, as can be seen in the Blue Book (1990) and from work 
at IIASA (1990), but the scale and extent of degradation are less. 
Unfortunately, these sources do not give figures for different years 
so it is difficult to judge quantitatively the dynamics of changes in 
the environment. However, the same problems with soil, humus, 
soil compaction, overuse of fertilizers , manure which is too liquid, 
and the pollution of streams are observed everywhere. The causes 
are the same: people do not consider themselves as real masters of 
the land and feel no real responsibility for it, as was the case in all 
totalitarian states. 
In the former USSR there are about 2,000 species of trees and 
thousands of species of grass and many lower plants. There are 
about 600 wild varieties of cultured plants , which represent the in-
valuable gene pool. Wild plants give about 12.5 Mt of the most 
valuable food products. About 2,500 plant species have a poten-
tial for medicine, but only about 200 of them have been studied 
in detail. About 40% of the medicine in pharmacies is produced 
from natural plants, and half the raw material is collected from the 
wilderness. The flora is influenced by the same anthropogenic fac-
tors as forests and is deteriorating. Many of the plants are now in 
the Red Book of endangered plants which must be protected at all 
costs. 
For the conservation of flora and fauna the USSR was the first 
country to introduce state reservations, which are areas without 
any human activity. Between 1970 and 1990 the number of these 
reservations increased from 91 to 167 and their area tripled: they 
currently occupy 21 Mha, i.e., 1 % of the total area of the FSU. 
The numbers of many animals, such as sable, beaver, brown bear, 
elk, deer, and boar, have increased. However, there is a danger 
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that many states which are now independent will not allocate re-
sources to these reserves or will relax their regime of human non-
intervention. 
In the author's personal experience, in the area around Moscow 
and the Central European part of Russia it is true to say that if 
the biodiversity of flora has not decreased greatly, the number of 
many organisms has certainly been drastically reduced. There are 
far fewer birds singing in the forests in spring, hardly any frogs are 
heard around ponds, rivers, or water reservoirs, and many butter-
flies have disappeared. Similar data can be found in the Blue Book 
(1990): in the Czech republic 95% of butterflies have disappeared 
from the landscape and out of 27 of the most common only 11 exist 
now. All this is caused by the sequence of pesticides, fertilizers, 
acid rain, etc. Therefore, the flora and fauna of the CIS and the 
other Eastern countries require continuing and increasing attention 
and efforts for their preservation. The extent and materialization 
of these efforts are very uncertain for the future , especially for the 
CIS. 
The Public Health Connection and 
Other Socioeconomic Aspects of 
the State of the Environment 
The influence of the state of the environment on public health is 
clearly seen at the local and, sometimes, the regional level, but not 
at the national level, especially for such a large country as the for-
mer USSR. We will not consider birth and death rate problems here 
because of the many complications involved in demography. One 
fact, however, should be noted, that is, a considerable decrease in 
the birth rate: in 1986 it was 20.0 children per 1,000 people, and 
in 1990 it was only 16.8. A further decrease is expected in the 
figures for 1991. Now (in early 1992), in this period of economic 
reform when liberalized prices are 10 to 100 times higher than in 
1990 and salaries have only been increased by a factor of between 
3 and 5, young couples are quite horrified at the prospect of having 
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babies. People can feed themselves (and not starve) on bread, cere-
als, vegetables, and, occasionally, meat: but, in early 1992, there is 
a shortage of milk and milk products in the larger cities and when 
they appear for sale people in huge lines pay between 30 and 60 
times more than they would have done a year before.[4] 
The mean life expectancy in 1989 was 69.5 years (64.6 for men, 
74.0 for women): this had remained more or less stable in the pre-
ceding 3 years. It is worth noting that between 1987 and 1989 the 
urban population had a life expectancy which was 1. 7 years longer 
than the rural population's life expectancy, probably due to better 
medical care. For the years since 1989 one may expect to see a 
decrease in life expectancy due to worse economic conditions and 
the lack of drugs. 
Life expectancy can be broadly correlated with the regional eco-
logical situation: it is less than average by a few years in the Mid-
dle Asian states, Kazakhstan, and Moldova, which are notorious 
for their poor-quality drinking water as a result of pollution from 
agriculture. The main cause of death, 56% in 1989, was disease of 
the blood circulation system: this has decreased in absolute terms 
from 692 to 641 per 100,000 people since 1980. In absolute and rel-
ative terms, deaths from respiration diseases also decreased: from 
124 in 1980 to 78 in 1989. At the same time, cancer took 169 lives 
(per 100,000) in 1980 and 189 lives in 1989. One may suspect that 
this is due to the increased influence of carcinogens, like benz(a)-
pyrene, but a thorough statistical analysis is needed to clarify the 
relationship. The child (up to 1 year old) mortality rate does show 
a very good correlation with sanitation and the quality of drinking 
water. Digestive tract infections are about 10 times more often the 
cause of mortality in the Middle Asian states than in the Baltic 
states. The child mortality rate in the region near the Aral, a zone 
of ecological catastrophe, is 7 times the average over the whole of 
the former Soviet Union: it reached 150 in 1990 compared with 21.8 
per 1,000 newly born babies in the former Soviet Union. The lowest 
child mortality rate was in Lithuania (10. 7), but that country had 
the highest percentage of children born with anomalies, 43% more 
than the average over the whole of the former Soviet Union, and 
3 times more than in Turkmenistan, which has the highest child 
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mortality rate of 54. 7! At the same time, the number of cancers in 
Turkmenistan is almost 8 times less than in the otherwise well off 
Estonia, where the cancer incidence in 1986 was about 60% higher 
than the average over the whole of the former Soviet Union. 
In the national report to UNCED five types of territories were 
classified, with various industrial structures, socioeconomic infras-
tructure, etc., varying from heavily industrialized territory, such 
as the Moscow region, to an agrarian one with low infrastructure, 
such as Middle Asia. They have their own specific disease charac-
teristics. In heavily industrialized urban areas there has been an 
increase during the last 15 years of children with bronchial asthma 
by a factor of five or six, while the average factor across t he coun-
try is three. There has been a general, large increase in allergies 
which were virtually unknown only two generations ago. We have 
already noted the 12% increase in lethal cancer cases during the 
1980s. The increase is considerably more in highly industrialized 
regions. There is also a marked growth in lost working time due to 
sickness and care of the sick. 
There are cases of the occurrence of strange, unknown diseases, 
which are suspected as being caused by pollution by toxic sub-
stances or heavy metals. In 1988 a lot of public attention was 
attracted by the mass falling out of children's hair in the Ukrainian 
city of Chernovtsy. First thallium was suspected, but then local , 
national, and international experts had to confess that the reason 
was not known. Thousands of children, meanwhile, were evacuated 
from the city. Recently, information that was suppressed gave the 
cause as being raisins from Turkey which had been treated with 
pesticides and delivered to the local cake and candy factory: most 
of the affected children had parents working at the factory. 
The same tendencies in the health of the population can be 
found in other countries (see IIASA, 1990; Blue Book, 1990; Russel, 
1990). In strongly polluted areas, life expectancy is several years 
lower than the average, allergies are considerably more common, 
and there are more respiratory diseases (for example, in children in 
North Moravia there is 40% more such disease compared with the 
average in the Czech republic, and in Prague such disease is between 
2 and 4 times more frequent than in smaller, cleaner cities). In 
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the 1980s in Czechoslovakia, the number of pollen allergy sufferers 
increased six-fold, and ten-fold among children. Noise pollution 
increases hypertonia, insomnia, and fatigue. 
In general, the interrelationship between a particular disease 
and the state of the environment is complicated and requires signif-
icant data base enlargement to analyze the problem. In 1982 in the 
USSR the Automated State Information System-Health (ASIS-H) 
was organized: between 1982 and 1990 its data led to the proposal 
of four groups of polluters. These were: phenol, formaldehyde, S02 , 
and H2S, which cause internal diseases of the respiratory and di-
gestive tracts and the blood circulation system; particulates, NOx , 
and CO, which cause respiratory diseases in elderly people, disease 
of the heart and blood vessels, and skin diseases; benz(a)pyrene, a 
major carcinogen; and heavy metals, which cause various disorders 
of the immune and other systems of the human body. At least some 
parts of the ASIS- H system are left in Russia, but what has been 
preserved in the other independent states is not known. The whole 
problem should be an area of well-coordinated, international study, 
preferably organized by the World Health Organization. 
The state of the environment influences not only the physical 
health of the population, and biodiversity is not only of material 
value as a gene pool or a pharmaceutical source. A beautiful land-
scape full of plants, birds singing, and moving fauna is a source 
of peace of mind and rest in our socially and psychologically dis-
turbed society. Many people value a healthy environment for that 
reason. The Blue Book (1990) states: "Decaying forests enhance 
the unconscious aggressiveness, particularly of youths , against Na-
ture, but also against other socially valuable objects" . Thus, we 
find cases of street vandalism and destruction of nature at recre-
ational areas everywhere in the former socialist countries (but not 
only in them). 
The deterioration of the environment also poses a question 
which has never been seriously considered or worked out in the 
former socialist countries: that is, the question of intergenerational 
equity. Do we have a moral, ethical, legal, or any other right to 
leave behind a much more depressing, poorer, and unhealthier en-
vironment than we enjoyed in our younger years? Do we care about 
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our children, grandchildren, and the next generations in general, or 
do we only care about our own immediate needs? Do we even care 
about ourselves (remembering numerous examples of considerable 
environmental change and their increased impacts during the last 
decade or two)? 
We are not considering here global problems such as global 
warming or ozone depletion. The problems we are considering are 
the more local or regional ones, for example, acid rain.[5] Most 
of the developed countries have found methods, technologies, and 
political determination to cope rather successfully with them, and 
the state of their environment is considerably better than a gen-
eration ago and than it is now in the eastern part of Europe and 
beyond. Here is just one example (Russel, 1990). In the UK in 
1985, in England and Wales 90% of the length of river and canal 
was of "good" and "fair" quality. The river water in Poland sat-
isfied only about 32% of a somewhat less strict classification and 
in the Czech republic 44% of river water satisfied the same crite-
ria. In the President's Message on Environmental Quality to the 
Congress of the United States, George Bush had the full right in 
April 1991 to write: " ... Compared to the conditions facing Amer-
icans earlier in my lifetime, our skies are clearer, our lakes and 
streams are cleaner, and our major technologies are less wasteful" 
{Environmental Quality, 1991 ). 
The Prospects of Improving the Environment 
The immediate prospects of improving the environment may be 
good in the case of the former socialist countries because all of them 
are in recession (the CIS has the largest recession), so stress on the 
environment should be relaxed. Of course, it is very difficult to 
quantify the improvements, if any (see footnote (3]!). For instance, 
the 13 February 1992 edition of the Moscow newspaper Izvestia an-
nounced that in January 1992 12% less oil and 15% less coal were 
produced in the CIS compared with January 1991 (compare this 
with the corresponding abovementioned 11 and 12% reduction for 
Russia), so there are great shortages of fuel in the Baltic states, the 
Ukraine, and almost everywhere else. These states are now trying 
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to import oil from other countries. Since there is a great shortage 
of capital, the imports do not cover all the needs. So one may ex-
pect less CO, S02 , and NOx emissions. However, such reductions 
are not the result of a positive effort by those states. Moreover, 
during conditions of disruption in economic relationships, huge re-
cession[6], and a sharp fall in people's standard of living, as in the 
CIS, maintenance to ensure the proper functioning of environment 
protection equipment, and its ability to do so, could be greatly re-
duced, so damage may increase in many places. The recession in 
the CIS is expected to deepen, at least for 1992, so there might 
be some prospects for environmental improvement, but with the 
provisions just described. 
New local authorities do not give details about how production 
units should observe environmental rules, so the units are not in-
terested in the details of the real harm they do to the environment. 
Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, production falls but pollution 
goes up. 
A slow recession, which started in many branches of the econ-
omy of the USSR in about 1985, is not favorable for increasing the 
attention of industry leaders to environmental issues. A thorough 
analysis of the USSR's report to UNCED reveals that in the first 
half of the 1980s much more action was taken than in the second 
half. To what degree hopes for a better environment in a period 
of fast recession materialize remains to be seen. A guide as to the 
reality of such hopes can be found if we look at the situation in 
Hungary. There has been a decrease in S02 emissions there which 
is ascribed to the recession (IIASA, 1990). The loss of the USSR 
market for agricultural products has led Hungary into a consid-
erable agricultural recession: again, this has somewhat improved 
the environment. Similar processes should be observed in other 
countries. 
However, it may be the case that in a few years the recession will 
stop and economic reforms will succeed. What about the environ-
ment then? First of all, one should not forget about it altogether 
during the bad years of transition and recession. In the Russian 
Federation at the beginning of 1992 the formation of the "Ecology 
of Russia" program was announced. What form it will take and 
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what funds, if any, it will be allocated remains to be seen.[7] The 
other independent states have not even made any definite comments 
in public on ecological problems. This is not a wise policy. Politi-
cians should remember that political unrest in the Baltic republics 
started with a strong "green" movement against some ecologically 
(and economically) unsound projects, such as the phosphate min-
ing and fertilizer plant in Estonia. Soon, this ecological movement 
was transformed and grew into a movement for, first, economic and 
then political independence. Most of the new independent states 
are also multi-national and they should remember this experience. 
The worst polluters in many places in the former USSR were 
closed between 1989 and 1990 by local authorities under pressure 
from the local green movements. In many cases, these polluters 
were pharmaceutical factories or unique production plants, so end-
ing their operation stopped the production of a whole chain of 
plants. In some cases, serious shortages of medicine and massive 
production losses forced the local authorities , often due to pressure 
from the central authorities, to reopen these factories and plants, 
having received an undertaking that they would purify their waste 
(how that was fulfilled is another question). The straightforward 
solutions are the installation of new cleaning facili ties for sewage 
and water wastes, desulfurization units in power stations, catalytic 
converters in cars, etc. Again, this requires capital , i.e. , hard cur-
rency. 
The whole of the economy needs restructuring. The change in 
emphasis in heavy industry (its conversion from military produc-
tion to production for civilian consumer needs) should considerably 
reduce the demand for steel and many other primary materials , the 
production of which causes heavy pollution. However, this alone 
will not be enough. An environmental dimension should be incor-
porated into new development programs using modern technologies 
and rigorous implementation of environmental legislation (Russel, 
1990). 
This might be the most difficult part for all the countries. First , 
all of them are in debt and lack the necessary convertible currency. 
They should not expect massive foreign aid. They may expect 
some aid from the IMF and/or the World Bank, but quite often 
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such aid, at least for developing countries, is now given to particu-
lar projects which include an obligatory environmental assessment. 
However, they may expect technical aid in the form of consultants, 
education, etc. Therefore, they should mostly rely on themselves, 
their hard work, and devotion to carry out the reforms successfully, 
to work out good legislation and implement it, to develop real eco-
nomic incentives for including the consideration of the environment 
in the economic process. An example of such an incentive could be 
the release of state subsidies from the energy and agricultural sec-
tors, the main polluters, directly to the natural resources account , 
resources such as water, land with its minerals, the biosphere, etc. 
The World Resources Institute (WRI) proposes that this should be 
considered as the natural capital and should be counted when es-
timating the functioning of national economies. Such assessments 
have already been performed by the WRI for Indonesia and Costa 
Rica (Repetto et al., 1989; Solorzano et al. , 1991). 
As is noted in Russel (1990), the largest polluters are usually 
those sectors which are most heavily subsidized, and therefore the 
most inefficient ones. If the subsidies were to be removed, and if 
there were proper taxes and incentives in a market economy, those 
polluters would either quickly reorganize themselves or become ex-
tinct. However , as the experience of the CIS shows, it is a long way 
to a true market economy if one starts from the situation where 
almost any producer has a monopoly. 
To achieve any success, or even acceptance of such measures 
by the public, a great effort should be made now, especially in the 
CIS, but also in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, to educate people 
in environmental problems, to make them aware of the problems 
and to disseminate information, which is only possible through the 
mass media. This would be especially difficult in the CIS. In the for-
mer USSR in the first years of perestroika environmental problems 
drew the public's attention, and that of the mass media. However , 
at that time the economic situation was changing slowly. Now, 
when there is a large mismatch between people's salaries and the 
prices and availability of goods, and the economy is recessing very 
quickly, not many people care about the environment. However, 
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this process of education of the public, of administrators, politi-
cians, newly appearing businessmen, and of NGOs must continue. 
Education of the public is best performed by direct participation 
in impact assessment and policy development. 
The sort of aid which may be valuable and can be given ef-
ficiently is a kind of patronage from the countries' closest neigh-
bors, the EC. That organization could determine environmental 
standards and help to implement them, share its experience in leg-
islation and its implementation, in public education, in advanced 
environmentally friendly technologies and products , etc. 
A lot of new research should be done to establish standards 
for new substances and, in many cases, to reassess old ones. For 
this purpose, a sophisticated analysis of medical statistics, together 
with state of the environment and emission inventories, should be 
performed. In the CIS there exists a wealth of data on the long-
term influences of various levels of radioactivity on human health 
and the state of the biosphere. The data need systematization 
and analysis. These kinds of studies are on the agenda for every 
developed country, and modest grants to do such research would be 
very helpful in supporting science in the CIS and a good investment 
for grantors. 
However, a genuine improvement in the environment can not 
happen without a general rise in the state of the economy, and its 
restructuring, or without the success of economic reforms required 
to introduce a market economy, with proper economic incentives 
set by central governments in the form of charges, taxes, or tax 
relief aimed at helping the environment. Also, only people who 
are properly fed, dressed, and who have a good standard of living 
will care about the environment and other spiritual values which 
have no instant profit . So if the present situation stabilizes at a 
low standard of living, then people's indifference, the deterioration 
of the present level of monitoring, and administrative corruption in 
the implementation of legislation would, eventually, lead to further 
degradation of the environment, especially in the CIS. 
The general strategy for the improvement of the environment 
- ecologically sustainable development - should be the same every-
where: it involves reducing the stress on the environment as far as 
152 Georgi S. Golitsyn 
possible, using as few as possible non-renewable resources, reducing 
waste, recycling and reusing materials, and organizing production 
in such a way that the wastes of one technological line become in-
put material for another. However, to implement these ideas in the 
form of concrete actions requires a long period of societal education 
and change. 
In most countries the energy sector is a major polluter. There 
are large areas of potential progress here, both on the production 
side ( cogeneration, the use of a different fuel mix, more renew-
ables) and, particularly, on the consumption and user side, i.e., 
energy-efficient transport, especially cars and trucks, electrical mo-
tors, lighting, residential appliances, house heating, etc. Saving 
energy must be encouraged. This is not the case at present in the 
CIS. The author's own institute received in January 1992 the quo-
tas for electricity for the year, with the provision that if we exceed 
the quota we should pay much more per kWh, but if we remain un-
der the quota, again we should pay more for the unused electricity! 
This practice must end. 
Also, energy efficiency is a major factor not only in curing the 
economy, but also in reducing carbon dioxide emissions into the at-
mosphere. Since the greenhouse effect and subsequent global warm-
ing is the real global problem, UNCED would probably adopt the 
framework climate convention. It would need a global solution. The 
least-cost approach has been used for some time at the state level 
throughout the USA by many utilities. Among them, the leaders 
are Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison, and New 
England Electric System. These companies expect to meet most 
of their new demand up to the year 2000 by being efficient and 
employing energy-saving measures (The Council on Environmental 
Quality, 1991 ). Such an accomplishment would be invaluable for 
Eastern and Central European countries. The least-cost abatement 
strategy opens up bright, new opportunities for the richer countries. 
They could invest in emission reduction not in their own economy, 
which is already quite efficient and to increase the efficiency fur-
ther and reduce C02 emissions would be very costly, but in the 
developing countries and in the states of the CIS and Eastern Eu-
rope, where for the same money much greater reductions could be 
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achieved because of the much greater potential for an increase in 
efficiency and much cheaper labor, especially in the crs. If those 
countries took such a stance, then the prospects for the environment 
would be considerably brighter. Finland and Sweden are already 
aiding Poland in reducing its sulfur emissions, which go directly 
into their countries. Finland and Norway are helping Kola Nickel 
Combinate to reduce its emissions too. 
If we look several decades into the future for the countries in 
question, and suppose that economic reforms succeed, then the po-
tential for energy efficiency and inexpensive improvements would 
end. What will be the prospects for sustainable development then? 
That is the big question. For the developed countries this question 
may arise much sooner, probably in this decade, before the year 
2000. The basic question is: what makes humans on the planet 
Earth really happy and to what extent should natural resources be 
spent for people in different places, in the north or south, or east 
or west. Life will always ask questions which are difficult to an-
swer, but we should find answers anyway, although the questions 
are becoming tougher and tougher, and finding the right answers 
becomes more and more difficult. 
Notes 
[1] The dangers of monopolies were always clear to the Soviet rulers and 
they avoided them at all costs in the industrial military complex, 
especially in aviation, rocketry, and satellites where the presence of 
many firms ensured the competitiveness of the USSR in the arms 
race with NATO countries. 
[2] A contemporary example of social apathy can be seen in the result 
of additional elections in the Parliament of the Russian Federation 
in November 1991 in the Yaroslavl region (some 300 km northeast of 
Moscow). As only 31 % of voters came to the polls, it was declared 
invalid, because 50% of voters have to vote for the election to be 
valid. In a similar case in Leningrad in June 1991 only 25% of the 
voters came to the polls. 
[3] As the author learned in early May 1992 at the Russian Ministry for 
the Environment and Natural Resources Use, production in the Rus-
sian Federation in 1991 fell by 15%, but pollution rose by 10%. The 
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reasons for this are many and include the general economic degrada-
tion and shortage of funds. In such a situation funds for the mainte-
nance of cleaning facilities are the first to suffer, then problems are 
caused by aging equipment, the use of old technology, and a lack of 
general working discipline. Emissions from burning fuels, etc., should 
go down because there is less to burn, but other effluents can and do, 
evidently, go up. So all expectations that a decrease in production 
will result in less stress on the environment should be given up. 
(4] The same increase applies to clothes and other goods. The monthly 
salary of the author, as the Director of the Institute of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, after taxes, was enough to buy one tire for 
a car, 20 kg of meclium-quality meat, and one pair of lower-quality 
winter boots for his wife or daughter, etc. Very soon people will wear 
out their clothes and shoes and this will be their prime concern . It 
is not difficult to imagine what people's morale will be like and how 
much they will care about the environment in the CIS. No increase 
in production is expected and the situation will not improve until 
the end of 1992, as President Yeltsin has promised. 
[5] From the problems related to climate change at the regional scale, 
one must mention the dramatic rise of the Caspian Sea level. Since 
1977, when it reached the minimum level after almost 50 years of fluc-
tuating decline, it has started to rise continuously due to increased 
run-off, 80% of which is supplied by the Volga, increased precipi-
tation, decreased evaporation, and the Kara-Bogaz-Gol dam, which 
was erected in 1980 to prevent a further fall in sea level. The total 
increase up until 1992 is 1.9 m, which causes major damage to coastal 
cities, roads, ports, etc., in Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran , 
and Azerbaijan. 
[6] In the Russian Federation in 1991 the decrease in production was 
14%, and in 1992 it is expected to be 15% (Izvestia, 15 February 
1992). Similar, or larger, figures can be expected for the other inde-
pendent states. 
[7] No funds have been distributed as of mid-May 1992. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Pluralism and Convergence 
in International Science Policy 
Sheila J asanoff 
Introduction 
The authority of science as an institut ion has been under siege since 
the end of World War II. The atomic bomb, the headlong build-up 
of nuclear arsenals by the superpowers during the cold war, the 
spate of technological disasters in economically disadvantaged re-
gions of the world, and, most recently, the growing consciousness 
of the frailty and finiteness of the biosphere - all these have con-
tributed to a public perception of science and its attendant tech-
nologies that is as cautious as it is deferential. Technology, from 
computers to contraceptives, is widely regarded as humankind 's pri-
mary resource for economic and social betterment, just as scientific 
research is still prized as one of the noblest applications of human 
critical thought. As we near the end of the century, however, there 
is a persistent intellectual unease about the directions of modern 
scientific inquiry, about the wisdom and integrity of the inquirers , 
and, most particularly, about the dangers that may follow from an 
overly intimate alliance between science and the state. 
To these manifest concerns, recent academic studies of science 
and technology have contributed a more subtle strain of skepti-
cism. Is it appropriate for science to claim a cognitive authority 
superior to that of other social institutions because it alone is able 
to find out truths about nature? Does the commitment of science to 
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detached and dispassionate inquiry sufficiently justify its asserted 
institutional right to autonomy and self-regulation? Historical and 
sociological research over the last two decades has raised doubts on 
both scores by presenting us with accounts of science that stress its 
in-built sociality. Scientific knowledge, according to a growing body 
of work, is a social construct, contingent on human interactions, and 
susceptible to the multiple influences of economics, ideology, cul-
ture, and political interest. Indeed, the closer science draws to the 
political arena, the narrower the distance seems to grow between 
the processes of science and politics. In the limiting case, the sci-
entific controversies that so frequently erupt in the course of policy 
making simply retrace the patterns of more enduring conflicts in 
society. 
Yet scientific and technical experts play an ever more influen-
tial role in the definition and control of fundamental social problems 
such as hunger, disease, environmental decay, and international se-
curity. With the growing worldwide saliency of these issues, the 
global community appears increasingly to have pinned its hopes for 
the future on science and technology. Not only are scientific knowl-
edge and know-how deemed essential for managing the world's most 
pressing problems, but science, because of its still potent claims to 
value-neutrality, promises to provide the only forum where nations 
can set aside their political and cultural differences in favor of a 
common, rationalistic approach to problem solving. To "scientize" 
an issue is at once to assert that there are systematic, discoverable 
methods for coping with it and to suggest that these approaches can 
be worked out independently of nationalistic or sectarian interests. 
The yearning to resolve social problems by appealing to the apo-
litical authority of science persists, even as accumulating evidence 
emphasizes the porosity of the membrane that actually separates 
science from society. 
My objective in this paper is to try to reconcile these contradic-
tory impulses about science and technology in the context of inter-
national science .policy. How can we gracefully come to terms with 
postmodern views about the relativism of scientific knowledge with-
out rejecting the possibility that science may provide a uniquely 
effective avenue for harmonizing disparate conceptions about the 
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rights of human beings, their place in nature, and their obligations 
toward each other and to their planet? I approach this question 
by first briefly reviewing several strands of scholarship that have 
revealed a previously unsuspected subjectivity, and a consequent 
pluralism, in the claims of science about the real world. Second, 
I discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship be-
tween science and public policy. Finally, I attempt to draw some 
lessons for science policy in the international arena from experiences 
which thus far have accumulated primarily in the varied national 
contexts of policy making. 
The Deconstruction of Scientific Authority 
In everyday talk about science policy, scientific knowledge is gen-
erally seen as the answer to problems; decision makers conceive of 
science as a mechanical component of solid reliability that can be 
fitted intact into the policy process. It comes as no surprise when 
senior officials at the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
vow "to get the science right" in carrying out the nation 's environ-
mental program[!] or when the Commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration turns to an expert committee for recommendations 
on how to improve the flow of scientific advice into his agency. For 
many years, a similarly naive optimism marked academic writing 
about science policy. Nearly two decades of postwar collaboration 
between American science advisers and their government produced 
no deeper insight than Harvey Brooks's well-known dictum that 
science can both act upon policy ("science in policy") and be acted 
upon by it ("policy for science").[2] 
Awareness that there might be unforeseen complexities in the 
relationship between science and science-based policy was slow to 
develop. An early contribution was a 1970 essay by the physicist 
and nuclear expert Alvin Weinberg. Spurred by new and controver-
sial developments in the public management of risky technologies, 
Weinberg speculated on the implications of policy makers' increas-
ing dependence on inadequate scientific evidence. Questions were 
asked of science, he noted in a now famous passage, that science was 
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not in a position to answer; Weinberg dubbed these issues "trans-
science" and suggested that scientists had a special obligation to 
"inject discipline and order into the often chaotic trans-scientific 
debate." [3] But although his essay underscored the problematic 
nature of the boundary between science and policy, it adhered to 
a conventionally linear notion of the relationship between the two 
fields of endeavor. Science, as Weinberg saw it, was still something 
that could be cleanly done by scientists and factored as needed into 
policy. The only complication was that pure science was no longer 
sufficient for solving social problems. Policy makers also needed to 
ask and resolve a variety of trans-scientific issues with a bearing on 
public decisions. For these, Weinberg judged the open and adver-
sarial processes of the law to be most appropriate, at least in the 
legalistic decision-making culture of the United States. 
The scientific and technical controversies of the early 1970s, 
however, brought forth evidence that Weinberg's model was too 
simple to capture all that was really taking place at the nexus 
of science and policy. A largely American body of case studies 
documented the important role that political interests played in 
the production and interpretation of science for policy purposes.[4] 
'Whether the objective was to site a nuclear power plant, market 
a new drug or pesticide, or build a new supersonic aircraft, it ap-
peared that the proponents of technology consistently read the ev-
idence of risk or safety differently from its opponents. As long as 
the science was uncertain - as Weinberg said was always the case 
when predicting extremely improbable events - the likelihood of ob-
jective scientific analysis appeared to be extremely low. Organized 
interests were always on the alert to give the available information 
a spin that supported their own demands with respect to science 
and technology policy. 
While political scientists and policy analysts focused mostly 
on the subordination of science to interests, a string of studies in-
spired by cultural anthropology argued that interests and prefer-
ences had to be grounded in a social context and that social orga-
nizations and institutions were therefore a more productive starting 
point for investigating how science was interpreted under conditions 
of uncertainty. Why, for example, did expert judgments about 
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environmental degradation and deforestation in the Himalayas dif-
fer so radically with respect to such seemingly scientific "facts" as 
"per capita fuelwood consumption"? Three researchers who ad-
dressed this question concluded that the experts' views were con-
ditioned in every case by underlying, socially induced perceptions 
of the problem. The "facts" that the experts had tried to discover 
about the Himalayas were so variable and context-bound, in short 
so irretrievably trans-scientific, that they could not possibly be as-
certained through universal models of scientific inquiry. What the 
experts had to offer in the end were not descriptions of reality in 
any epistemologically tenable sense, but rather varying interpreta-
tions of uncertainty shaped by their own and their informants' local 
contexts and locally colored world views.[5] 
Social organization has also been offered as the explanation for 
divergences in the public perception of risks from contemporary 
technologies. Building on a theoretical framework first developed 
by the anthropologist Mary Douglas, a number of authors have ar-
gued that risk perceptions are conditioned by two factors common 
to all organizations: the strength of a group's boundaries in relation 
to the rest of society, and the rigidity of the internal rules of pre-
scription or differentiation within the group. Applying this model 
to the American environmental movement, for example, Douglas 
and her co-author, the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, sug-
gested that entrepreneurial cultures, characterized as low on both 
the grouping and prescriptive dimensions, are generally most open 
to the risks as well as the benefits of new technologies. By contrast, 
Douglas and Wildavsky saw strongly grouped, egalitarian cultures 
as intrinsically risk-averse, because they are able to defend their 
group's social identity most effectively by reacting against a per-
ceived external threat.[6] 
If interests and cultural biases permeate the way people perceive 
risk, then traces of such bias can be expected to surface in the anal-
ysis of scientific evidence purporting to establish that risks exist. 
Numerous comparative policy studies lend support to this hypoth-
esis. In my own work on chemical regulation in Europe and the 
United States, which used political rather than social organization 
as the relevant independent variable, I found systematic differences 
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in the way national regulatory experts interpreted evidence of car-
cinogenicity from animal and epidemiological studies.[7] Features 
of political culture, such as the extent and forms of public partici-
pation, influenced the reading of science, accounting in many cases 
for divergent interpretations of the same body of data. The open 
and adversarial style of US regulation, in particular, exposed the 
uncertainties in the data, raised questions about the principles of 
risk assessment, and perpetuated technical debate in a manner that 
was virtually unknown in Europe. The dynamics of the politics of 
science as revealed in these studies were remarkably similar to more 
general patterns of national regulatory politics.[8] 
Does the interplay between scientific uncertainty and social in-
stitutions or interests fully account for the myriad ways in which 
science splinters, fragments, and kaleidoscopically rearranges itself 
in the policy context? Recent work in the sociology of science sug-
gests that a deeper explanation can be found in the means of pro-
duction of scientific claims. Close observations of science in the 
making have revealed that the validity of scientific "facts" and "the-
ories" depends on tacitly negotiated, interpretive conventions that 
are shared among communities of researchers .[9] Science, thus "so-
cially constructed," retains its authoritative status as long as its 
underlying premises are not scrutinized too closely or with hostile 
intent. It is, however, always vulnerable to deconstruction, and 
particularly so in the policy arena, where pressure from compet-
ing interest groups and organizational cultures routinely militates 
against consensus-building or closure around any particular account 
of "reality."[10] 
At the junction between science and policy, even the definition 
of "science" is open to interpretation and renegotiation. Weinberg, 
as we saw, identified a bridging domain of trans-science between 
pure science and pure policy, but his approach failed to recog-
nize that assigning an issue to one or other side of the science-
policy boundary can never be a neutral exercise. Labeling an issue 
as either "science" or "policy" implicitly entails an allocation of 
power, as has been compellingly illustrated by decades of contro-
versy about the principles of cancer risk assessment in .the United 
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States. Regulatory agencies have tended to stress the policy content 
of these principles, a move that preserves their discretionary right 
to articulate and modify them; industry and some segments of the 
scientific community, by contrast, have characterized the principles 
as science and pressed to remove their definition and revision to 
conventional scientific forums. While both sides recognize the im-
portance of scientific uncertainty, regulators construe uncertainty as 
legitimating policy choice, whereas industry representatives see it 
as a justification for the exercise of expert judgment. Similar forms 
of boundary drawing have occurred with respect to the definitions 
of "peer review" and "risk assessment" as parties with stakes in reg-
ulation have sought to emphasize or de-emphasize the "scientific" 
character of these procedures. [11) 
The boundaries of "science" are taken more for granted in cul-
tures with lower levels of social conflict or more entrenched tradi-
tions of expert decision making than in the United States. Even in a 
relatively closed and consensual society, however, controversies oc-
casionally become public enough to force disclosure of the unartic-
ulated, and frequently unscientific, assumptions about nature and 
society that underpin many supposedly scientific assessments. In 
the aftermath of Chernobyl, for example, British nuclear experts 
wrongly estimated the likely uptake of radioactive cesium by plants 
in northern sheep-farming country with acid, peaty soils. Their sci-
entific models, based on studies in clay soils where cesium is chem-
ically immobilized, had failed to take account of a key ecological 
variable - a mistake that only came to light when the measured lev-
els of radioactivity exceeded the expert predictions.[12] The model 
in this case was based on a false presumption of ecological uni-
formity which might well have been disputed and set aside by the 
"non-expert" sheep farmers on whose behalf the model was applied. 
In other instances, expert advisers have incorporated untested and 
possibly unfounded assumptions about human behavior into their 
assessments. Unless criticism is institutionalized into the policy 
process, as it is to a great extent in the United States, deference to 
the label "science" generally protects such unwarranted exercises of 
expert judgment from review by knowledgeable publics. 
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Scientific Pluralism and Normal Politics 
The reality of policy-relevant science, then, appears to have suc-
cumbed to postmodern attributions of subjectivity, relativism, and 
context-specificity as surely as the distinctive social realities con-
structed by contemporary historians , anthropologists, journalists, 
or photographers.(13] The content of science, and even what con-
stitutes "science" in a given situation, is now seen as lending itself 
to a multiplicity of interpretations. What implications does this 
profound shift in 20th century thought hold for the poor policy 
maker who still seeks to ground governmental decisions in "good 
science"? Must the effort be abandoned, and policy declared to 
be a field for politics, untrammeled by claims of knowledge about 
how the world works? If not, what arguments can we possibly ad-
vance for according a special role in policy to scientists and their 
imperfect ways of knowing reality? 
The experience of industrial societies provides incontrovertible 
evidence, to begin with, that more science does not necessarily make 
for better, quicker, or more politically acceptable policy. In part, 
this is because the line between policy and the production of science 
to guide policy cannot be cleanly drawn; science that is mandated 
for policy purposes seldom remains sufficiently independent from 
its context to serve as an entirely credible legitimator of policy.[14] 
Calls to keep science free from the "taint" of politics are frequently 
heard, but the social analysis of science has long since established 
the futility - and perhaps even the folly - of seeking completely 
context-free knowledge in the making of policy. Since the produc-
tion and interpretation of science remain contingent on contextual 
factors, it is hardly surprising that new knowledge does not act pre-
dictably or systematically to close debates.[15] Indeed, the evidence 
from comparative policy shows that expert decisions carry great-
est weight in precisely those environments where criticism is most 
muted - and where decision makers are correspondingly least likely 
to be pressured into producing new evidence bearing on policy.[16] 
Observations about the contingency of knowledge prompted 
British policy analysts David Collingridge and Colin Reeve to adopt 
a position of radical skepticism about the power of science to ad-
vance rational policy making. The policy process, they contend, 
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always presents an under-critical or an over-critical environment for 
scientific claims.[17) In the former case, there is already a strong 
consensus about policy and the addition of new science makes no 
perceptible difference to the outcome. In the latter, policy adver-
saries who are separated by serious normative disagreements turn 
to science for help, but a socially constructed (and hence decon-
structible) science again is powerless to deliver them from their 
political impasse. Instead of accepting science as a neutral arbiter, 
opposing interests subject each other's scientific evidence to height-
ened scrutiny, producing endless technical debate. Ironically, the 
transfer of value conflicts into the scientific arena serves to under-
mine the authority of science even as it is reaffirming science's power 
to resolve problematic social issues. 
The over-critical model appears on the surface to square well 
with the experience of US agencies involved in science policy mak-
ing. The regulation of carcinogenic chemicals at the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), as noted earlier, provides a case in point. 
Protracted debates over science and years of apparent stalemate on 
policy have indeed been commonplace in the EPA 's attempts to 
set standards for chemicals suspected of causing cancer. But the 
over-critical model does not alone explain why scientific closure has 
proved so much more elusive in some national contexts than oth-
ers. Particularly from the standpoint of international science policy, 
it is important to ask why scientific controversies persist so much 
more stubbornly in America, for example, than in other industrial 
countries sharing similar economic and political concerns and con-
fronted by similar gaps in knowledge. To address this issue, we have 
to look beyond the cognitive structure of science to the institutions 
and procedures by which science is incorporated into policy. We 
can then point to specific impulses in American democratic culture 
- in particular, a commitment to a rationalistic mode of policy crit-
icism - that present a deep dilemma for expert agencies seeking to 
harness science to the resolution of social problems. 
The experience of regulatory politics in America discloses an 
underlying tension between the transparency that is required in a 
system of democratic politics and the boundedness (both epistemo-
logical and social) that is needed for closure in science. Thus, the 
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obligation to make the administrator's scientific reasoning explicit 
evolved as the quid pro quo for extraordinary expansions of admin-
istrative power during the 1970s. US expert agencies were granted 
considerable discretion to make decisions that were supported by 
suggestive but not conclusive scientific evidence, but the price they 
paid was to give up exclusive control over the interpretation of un-
certainty. In an unparalleled move to open up scientific decision 
making, legislative and judicial decisions combined to ensure that 
interested parties and, if necessary, the courts could scrutinize every 
step in the agencies' technical analyses. American jurists in partic-
ular were convinced that transparency of reasoning would lead to 
more effective criticism, and hence in the long run to a better fit 
between science and policy. 
The model of progress that the courts envisaged for policy was 
very similar to the model of scientific progress offered in a 1942 
article by Robert Merton, one of America's foremost sociologists of 
science: full disclosure and open criticism by peers, procedures that 
had successfully turned the wheels of science for three centuries, 
would equally move the policy process along toward a happy conver-
gence of truth and power.[18] As expressed by David Bazelon,[19] 
an eminent federal appellate judge: 
[D]ecisionmakers should disclose where and why the experts dis-
agree as well as where they concur, and where the information 
is sketchy as well as complete. Other experts who are steeped 
in the subject matter - in academe, in government, in industry 
- can then evaluate the agency's factual determinations, bring 
new data to light, or challenge gaps in reasoning. (Emphasis 
added.] 
Missing from this analysis, however, was any clear acknowledg-
ment of the divergent goals of science and policy and how these 
might influence the construction of scientific claims relevant to pol-
icy. Science, as we have seen, needs a certain level of containment 
in order to move forward. To be successful, scientists have to accept 
the theories and claims of their predecessors as a point of depar-
ture for building other claims, which, in turn, can serve as building 
blocks for their successors. The historian of science Thomas Kuhn 
called this type of activity "normal science" and pointed out that 
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it takes place within a governing "paradigm" that remains stable 
for long periods of time but can be overthrown by scientific revolu-
tions. [20] More recently, the French sociologist Bruno Latour has 
noted that scientists need to "black box" certain findings (i.e., to 
shut them off against overly intrusive criticism) in order to propel 
forward the overall project of science, which is to build more and 
more "facts" about the real world. [21] 
The scientist's primary rationale for closure (making more facts) 
ceases to be relevant, however, when science is engaged in policy 
making. In this context, scientific facts function as a bridge to pol-
icy rather than to more facts, and the way is therefore opened for 
diverse interests to coopt the definition of facts in ways that ad-
vance their particular social and political leanings. As the terrain 
expands from normal science to normal politics, scientists , govern-
ment officials, labor and industry, public interest groups, and even 
the news media claim the right to place their own interpretive stamp 
on science. Advantage can be gained, moreover , not only by ad-
vancing one's own account of the "facts," but also by weakening the 
accounts of others. Thus, procedures that allow for open criticism 
do indeed "bring new data to light, and challenge gaps in reason-
ing," as the US courts foresaw, but the commitment to scientific 
rationality, coupled with the commitment to democratic openness, 
leads in the policy environment not to enlightened consensus but 
to a mounting cacophony. 
Renegotiating the Boundary of Science 
and Politics 
The picture I have painted thus far of the relationship between sci-
ence and policy looks bleak indeed. The contingency of knowledge 
can be overcome, and science can be invoked as an independent 
support for policy, but only in relatively closed political systems, 
where the opportunities for effective criticism are largely foreclosed. 
Such policy environments are "under-critical" chiefly because they 
are under-inclusive: they systematically exclude viewpoints that 
could lead to the deconstruction of dominant expert opinions. In 
more open democratic environments, by contrast, criticism only 
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begets more criticism, with policy stasis as the inevitable result. 
Once science becomes the property of groups of diverging interest, 
institutions of government can rarely muster the authority to close 
off spiraling scientific debate. There are no analogues in the con-
tentious domain of normal politics for instrumental testing of the 
"truth" of competing claims (e.g., through building a technologi-
cal artifact) or for the shared communal objectives that promote 
working closures in normal science. 
Confronted by this dilemma, some societies have opted to re-
main in, or even revert to, a policy framework that restricts the par-
ticipation of potentially destabilizing critical voices. Such a trend 
is discernible even in the United States, where public participa-
tion in science policy has hitherto achieved its fullest flowering. At 
the EPA, for example, the influence of external scientific advisory 
committees has grown since the early 1980s, when the Reagan ad-
ministration briefly attempted to reduce the power of the agency's 
Science Advisory Board. The US Congress has mandated from time 
to time that the EPA should institutionalize an advisory mecha-
nism, seek external peer review, channel research funds through 
an independent body,[22] or solicit advice from the prestigious Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. These developments signal that on 
the American political scene the EPA 's own expertise is no longer 
viewed as sufficient to mediate among conflicting scientific view-
points. The agency must look to outside bodies, with unassailable 
claims to impartial scientific authority, in order to validate its own 
interpretations of uncertain science. 
Recent efforts to reform the handling of scientific evidence in 
the US court system reveal a similar technocratic bent. For much of 
the last quarter-century, a fairly relaxed standard governed the in-
troduction of expert testimony into legal proceedings. Courts were 
inclined to admit scientific evidence so long as the risk of confusion 
or prejudice did not outweigh its potential relevance. Assessing the 
relative weight and credibility of the evidence was thought to be 
the responsibility of the jury or other fact-finder. But with the rise 
of technology-related lawsuits, class actions, and crippling damage 
awards for major companies, the role of experts in the courtroom 
has begun to attract growing and adverse attention. Unrestricted 
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access of experts to the jury is seen by segments of the Ameri-
can policy community as an invitation for "bad science" to crowd 
out the "good," thereby allowing anti-technological sentiments to 
control the outcomes of legal decision making.[23) Support has 
emerged at the highest levels of the US government for the propo-
sition that judges should take more care to exclude "fringe" scien-
tific views, so that the authority of "mainstream" and "respectable 
minority" views can be enhanced.[24] We can see in this proposal 
another manifestation of a more general cultural trend toward en-
larging the power of science to influence the directions of policy. 
Efforts to restructure a bounded institutional space for science 
within the policy process can be defended on the grounds that any 
system of scientific assessment - including policy advice - needs 
some bracketing off from society in order to achieve cohesion and 
credibility. Common standards for interpreting scientific evidence 
are more likely to evolve when scientists feel united in a shared 
ethos, such as the public service orientation of an advisory com-
mittee, than when they meet as representatives of competing so-
cial interests. Interpretive differences , moreover, can be more easily 
ironed out in the relatively non-adversarial culture of the typical ad-
visory panel than in the confrontational environment of lawsuits or 
administrative hearings. Regulatory agencies have taken advantage 
of these characteristics of advisory committees to resolve conflicts at 
several critical stages in the assessment of policy-relevant science: 
validation of long-term research strategies; certification of study 
protocols and analytical methodologies; definition of standards of 
adequacy for scientific evidence; and approval of inferences from 
less-than-conclusive studies and experiments.[25) 
Attempts to spin off interpretive authority over science from 
politically accountable governmental agencies to advisory panels, 
however, may produce new tensions for science, primarily in the 
form of intensified public scrutiny. Thus, US legislation already re-
quires all advisory committee meetings to be conducted in public, 
and real or imagined lapses from this mandate frequently trigger 
enforcement actions by vigilant public interest groups or the news 
media. The US Congress, too, has enlarged its periodic inquiries 
into the conduct of advisory committees to include investigations 
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of the political or intellectual biases of individual committees mem-
bers. Balance in the composition of expert panels has assumed 
growing importance as a political issue. There is considerable pres-
sure for expert committees to mimic the diversity of the US popu-
lation, and federal guidelines exist to ensure that women and ethnic 
minorities are adequately represented on all such bodies. 
Allegations of bias and conflicts of interest represent another 
kind of challenge to expert committees wielding significant decision-
making power. In the United States, for example, former members 
of an EPA advisory panel were accused in one case of violating fed-
eral ethics requirements by testifying on behalf of a pesticide com-
pany before the panel on which they had served. [26] In another 
episode, the tobacco industry sought to block the appointment of a 
particular medical scientist to an EPA panel on the ground that he 
was not sufficiently "open-minded" about the risks of smoking. [27] 
Controversies over the health risks of formaldehyde, asbestos, and 
lead illustrate another kind of exclusionary pattern aimed at chal-
lenging established policies. In these cases, scientists whose work 
had already influenced significant policy commitments found their 
objectivity or good faith under attack by parties seeking to re-
capture control over policy through competing accounts of reality. 
Incidents such as these highlight the vulnerability of the social con-
sensus that protects scientific advice against the intrusive thrust of 
politics. 
While advisory committees represent an undeniably techno-
cratic approach to dealing with political dissension and the contin-
gency of knowledge, a contra.sting, apparently democratizing trend 
can be observed in the growing popularity of technology assessment, 
which was institutionalized in the United States with the passage of 
the 1972 Technology Assessment Act, and which later made rapid 
headway in Europe during the 1980s. Technology assessment ini-
tiatives have in common the presumption that technology policy 
works best when stakeholders are identified in advance and are 
drawn into the policy making process. Right-to-know laws, such as 
those enacted in Europe following the Seveso accident and in the 
United States following the gas leak in Bhopal, also place a high 
value on integrating the public earlier and more fully into science 
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and technology policy. These provisions presuppose that a certain 
level of shared information is necessary in order for the public to 
recognize and effectively protect itself against risks from industry. 
The preoccupation with ideas such as "risk communication" and 
"public understanding of science" on both sides of the Atlantic 
similarly reflects an emergent philosophy that sharing knowledge is 
the most effective means of creating a receptive public environment 
for science and technology. 
On closer inspection, however, these moves toward democrati-
zation in science and technology policy appear no less technocratic 
in inspiration than the strategy of containing the interpretive flex-
ibility of science within specially appointed advisory committees. 
The irony in the democratizing strategy is that state planners ap-
parently assume that the public, once it is fully informed, will come 
to value the benefits of technological advancement more than they 
fear its possible deficiencies. But the state can ensure such results 
only by carefully controlling or manipulating the knowledge that 
it offers to share with the public. It has been noted, for example, 
that in the European context the public's "right" to know is con-
strued by the state as coextensive with the public's "need" to know. 
The Seveso directive recognized no generalized public right to in-
formation; European governments agreed to make available only as 
much information as they thought the public needed to know for 
purposes of self-protection.[28] In the absence of such centralized 
control, more information could reasonably be expected to lead to 
a pluralization of views, as various segments of the public impose 
their particular social constructions on the contingencies inherent 
in the available scientific information. 
The Internationalization of Science Policy 
How do the foregoing observations carry over into the international 
arena, where forces of economic and environmental interdependence 
are creating accelerating pressure for supra-national approaches to 
science and technology policy? The question has profound impli-
cations which academics and decision makers have barely begun to 
172 Sheila Jasanoff 
address, and the literature on international science policy accord-
ingly lacks the theoretical sophistication that is evident in many 
studies focusing on national and comparative policy contexts. I 
will argue, in particular, that there is an important discrepancy be-
tween the postmodern account of policy-relevant science that I have 
presented above and the positivist or empiricist strain evident in 
much current writing concerning the role of science in international 
environmental policy. One consequence is that the degree of con-
sensus in environmental sciences, as well as of scientists' power to 
influence policy, have been exaggerated, while the problem of inad-
equate participation in international science and technology policy 
has received disproportionately little attention. 
The first satellite pictures of the earth freely suspended in space 
not only ushered in a new era for space exploration but also gave 
rise to a new ecological paradigm for the scientific study of the en-
vironment. Here was visually irrefutable proof of the finiteness of 
the place we inhabit, the interconnectedness of its living systems, 
and the futility of looking beyond the planet for solutions to plan-
etary problems. The concept of the biosphere gained prominence 
and the urge to understand it more completely led to authoritative 
new approaches in both the natural and social sciences. National 
funding priorities shifted toward fields that tried to make sense of 
large systems or connections among systems, such as ecology, cli-
matology, chaos theory, and geography. Even the Gaia hypothesis 
won grudging respect from scientists who a few years ago had dis-
missed it as the brainchild of a religious crank or mystic. Across 
the environmental sciences there was a new emphasis on research 
that would bridge existing disciplinary divides and produce insights 
into the complex and ill-understood workings of planetary phenom-
ena. In short, the systems analytic perspective seemed to come into 
its own, with regained vitality, in the context of efforts by human 
beings to understand their environment. 
In policy analysis, as well, a new discourse emerged to en-
compass the unsettling image of spaceship earth, a discourse that 
tried to temper the freshly acquired sense of human limitations 
with hopes for a common scientific understanding and interna-
tional cooperation. A seminal report from the World Commission 
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on Environment and Development[29] captured both the terminal 
loss of the frontier and the promise of enhanced control: 
From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by 
human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, 
greenery, and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its activities 
into that pattern is changing planetary systems fundamentally. 
Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards, 
from environmental degradation to nuclear destruction. These 
new realities, from which there is no escape, must be recognized 
- and managed. 
In an influential discursive move, the Commission adopted the 
term "sustainable development" to designate the possibility of over-
coming resource limitations through human enterprise. These two 
words seemed to sum up and yet transcend the contradictions of life 
and growth on a bounded planet. They suggested that the indefi-
nite survival of the human species on planet earth could be assured 
through a simple marriage of science and rational stewardship of 
the earth's resources. 
Although a few scientists and policy analysts questioned the 
capacity of science to operationalize the notion of sustainability, 
most policy makers began looking to the sciences (as they histori-
cally have done) to define both problems and solutions in the global 
environment. Scientific knowledge has been credited with creating 
the momentum for worldwide cutbacks on the production and use 
of ozone depleting chemicals, as well as for multi-lateral discussions 
promoting wider consensus on greenhouse gases, biodiversity, and 
deforestation. Scientists themselves are identified by some analysts 
as primary agents of policy change, using the power of knowledge to 
move national governments toward decisions that they could never 
have reached under accepted models of rational choice. Accord-
ing to one view current in the literature, "epistemic communities" 
of scientists, actuated by common professional norms and shared, 
holistic definitions of environmental problems, are successfully set-
ting the agenda for international negotiations and driving their own 
governments toward agreements.[30] Here, then, we have a rever-
sion to the classical (that is, pre-Weinberg) model of science policy, 
which envisioned a united front of scientists engaged in "speaking 
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truth to power." In this latter-day formulation, a new cadre of sci-
entific high priests, equipped with the potent paradigm of ecologi-
cal interconnectedness, are taking control of policy, thereby uniting 
truth and power in benevolent harmony. 
The problem with this optimistic assessment is that it disre-
gards virtually everything we know about the contingency and plu-
rality of knowledge and the interaction between knowledge and pol-
itics. The picture of scientific and policy consensus that dominates 
recent work on international environmental policy seems immedi-
ately suspect from the standpoint of social studies of science or 
interpretive policy studies. Important questions are missing or ob-
scured. Why, one wishes to know, has the ecological viewpoint so 
easily gained ascendancy in environmental policy circles? Is there 
really a strong consensus about the causes of global environmen-
tal problems such as ozone depletion and global warming, and , if 
so, what accounts for the surprisingly low levels of conflict on such 
momentous questions? Who are the participants in the world 's sud-
denly powerful epistemic communities, and how have they managed 
to overcome the problems of criticism and deconstruction that have 
consistently plagued their counterparts in national frameworks of 
science and technology policy? Does the apparent epistemic con-
sensus on some environmental issues betoken inadequate levels of 
participation, and will the entry of more states into global scientific 
conversations increase the level of controversy in the same ways as 
participation by interest groups? 
Once embarked on these skeptical lines of inquiry, one does not 
have to look far to notice that the consensus on the scientific causes 
of global environmental problems may be much less durable than 
it seems. The on-going North- South debate over population pro-
vides a telling example. To many scientists in advanced industrial 
societies, the concept of a finite biosphere inescapably suggests the 
need for stringent controls on human population. Yet Third World 
environmental analysts and activists generally reject the idea that 
current population levels pose a critical threat to achieving sus-
tainable development. Natural resources in the Third World, so 
their argument goes, are sufficient to support the ecologically bal-
anced life-styles of the world 's poor, provided that ways can be 
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found to eliminate the dislocations induced by arbitrary and inef-
ficient state management schemes in developing countries and by 
non-sustainable consumption patterns elsewhere in the world. The 
"problem" from this perspective is not how to limit the numbers of 
the poor, but how to improve their access to nature's still bountiful 
resources. Scientists in the North offer a quite different definition 
of the problem, focusing on the environmental damage that will be 
caused if populous Third World countries emulate, and eventually 
attain, the resource-consumption patterns of the North. 
That the same "scientific" concepts - here "overpopulation" 
and "sustainable development" - can give rise to two such dia-
metrically opposed problem definitions provides strong evidence of 
their socially constructed character. Clearly, the widely accepted 
ecological paradigm that underlies emerging ideas of sustainability 
is not by itself enough to determine whether the "right" definition 
of the population issue is "too many people" or "inequitable access 
to resources". To create global convergence on such explosive top-
ics as population, we need to build not merely a common body of 
knowledge about how the world works (that is, epistemic communi-
ties) , but also communal norms about what kind of world we want 
and how human beings should relate to the world's other living and 
non-living systems. 
A Role for IIASA 
\\1hat does this review of science and technology policy from na-
tional and international perspectives imply for IIASA in the coming 
decades? Two strategies are imaginable, with the riskier one carry-
ing the greater prospects for long-term satisfaction. An apparently 
safe option for IIASA would be to accept at face value the invita-
tion to systems analysis that is implicit in the new ecological think-
ing about the global environment. With support for systemic ap-
proaches running high in both scientific and political circles, IIASA 
could choose to present itself as a provider of integrated, culturally 
unbiased research and policy advice on the "big" environmental 
issues of our time: population, loss of species, deforestation, de-
sertification, climate change, and environmental refugees. There is 
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a strong demand in policy circles for more "scientific" methods of 
predicting the physical and social impacts of global change, as well 
as an enduring belief that modeling on a grand scale holds the keys 
to universal understanding. It should take no daring act of creative 
imagination to design a program that meets these perceptions and 
perceived needs. Few policy makers have the courage to withstand 
the lure of numbers, and IIASA 's international network could easily 
summon up the shamans of economic and environmental science to 
answer to almost every uncertainty. 
The second, and more challenging, strategy would be to take 
the apparent givens of the physical and social worlds and turn them 
into questions leading to vastly different forms of inquiry. In this 
approach, the ecosystemic paradigm and the conceptual subcate-
gories traditionally associated with it become starting points for 
looking more closely at their constitutive elements rather than for 
reductionist system-building. Instead of refining the existing an-
alytical models, which often flatten out detail and diversity, this 
strategy requires us first to ask which are the right problems and 
how we should recognize them. Is the problem too many people or 
unequal access to food or fuel? Is it cutting down trees in subsis-
tence economies or subsidizing the milk prices of the already rich , 
thereby increasing the demand for unforested grazing lands? Is it 
how to accommodate refugees fleeing forms of repression that no 
law at present recognizes or how to achieve an ecologically benign 
redistribution of human populations to ensure more efficient use of 
nature's resources? 
Pursuing these alternate lines of inquiry is sure to open up 
epistemological and moral questions that have not yet caught the 
attention of most global change analysts. How can we identify and 
evaluate the different belief systems that support competing defi-
nitions of the "same" problem, particularly when one side claims 
to be the more "scientific"? What should be the objectives of the 
inquiry: merely to reveal the basis for discrepant problem defini-
tions or also to reconcile them in some fashion? If the latter, then 
where will the means of reconciliation be found - in claims of su-
perior expertise or in knowledge tempered by more participatory 
forms of politics? If science is accorded a special role in ironing 
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out cross-national or cross-cultural differences (as it surely will be), 
then in cases of disagreement whose "science" should be taken as 
con trolling? 
These deconstructive approaches to looking at global problems 
may, ironically, point toward "systems" of a kind that are not cur-
rently recognized in any traditional branch of science, although they 
have a growing reality in the social studies of science and technol-
ogy. I speak of the heterogeneous systems - composed of people, 
practices, social rules, laws of nature, artifacts, and the like - that 
govern our increasingly complex existence. Where should we look 
for the "causes" of deforestation in the Amazon basin, the rising 
incidence of brain or skin cancer in parts of the world, or the in-
dustrial catastrophes that have occurred in various Third World 
countries? If a clod be washed away by the sea in the Bay of Ben-
gal, the cause today may truly lie in the social life of Europe or 
North America. Yet one may not see the connecting threads with-
out drawing on as yet unsystematic bodies of knowledge or engaging 
in inquiry that cuts orthogonally across more orthodox approaches 
to systems analysis. 
Adopting my second strategy would undoubtedly require IIASA 
to expand its participation beyond the countries it has served for 
20 years, as well as to seek out resources that are not earmarked for 
conventional programs of study. At the same time, the best ana-
lytic orientation for this wider membership may well be to begin by 
thinking small. Microstudies of microproblems may offer more illu-
minating results than the analysis of full-blown systems that turn 
out in the end to contain neither the causes nor the solutions that 
really matter. Qualitative research will be needed to give meaning 
to quantitative analysis. But the dangers that humanity faces call 
for fresh academic endeavor. In science policy, as in life, it is the 
road not taken that often holds the richer promise. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Redrawing the Boundaries 
Between Science and Politics: 
Toward a Postmodern Version 
of Speaking Truth to Power 
Helga Nowotny 
In Chapter 5 (Pluralism and Convergence in National and Inter-
national Science Policy) Sheila Jasanoff traces the roots of the 
widespread intellectual unease that surrounds a lot of scientific 
inquiry and technological practice at present. She highlights the 
more subtle strain of skepticism that has been added through the 
recent work performed in social studies of science and technology, 
with their emphasis upon the in-built sociality of science and the 
role played by social negotiations in the construction of scientific 
knowledge. She maintains that the distance between scientific and 
political processes is narrowing. In extreme cases this may lead 
to endemic conflicts in society becoming re-enacted in public con-
troversies that erupt over scientific and technological issues. The 
overall aim of her chapter is to invite us to consider ways of rec-
onciling the recent, more relativistic conception of science and its 
deconstruction with the unique effectiveness that scientific knowl-
edge holds with regard to what she identifies as an urgent goal for 
the future, namely, "to harmonize disparate conceptions about the 
rights of human beings, their place in nature, and their obligation 
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toward each other and to their planet." This entails a reconcilia-
tion of political pluralism with a new definition of the relationship 
between science and public policy, both in a national and interna-
tional context. 
Some of the key words that Sheila Jasanoff puts on our agenda 
are: subjectivity; deconstruction; pluralism and postmodernism, 
rather than what we have so far understood as scientific realism; 
objectivity; and instrumental scientific rationality or social engi-
neering. The main issue addressed in her chapter is how the author-
ity of science, by now socially deconstructed, might meet political 
pluralism, and the new demands that are addressed by a policy-
oriented or policy-relevant "science for public policy". On reading 
her chapter, which accords well with other accounts, I was struck 
by the observation, in retrospect, of how rapidly the processes she 
describes under the rubric of deconstruction have proceeded . From 
A. Weinberg's prescient article in 1970, where he introduced the 
notion of "trans-science", 20 years later we have barely moved to 
a situation where the insistence upon such boundaries separating 
different roles for scientists appears hopelessly inadequate. Only 
about eight years ago an international forum on Science for Public 
Policy was held at IIASA where many of the pressing issues of to-
day were raised, yet at the time they may have appeared as mere 
warnings of possible trends to come (Brooks and Cooper, 1987). 
So what has happened that has caused such a dramatic redef-
inition of the relationship between science and policy? What we 
have witnessed is, first of all, the rapid (and some may say over-
due) demise of the old model of rationality that was believed to 
be inherent both in the policy process and in the way a purported 
scientific rationality in the form of policy advice could be fed into 
it. The demise of this model is related to other profound changes, 
notably those that have altered the relationship between market 
forces and the state. In Europe, especially, the all-powerful wel-
fare state, in the glorious three postwar decades in which it reigned 
supreme, saw the rise of powerful and effective alliances between 
modernizing elites and scientific establishments, including the so-
cial sciences, all eager to advise policy makers. The welfare state 
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was built on a belief in rational planning, with a definite scien-
tific underpinning. One of its fundamental premises was an as yet 
largely unclouded vision of further human betterment which would 
be achieved with the help of science and technology, while negative 
consequences either were·denied or kept invisible. 
Since then, much has changed. Not only have these political 
alliances fragmented, but the former broad consensus of a "societal 
project" of major, future-oriented proportions has been shattered. 
In addition, the once-powerful state has lost much of its former ca-
pacity to control events and ideologies that favor such control. Po-
litical majorities have become difficult to maintain and demagogical 
elements pervasive. A process of societal desolidarization has set 
in, for which the belief in progressive forces of further technological 
innovation along with the distribution of wealth thus created can no 
longer compensate. After the fall of the Communist regimes in the 
countries of Eastern Europe, science and technology run the risk 
of being perceived as having been deeply involved with the old to-
talitarian order, giving rise, perhaps, to new waves of anti-science. 
In the USA, where the state never played the central role it did in 
continental Europe, other dispersive forces have come to the fore, 
aided by an adversarial, political legal culture that relies heavily 
on the judicial system to confront societal conflicts and that allows 
"junk science" to enter the courtrooms. Everywhere the growth 
of legislation containing a scientific or technical dimension is enor-
mous, while the political mechanisms for solving disagreements and 
the ensuing conflicts have undoubtedly been lagging behind. 
Other factors come to mind that have made an equal contribu-
tion to the demise of the old conception of science for public policy 
and have led to a greater demand for the public accountability of 
science and technology. In many ways one might argue [as I have 
done elsewhere (Nowotny, 1990)) that science has become much 
more like other institutions in modern society: in its organization 
and work setting, in its moral standing and the norms held by its 
members, and in its affinity toward (some would say corruption 
by) economic and political influence. From this it is easy to make a 
more discomforting conclusion: if science is not so special, it has no 
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grounds upon which it can claim privileged status as far as its fund-
ing base and political support is concerned. It is but a short step 
to being treated like any other institution that functions to serve 
society. It is but another short step for science to become affected 
by this process of "societal normalization": science would then not 
only be held accountable for achieving results "worth their money", 
but could rapidly lose its claims to a higher form of rationality and 
the higher cognitive status and authority that goes with it. 
In de-mystifying science and technology in society at large, and 
in deconstructing the claims upon which scientific knowledge are 
based, social studies of science and technology have played but an 
epiphenomena! role. While the new approaches toward studying 
"science in the making" have made a decisive contribution by elu-
cidating the social nature of science and technology and by showing 
their profound in-built sociality, it is too simple to make social stud-
ies of science and technology responsible for attempting to subvert 
the authority of the natural sciences while offering little in return. 
While it is understandable that natural scientists react with irrita-
tion to what they see as the subversive and de-mystifying results of 
much social analysis, it would amount to a gross overestimation of 
the potential impact of any social science research to attribute the 
actual process of de-legitimation of science largely, or even in part, 
to such analysis. If we look to the power of ideas and the cultural 
influence they can command to change the general outlook of a so-
ciety, then we have to take into account the much wider currents 
flowing in the ever-changing cultural sea of society. 
The decisive turn, then, is from a modern society to a new for-
mation under the label of "postmodernity". Postmodernism is far 
from being merely a cultural fad or an intellectual game invented 
by and for Parisian intellectuals. Recently, Thomas Hughes, the 
eminent historian of technology, spoke about "post-modern tech-
nology". What he meant were the radically altered organizational 
conditions of production, as well as the altered conditions of in-
tellectual and social creativity under which technologies are being 
created today. They include modes of financing as much as al-
tered styles of corporate management - the new patterns in which 
the originators of science and technology interact constantly with 
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potential users: configurations of people and things and hardware 
and software that are all rearranged in a novel , postmodern form 
(Hughes, forthcoming) . 
One of the premises of postmodernism is the deconstruction of 
any central authority. Due to the increase in complexity, no single, 
centrally organized locus can be in control any more. The post-
modern condition entails fragmentation and the loss of any central 
perspective. In line with Sheila Jasanoff, I will argue that it also 
enables new forms of local action and allows for contingencies: it 
entails entirely new possibilities of "just connect" through multiple 
configurations via which creative new interlinkages are being net-
worked. Far from being only a "bundle of ill-defined concepts and 
methods", the postmodern Zeitgeist has seeped into the social fab-
ric of society, it has affected, for better or worse, the relationships 
between a former centralized locus of power and authority and those 
who are connected to it. In essence, postmodernism constitutes a 
solution that has evolved in response to a greatly increased societal 
complexity. Is it surprising that science, as a central authority in 
our highly industrialized societies, is also affected by the radical 
shift toward postmodernity? 
So far , the response from the natural scientific establishment 
has been largely one of bewilderment and defense. The first over-
riding impulse was, and still is, to cling to sharply defined bound-
aries between science and society, while allowing the intermediate 
and intermediary space that exists between them to grow. In this 
intermediate space, a pragmatic model of managerial science for 
public policy has been allowed to operate, yet its effectiveness is 
contingent upon policy contexts that have become much more un-
predictable. Sheila Jasanoff detects a definite technocratic bent in 
the ongoing renegotiations of the boundary separating science and 
politics, and she believes, if I read her correctly, that this trend is 
likely to succeed. In the USA, she sees a more general tendency 
toward reducing the power of lay perspectives to influence the di-
rection of science and technology policy, partly as a reaction toward 
the role of experts in the courtroom. She has some fine things to 
say about the importance of "closure" in the production of scien-
tific knowledge, which loses its rationale once scientific ·knowledge 
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switches context and becomes policy-relevant. She points out that 
both scientists and the state have a stake in representing results as 
"science" so as to protect them against renewed destruction - all 
of which, presumably, will strengthen the return to a more techno-
cratic bent. However, this may turn out be no easy road of return. 
Another scholar, Yaron Ezrahi, who has attentively observed 
science in the framework of the transformation of contemporary 
democracy is convinced that the growing public distrust of science 
and technology is more a symptom of the changing conception of 
politics than of science and technology per se. However, if this 
is the case, it nevertheless has radical consequences for science and 
technology too. While major economic, military, or social crises are 
likely to revive the more conventional rhetoric of scientific realism, 
the criticism of "pleasing illusions", and appeals to science and 
technology, Ezrahi believes that, for the time being, "stagecraft", 
the art of eloquent, edifying, and politically effective gestures, is 
the supreme technique of "statecraft". However, he also cautions 
that the "descent of Icarus", the de-legitimation of grand social and 
political engineering and the decline of instrumental rationality in 
the context of public affairs, does not necessarily represent a return 
to darkness. Postmodern politics and postmodern science will have 
to face their own respective limits (Ezrahi, 1990). 
The situation in which postmodern politics and science are cur-
rently facing their limits while renegotiating their boundaries is 
perhaps nowhere as manifest and as urgent as where environmental 
sciences meet environmental policies. The very term of "science for 
public policy" ceases to be meaningful if science is taken to imply a 
relatively closed, self-contained set of knowledge which is supposed 
to provide guidelines for action. The complexity of the phenomena 
and the problems associated with them, their truly global nature, 
and their interconnectedness continue to raise some fundamental 
questions about scientific determinancy, uncertainty, and the rela-
tionship between scientific knowledge and policy advice and action. 
The ongoing, threatening degradation of the environment defies 
any simple, causal approach to solutions. Instead of "solutions", 
the best we can hope for is "management", instead of a simplistic 
notion of growth, sustainability as a collectively sustained process 
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has yet to be learned by individuals and nations alike. Multiple 
local actions, all embedded in economic and social arrangements, 
and global environmental effects are interlinked in intractable ways , 
while global action, the aim of reaching international consensus and 
binding agreements, is confronted with obstacles that thrive on sci-
entific uncertainties. 
Historically, it can be said that science-based industry and in-
dustrialized science began when, in the second half of the 19th 
century, academic science moved into specially set-up industrial re-
search laboratories. Today, we witness another historical turning 
point - that of environmental sciences moving out into society. This 
makes them open to new claims of societal access, participation, and 
accountability. A whole new set of issues is awaiting recognition and 
some form of incorporation into science: the environmental rights 
of citizens, a new "contract" with nature, intergenerational rights, 
communal rights for common property, such as the atmosphere and 
the oceans, the setting up of environmental codes of conduct, and 
the definition of the responsibilities of scientists. Science is being 
challenged to become "vernacular" - conversant with mature citi-
zens and willing to accede to certain of their legitimate demands. 
Science is being asked to share knowledge and information, to set 
up monitoring processes with these mandates in mind and share 
their results. The management of sustainable development calls 
for a new kind of cooperation between natural science and social 
science, but this management process can only hope to succeed if 
it does not fall into either of the two old traps: becoming science 
infiltrated by politics or science aloof from society. 
I have reached the last part of Sheila Jasanoff's paper where 
she turns to the internationalization of science policy. Jasanoff 
argues that there is an important discrepancy between the post-
modern account of policy-relevant science and the positivist or 
empiricist strain evident in much of the current literature about 
the role of science in international environmental policy. She be-
lieves that the degree of consensus among environmental scientists 
has been vastly exaggerated, while the problem of inadequate par-
ticipation in international science and technology policy has re-
ceived disproportionately little attention. She detects an unfounded 
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optimism in accounts that celebrate a united front of scientists 
engaged in "speaking truth to power", which is equally evident 
in those accounts that seek to unite truth and power in what 
she calls "the benevolent harmony of the paradigm of ecological 
interconnectedness". 
She asks the pertinent question of why - given the skeptical 
stance that social studies of science and technology teach us - the 
ecological viewpoint has so easily gained ascendancy in environ-
mental policy circles and whether there is really a strong scientific 
consensus about issues such as ozone depletion and global warm-
ing. Why are scientists - as epistemic communities - working in 
the international framework apparently immune to the problems of 
deconstruction and criticism that plague their counterparts within 
national frameworks of science and technology policy? Is this con-
sensus not more apparent than real, a mask that can easily be 
undone if one gets down to the real political issues, such as the 
North- South debate over population issues that is defined differ-
ently by scientists working in the North and those working in the 
South? 
The answers to these and other apparent contradictions lie, I 
believe, in the following: scientists working on global environmen-
tal problems have no choice but to become truly trans-scientific. 
As the first genuine trans-scientists they are constantly moving 
over scientific terrain: but the terrain's epistemic core is intrin-
sically policy-relevant, and hence is bound to reach out beyond 
merely scientific issues. Knowledge cannot be separated from ac-
tion any more: knowledge, action, and power meet in one. As trans-
scientists, they occupy plural roles. They sometimes act as advisers 
to their governments and form part of their nation's delegation in 
political-environmental summit meetings and other international 
conferences. At the same time, they are highly expert in their own 
right and form part of the epistemic community of world environ-
mental scientists. They understand that problem definitions are 
contingent upon context, which includes the policy context. They 
have learned to practice dual or plural loyalties - to science, which 
always means international, universalistic knowledge, and to their 
governments or employers as well. The apparent ease with which 
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they move between these realms, the dexterity with which they 
change hats and cross boundaries, makes them truly postmodern. 
They speak to each other in one language and to those in power in 
a different one, tinged sometimes by national allegiance, while still 
professing the internationalism of science. Some of them have also 
learned to speak a third, fourth, or fifth language, among them the 
one that Tim O'Riordan has called the vernacular language of sci-
ence, namely the ability to address lay people and to involve them 
in environmental science as it reaches out to the public. Speaking 
truth to power has become a truly postmodern affair. 
Of course, this does not imply that international science and 
international science policy are immune to the redrawing of bound-
aries between science and politics. Rather, they are already part of 
it. Yet , as is too patently obvious, the international political com-
munity of this planet is growing together only slowly. Despite the 
urgency of action, international concerted action is - as one would 
expect - much more difficult to obtain. On the other hand, what-
ever international action can be achieved can also be interpreted 
as an encouraging sign in moving onwards on what is definitely a 
long road ahead. In the sea of international political dissension , 
international scientific consensus strengthens not only the position 
of scientists themselves vis-a-vis their national governments, but 
vis-a-vis political power in general. In contrast, those in national 
politics, often faced with contradictory scientific evidence in regu-
latory matters, can use scientific international consensus to empha-
size or de-emphasize national policy goals. Hence the interest of all 
parties in colluding with what Jasanoff describes as the surprising 
ease with which the ecological viewpoint has gained ascendency in 
environmental policy circles. 
Of course, there are other forces at work as well. We should not 
see speaking truth to power solely in Machiavellian terms. There 
are genuine concerns that result from realizing the global nature 
of the problems and the hazardous situation in which humanity 
is rapidly finding itself on this planet. There is the challenge of 
sustainability and the redefinition of our way of seeing the world 
that comes with it. There have been historical gestalt switches in 
the past in the societal definition of the fundamental relationship 
190 Helga Nowotny 
between society and nature: but never before has the challenge 
been perceived so globally and never before has there been such 
a powerful array of scientific and technological means at our dis-
posal. We are faced by an apparent lack of societal consensus on 
how to proceed and how fast, while realizing only slowly that the 
two may be connected. It is the nature of science itself that has 
changed. I believe this is the final point stressed by Jasanoff when 
she speaks about IIASA 's second option. The deconstructive ap-
proach - once it is also accepted by natural scientists and all those 
who mistakenly still believe they can clearly separate "hard" facts 
from "soft" values, or keep the boundaries that separate science 
from society watertight - constitutes a powerful intellectual tool 
of the new societal self-reflexivity. It allows us to come to terms 
with the "postmodern" condition that permeates society, while at 
the same time giving rise to postmodern science and postmodern 
technology. It allows us to see the heterogeneity of systems and in 
systems - and yet to perceive some patterns of order emerging from 
apparent chaos. 
I therefore join Sheila Jasanoff in her wise words of advice to 
IIASA to be more daring and to embark on a road that, while ac-
cepting deconstruction, nevertheless aims at utilizing the knowledge 
and self-reflexivity thus gained to make political pluralism a work-
able solution. Much will depend on the robustness and adaptability 
of the intermediary organizations that are springing up everywhere, 
and their success in renegotiating the boundaries between science 
and politics. Much will also depend upon the authenticity with 
which the intermediary space is open to citizens' demands, even if 
openness will not necessarily bring with it political consensus. If we 
are to go for political pluralism, it may well be true that only "di-
vided we stand" (Schwarz and Thompson, 1990). In the end, there 
cannot be only one solution, for this very pluralism implies that 
science and society will have to find - and accept - many different 
configurations in which their boundaries are redrawn. 
If there is a lesson to be learned, it is that science will be able 
to maintain its claims toward a higher form of cognitive rationality 
only if it is able to incorporate and accommodate sufficient elements 
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of the ongoing societal discourse - for the simple reason that science 
is no longer immune to society. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Decision Analysis and 
Support, and the Study of 
Developmental Challenges 
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki 
IIASA 's Role in Systems and Decision Analysis 
The history of IIASA contributions to the field of theory and 
methodology of systems and decision analysis would actually re-
quire a separate book [a paper on this theme was written 10 years 
ago, see Wierzbicki and Young (1981)].There are several areas of 
this field in which IIASA research - done mostly in the Systems 
and Decision Sciences Program, but often in cooperation with other 
IIASA programs and projects - achieved international recognition. 
For example, this research contributed significantly to the increase 
of knowledge in areas like non-smooth optimization, uncertainty in 
mathematical modeling, non-linear dynamics, and multiple-criteria 
decision analysis and support. 
The essential reason for IIASA 's effectiveness, both in theoret-
ical or methodological and in applied or substantive fields of re-
search, is the multi-cultural and interdisciplinary cross-fertilization 
background. We are well aware that, in addition to universal scien-
tific values, many perspectives emerge from the diversity of national 
cultures. On the other hand, the issue of achieving a global unity 
of goals while preserving cultural diversity is one of the most dif-
ficult challenges of the contemporary world, which we can observe 
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in contemporary politics. At IIASA, different outlooks and tradi-
tions brought from various member countries confronted each other 
and melted together - often not without conflicts, but with conse-
quences that should be measured by the roles of IIASA alumni 
around the world rather than by scientific publications alone. 
Yet there is still another, more basic level of IIASA contribu-
tions: such a melting pot as IIASA helps to lead to a deeper de-
velopment of new basic concepts which are necessary for a better 
understanding of the increasingly complex world. This will be il-
lustrated in more detail for specific examples: we should stress here 
that contributions at this level cannot be achieved without not only 
multi-cultural , but also interdisciplinary synthesis. Thus, whatever 
IIASA 's future might be, it should not concentrate solely on one 
disciplinary field. 
Decision Analysis and Support 
The question of how decisions are made and how to support decision 
processes has been investigated in several, originally separate, theo-
retical fields such as decision and game theory, operations research, 
optimization theory, control and dynamic systems theory, mathe-
matical modeling, computer science, artificial intelligence, and ex-
pert systems. There has also been an antithesis to all these ana-
lytical approaches - the soft systems approach related to general 
systems theory, stressing holism and synergy as opposed to reduc-
tionism in systems analysis: see, for example, Grauer et al. (1985) . 
Over a decade ago - see, for example, Bonczek et al. (1981) and 
Andriole (1989) - the growing power of computer technology and its 
practical applications led to another development: the emergence 
of decision support systems (DSSs) as opposed to earlier data pro-
cessing systems (DPSs). 
Originally, DSSs were developed as a practical, ad hoc collection 
of "any and all data, information, expertise and activities that con-
tribute to option selection." Today, due to a development in which 
IIASA played a considerable role, the concept of DSSs is inter-
preted more broadly: they are computerized systems that support 
their users in the rational organization and conduct of a decision 
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process (or its selected phases) and contain, in addition to a data 
base, a pertinent knowledge representation in the form of models 
of decision situations, as well as appropriate algorithms for using 
these models. However, the original concentration on practical as-
pects of decision support has led to possibly the most important 
dimension of the contemporary definition of DSSs: the sovereign 
position of the user - see, for example, Andriole (1989). The user 
can be a decision maker, an expert or an analyst, an ordinary per-
son working in an office on a well-defined task that might benefit 
from decision support, or even a group of people with varied exper-
tise and decision authority. In any of these cases, a DSS must not 
replace the user in their sovereign decision making, it should only 
help them in: 
• A rational organization of the decision process. 
• Processing information customized for selected situations and 
phases of this process. 
• Enabling them to draw upon expertise and knowledge encoded 
in the models included in the system and to use various algo-
rithms for the evaluation of options and alternative decisions. 
In this conceptual and methodological development, IIASA has 
played a significant role. We realized that the substantive, ap-
plied programs and projects at IIASA represent a unique source of 
expertise on various aspects of environmental, economic, and de-
velopmental processes, often encoded in mathematical models, but 
usually transcending such models and consisting of a much more 
diversified type of knowledge than typically represented in artificial 
intelligence or expert systems. Human knowledge can only partially 
be represented by models of the logical type: various analytical 
models and the intuition related to their interpretation constitute 
not only a more flexible , but also a much broader part of knowledge. 
The question was how could we develop methodological tools 
to incorporate this type of knowledge in DSSs. In accordance with 
IIASA tradition - see, for example, Keeney and Raiffa (1976) - we 
concentrated on a multi-attribute approach. However, in order to 
stress the sovereign role of the user, we did not concentrate on the 
issue of option selection alone and used multi-objective optimiza-
tion as a tool for the flexible analysis of models and for organizing 
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efficient interaction between the user and the DSS. This was the 
essence of the reference point method, developed at IIASA in the 
early 1980s, starting with Wierzbicki (1980, 1982) and Kallio et al. 
(1980). From the beginning, this method stressed the combined 
use of models, which were provided by substantive projects, with 
multi-objective methods for their analysis and for their interaction 
with the user, which were supplied by methodological projects. Ap-
plications at IIASA were related to several areas such as sectorial 
economic policies, future energy supply scenarios (see Grauer et al. , 
1982), the natural gas trade in Europe (see Messner, 1985), as well 
as several other topics [see, for example, Strubegger (1985)). 
During the 1980s, methods similar or essentially equivalent to 
the reference point approach were internationally recognized as the 
most versatile tools for multi-objective model analysis: see Mikhale-
vich and Volkovich (1982), Steuer and Choo (1983), Nakayama and 
Sawaragi (1984) , Korhonen and Laakso (1986) , and Seo and Sakawa 
(1988). The reason for this evolution was that methods of this 
class can be treated as the generalizations of several older meth-
ods of multi-objective analysis, such as compromise programming 
by Zeleny (1973), surrogate trade-off methods by Haimes and Hall 
(1974), the maximal effectiveness principle by Khomenyuk (1977) , 
and, especially, goal programming - see Charnes and Cooper (1977) 
and lgnizio (1978) - while preserving the advantages of these older 
methods but overcoming their drawbacks. 
For applications in DSSs, reference point methods have a spe-
cific, desirable property that stresses the sovereignty of the user: 
the continuous controllability of the selection of efficient solutions 
by the user, see Wierzbicki (1986). The development of these 
methods was continued, among others, by the Polish community 
of researchers in DSSs cooperating with IIASA. Several prototype 
DSSs using reference point methods were implemented and tested 
on diverse applications - including variants of DIDAS, DINAS, 
HYBRID, and other systems, see Lewandowski and Wierzbicki 
(1989). Such systems were later also called aspiration based. Con-
tributions to multiple-criteria bargaining and group decision sup-
port were made [see Bronisz et al. (1989) and Wierzbicki (1990)]: 
partly in cooperation with IIASA 's project on negotiations. Diverse 
Decision Analysis and Support 197 
approaches to representing uncertainty or imprecision in decision 
analysis, mathematical modeling, and optimization, such as set-
valued or inverse methods [see, for example, Kurzhanski (1986)), 
stochastic optimization with its multi-objective aspects [see, for 
example, Ruszczynski (forthcoming)) , fuzzy sets [see, for example, 
Kacprzyk and Fredrizzi (1988) and Slowinski and Teghem (1990)) 
or rough sets (see Pawlak, forthcoming), have been studied either 
in IIASA or in Poland. We perceived also that while mathemat-
ical modeling and simulation are established disciplines, their ap-
plications to decision support have specific aspects which require 
considerable methodological advancement (Wierzbicki, forthcom-
ing; Wessels, forthcoming). 
Thus, while the original work on decision support tended to 
neglect methodology, IIASA-related activities resulted in its sub-
stantial theoretical and conceptual advancement. Various phases of 
decision processes were better understood. An essential distinction 
between preferential versus substantive models representing knowl-
edge in DSSs was made and the use of diverse classes of analytical 
models of knowledge investigated (see Wierzbicki, forthcoming) . 
New conceptual challenges resulted from the dispute about the role 
of human intuition in decision making [see, for example, Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus (1986)): it appears now that there are possibilities of 
a rational study of intuitive decision making that. would help to 
construct DSSs which could enhance the intuition of the sovereign 
user. 
Most of the concepts and developments indicated above can be 
stated in mathematical terms. We comment here only on some 
related basic concepts and ideas. Although the basic concepts of 
multiple-criteria optimization are sufficiently well described, for ex-
ample, in Sawaragi et al. (1985), Yu (1985), Steuer (1986), Seo 
and Sakawa (1988), it turns out that an essential role in this field 
is played by conical separation theorems. While separation theo-
rems are universally used for the derivation of necessary conditions 
of optimality in single-objective optimization, their application is 
usually restricted to convex cases and linear separating functions. 
The nature of multi-objective optimization, however, is such that 
we should separate a set of attainable outcomes from a ·cone: it is 
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then possible to select non-linear separating functions with conical 
level-sets. Such functions are called order-consistent, achievement 
scalarizing functions (see Wierzbicki 1986, 1990) and have several 
advantages. They result in a very general characterization of ef-
ficient (multi-objectively optimal) solutions, including non-convex, 
discrete, dynamic, and other infinite-dimensional cases. They are 
parameterized in a natural way by reference points that express 
the aspiration or reservation levels of a user of a DSS or a decision 
maker. By changing the reference points, the user can continu-
ously control the selection of efficient decision outcomes - which 
would not be possible if linear scalarizing functions were used. The 
use of an achievement scalarizing function with conical level-sets is 
equivalent to applying exact penalty functions to soft constraints 
representing reservation levels for various objectives: thus, such an 
approach generalizes several former approaches to multi-objective 
optimization. 
The concept of conical separation can also be applied to prob-
lems with uncertainty expressed either by probabilistic formulations 
or by fuzzy sets. In the latter case [see, for example, Zadeh (1965) 
and Granat and Wierzbicki (1992)], it can be assumed that a deci-
sion maker - a user of a DSS - might be imprecise about his pref-
erences concerning decision outcomes, but can specify and modify 
fuzzy membership functions expressing the degree of his/her satis-
faction with the outcome values. The aggregation of such member-
ship functions for several objectives might then be obtained through 
an achievement scalarizing function. Such an approach is particu-
larly helpful when organizing a graphical interaction with a DSS. 
Another application of the concept of conical separation is 
related to the characterization of non-cooperative solutions in 
multiple-criteria games. While the main body of game theory deals 
with multiple criteria under the assumptions that they can be ei-
ther scalarized by a given value or utility function or represented 
by additional players, there are many cases when such assump-
tions are not justified. This was often pointed out, for example, 
by Blackwell (1956), Contini (1966), Yu (1973), and Zeleny (1976). 
Although the basic concepts of a multi-objective version of game 
theory were defined and analyzed by Bergstresser and Yu (1977), 
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this theory was not fully developed subsequently. The application 
of conical separation theorems - see Wierzbicki (1990) - results in 
a full characterization of non-cooperative solutions to such games, 
even in non-convex cases. 
The analysis of non-cooperative solutions in multi-objective 
games can be applied to studying processes of conflict escalation. 
The computation of an equilibrium in a single-objective game is 
based on the assumption that the preferences and pay-off functions 
of all players are known to each other. In a multi-objective formu-
lation of a game we must still assume that at least the nature of 
objectives and and some additional information (for example, as-
pirations or reference points) are known. However, in real-life sit-
uations even this information would be strategically guarded: any 
player would have to guess and assume the objectives and reference 
points of other players. If some of the players guessed incorrectly, 
their decisions would not correspond to any equilibrium and the 
outcomes of such decisions might be worse than expected . In a 
repetitive game, this would lead to revised assessments of the pref-
erences of other players, with a psychological tendency to blame 
them and to retaliate: the original lack of information and the in-
ability to communicate is the real cause. Retaliation, or even seem-
ingly rational responses based on inadequate information, usually 
leads to a process of conflict escalation. Special experimental multi-
objective games can be devised in order to study such processes and 
the adaptability of players when avoiding conflict escalation. 
The Study of Developmental Challenges 
We are living at the turn not only of the millennium, but also of the 
epoch of civilization. The epoch that started with the Industrial 
Revolution and the Enlightenment era almost three centuries ago 
is coming to its end, having produced not only advances in science 
and technology, but also ideological strifes between communism and 
capitalism, or extreme nationalism and globalism, worldwide wars 
and threats to global environment, and demographic explosions and 
green revolutions - all without precedence in human history. The 
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next epoch is variously characterized as the post-industrial, ser-
vice, or information society, or the epoch of Informed Reason: see, 
for example, Toffier (1980) and Wierzbicki {1983, 1987). In these 
publications, it was often stressed that an essential aspect of this 
transition is a deep change in the basic concepts of perceiving real-
ity. Without a deeper understanding of these concepts, we will not 
be able to meet the developmental challenges of the coming epoch. 
Yet these are usually perceived on the conceptual basis of the 
old, not the new epoch. Thus, important aspects of these challenges 
are often neglected, as in Fukuyama (1992) and related discussions 
where it was not even noticed that the fall of communism was ac-
celerated by the emergence of the information society. Similarly, 
the difficulties of the transition of Central and Eastern European 
countries to a market economy are perceived through the focus of 
Smithonian concepts, which are adequate for industrial capitalism, 
but the transition is more difficult precisely because the people in 
these countries have aspirations to become members of the infor-
mation society, not the old industrial one. 
Advances in science and technology during the last century 
resulted in a change in the basic concepts of understanding real-
ity - time, space, cause and effect relations, uncertainty and chaos, 
information processing and knowledge representation, the nature of 
human decisions, and the possibility of supporting them by com-
puters. While this change originally resulted from developments in 
physics (the relativity of space and time), in telecommunications, 
and automatic control (the concept of feedback that made obsolete 
the mechanical understanding of cause and effect), further stages 
of this change are related to computer science, as well as to devel-
opments in systems and decision sciences. 
We shall consider here briefly some of the concepts mentioned 
above: the chaotic behavior of complex systems, the value of infor-
mation, the formation of aspirations and the possibility of a cusp 
in a dynamic system, and the traps of rationality and the evolution 
of cooperation, as well as their possible applications in studying 
developmental challenges. 
The concept of chaotic behavior [see, for example, Gleick 
{1987)] is based on the observation that even a relatively simple 
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deterministic mathematical model of a dynamic system, if it is non-
linear and contains sufficiently strong feedback, can produce behav-
ior that is extremely sensitive to microscopic changes in parameters 
or initial conditions and is sufficiently complex to be practically un-
predictable. Actually, this was known some time before the study 
of chaos. For example, we cannot produce truly indeterministic 
behavior in computers, and all random number generators are ac-
tually quasi-random: they are in fact chaotic generators. Contem-
porary physics, although it frequently uses these chaotic generators 
in computers, has not yet fully assimilated the concepts of feedback 
and chaos. The uncertainty principle is still interpreted as a reason 
to believe that the universe is indeterministic: it may be felt that 
there is no sense in discussing this issue when a simple, determin-
istic model can represent uncertain behavior equally as well as an 
indeterministic one. The concept of chaos, however, is even less 
well known, and might have more profound consequences for social 
philosophy. 
Social philosophies of the industrial epoch - be they Marxist 
or Smithonian - are based on mechanistic models of society, where 
an individual action is lost in the statistical average. However, 
if we perceive society through the perspective of chaotic behav-
ior , a tremendous responsibility descends upon the individual. In 
critically sensitive circumstances, an individual 's action can have 
decisive consequences for the future of the world (which is actually 
well known in history, but social philosophies tended to overlook 
this fact). Naturally, the individual will be guided by his own in-
terest (the fall of communism has taught us that it is foolish to 
assume otherwise). However, studies of decision analysis teach us 
(see Axelrod, 1984; Rapoport, 1989) that in a sensitive situation -
for example, in a situation of conflict - the individual often modifies 
his own interest by invoking a set of basic values which, if properly 
chosen, might prevent conflict escalation. 
Naturally, we might also ask the question: how common are 
such sensitive situations that could affect the future of the world? A 
time of civilization transition is generally sensitive and such critical 
situations might occur quite frequently. Besides, the frequency of 
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such situations might increase in the next epoch. This is related to 
the next concept - the role and value of information. 
A loaf of bread must be divided and either eaten or saved for 
the next day; a book can be read by many without losing value. 
Obviously, if the information component is a decisive factor in the 
value of products of the information age, we must develop new eco-
nomic principles. The traditional answer is to establish a market 
for information: it is true that we must guard intellectual prop-
erty and rights in order to have a sound economic system in the 
coming epoch . However, there are several catches in this simplified 
reasoning: an information market has various peculiarities, since 
an economic game with information content has neither zero nor 
constant sum. Moreover, in truly sensitive situations, access to 
appropriate information might have impacts quite beyond its mar-
ket value. Information can be either properly or improperly used 
(e.g., by a researcher finding a cure for AIDS or by a nuclear ter-
rorist) . Thus, some information should be common property and 
some must be restricted: which set of basic values should be used 
to decide which is the case? 
Science thrives on free information exchange: the developed 
countries should help the developing ones by providing information 
that might be essential for preventing a further growth of discrep-
ancies in the world. Unless we treat the issue of information value 
more deeply and seriously, it might well become the main source of 
social tensions in the coming epoch. A Manifesto for an Informa-
tion Age bas already been written (Grundner, 1989). 
Up until this point we have discussed the possible future im-
portance of the concepts mentioned above, but they might also be 
essential for understanding what is happening at present. The value 
of information can be illustrated by a simple example of a recent 
controversy concerning scientific and educational policy in Poland. 
In the process of transformation toward a democratic market soci-
ety, the Polish parliament decided that the allocation of budgetary 
funds for scientific research should be supervised by a democrati-
cally elected representation of scientists and must employ competi-
tive allocation mechanisms similar to systems used by the National 
Science Foundation in the USA for granting support for research. 
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Accordingly, a new law was passed, elections held and the Commit-
tee for Scientific Research constituted. (It has a rather complicated 
structure, but the Committee proper consists of 12 elected repre-
sentatives of the scientific community and 6 representatives of the 
government - ministers of cabinet rank). Having been elected to 
this body, the author of this chapter - as a specialist in decision 
analysis and support - spent much of his time improving the details 
of the corresponding competitive allocation mechanisms. 
However, the Committee of Scientific Research also has an im-
portant role in formulating the overall policy for science and edu-
cation in Poland - and a controversy soon escalated between the 
members from the liberal government and the elected members of 
this body. All agreed on the necessity of competitive mechanisms, 
but the liberal government also came to the conclusion that the sys-
tem of science and education in Poland is overexpanded and, in this 
time of budgetary shortages, should be the first source of savings. 
What we needed was rather simple information - international com-
parisons of the size and funding of various parts of the system, well 
interpreted and understood (because of the international diversifi-
cation of the structures of such systems, it is necessary to decide 
which elements are comparable). Such information actually existed 
in Poland - but the government members did not pay attention 
to it, rather they listened to the opinions of their foreign advisers 
which can be summarized as follows: "since you have such good 
scientific and educational results in Poland, it is clear that the sys-
tem must be overexpanded." This resulted in budgets for science 
being cut by half and by one third for education - which caused a 
crisis that threatens all the reforms that have been initiated. 
Intuitive opinions might be not only valid , but sometimes more 
valuable than those based on analysis. However, experts must en-
sure that their opinions (no matter whether intuitive or analytic) 
reflect adequate information. The proportion of GNP allocated 
for science and research in Poland (around 1.2% for several years, 
less than 1 % last year and less than 0.5% after budgetary cuts) 
is several times smaller than, say, in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, 
similarly for education. Hence, the system is certainly not overex-
panded in financial terms. In terms of scientific personnel, the part 
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of the system consisting of the basic research institutes of the Pol-
ish Academy of Sciences and industrial research institutes is slightly 
overexpanded: but, including universities, the overall number of re-
searchers in Poland relative to population is one of the smallest in 
Europe. This is due to an undersized and elitist system of higher 
education in Poland that teaches only about 10% of the age cohort 
to the level of a high-quality, five-year study leading uniformly to 
a masters degree. This scholarization index of 10% is again sev-
eral times smaller than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. We cannot 
sustain democratic reforms without substantially increasing this in-
dex, shortening the number of years of study, and diversifying the 
university system. Therefore, the transformation of this system 
needs more, rather than less, financial support. This information 
succeeded in convincing the government - which had changed in 
the meantime and become christian-nationalist - that it should not 
decrease (there is no possibility of actually increasing) the funding. 
but the crisis is not over yet. 
Perhaps more significantly, the understanding of current devel-
opmental challenges can be improved by using the concept of aspi-
ration formation , introduced by H. Simon (1957) in the satisficing 
theory of decision making. [Actually, the methodology of refer-
ence points in decision support can be considered as an extension 
of this theory to a quasi-satisficing approach: see, for example, 
Lewandowski and Wierzbicki (1989).] If we have a computerized 
model of a developmental process that includes some decision vari -
ables, we do not need to analyze future scenarios by making as-
sumptions about which decisions will be made. Much more con-
sistently, we can ask experts what, in their opinion, will be the 
development of socioeconomic aspirations, quantified in the form 
of some aspiration trajectories for selected development indices. A 
multi-criteria decision support system can then solve the inverse 
simulation problem by computing the necessary decisions to come 
as close as possible to the specified aspirations (or, if possible, to 
exceed them) and ascertaining the corresponding attainable trajec-
tories for the selected indices. By changing aspiration trajectories, 
we can generate alternative development scenarios. This approach 
has been used by several applied projects at IIASA, in cooperation 
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with the SDS program: for example, when analyzing forestry sector 
policies, energy supply scenarios, natural gas trade, etc. 
In its essence, this approach assumes that a society finds ways 
(e.g., by acting through its democratic institutions) to institute 
policies that help to come as close to the dominant social aspirations 
as is possible in given physical , economic, and environmental con-
ditions. These conditions are often represented by a computerized 
model, called a substantive model because it encodes expert knowl-
edge on the substantive limitations to development - as opposed to 
preferential models that represent social preferences, which, in this 
approach, are simply approximated using the concept of aspiration 
trajectories (and order-consistent achievement functions). 
However, sometimes such substantive models of complex de-
velopmental issues are not available. This is the case in the soft 
analysis of developmental challenges, usually performed by an inter-
disciplinary committee of experts. The organization of work along 
traditional lines in such a committee is often quite difficult. In the 
Committee of Future Studies, "Poland 2000" (in 1989 reorganized 
and renamed "Poland in the XXI Century"), of the Polish Academy 
of Sciences, we found that the concept of aspiration scenarios is also 
quite useful for soft analysis. The committee discusses and chooses 
what might be alternative scenarios of dominant social aspirations , 
while keeping in mind that actual development scenarios could be 
quite different to the aspirations. Appointed subcommittees then 
address the question of what would be the actual development in 
selected areas for each of the assumed aspiration scenarios. The 
most difficult is the last phase: this is a joint discussion and the 
formation of conclusions about what the attainable development 
scenarios corresponding to alternative aspiration scenarios would 
be. The results of such a study are then reported. An example is 
Wierzbicki (1991). 
The events of the last few years in Eastern Europe indicate that, 
in times of change, another related concept might be important -
that of the aspiration gap. If the difference between the social as-
pirations and the attainable development becomes too large, social 
tensions grow and can result in either a cusp (an essential change 
of development trajectory related to the phenomenon of bifurcation 
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in non-linear dynamics) or even unpredictable, chaotic behavior re-
lated, for example, to regional or national conflicts. 
When reverting to old nationalist values in times of global 
change, people fall into rationality traps that can be avoided only 
by the evolution of cooperation: these concepts are well studied 
in contemporary decision analysis (see Axelrod, 1984; Rapoport, 
1989), but unfortunately not sufficiently well known to the popular 
audience. In order to accelerate such evolution of cooperation, it is 
necessary to promote new values: however, which ones? 
We have already indicated several times the importance of this 
question. It appears that values universally acceptable to humanity 
might be derived from the evident threats to the global ecosphere. 
The emergence of the concept of Gaia is a very significant intellec-
tual development. Instead of conclusions to this chapter, I would 
like to propose a further intellectual challenge: perhaps somebody 
should attempt to write a report to Gaia, not only stressing the 
necessary basic components of the value of global responsibility, 
but also postulating and analyzing such a new set of values. 
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PART IV 
Models to Say What 
the Future Holds 

CHAPTER 8 
A Linear Model for 
Environment and Development 
Lawrence R. Klein 
The Layout of an Economic Model 
The general linear model of an economic system can be described 
by the following compact design: 
A(L)yt + B(L)xt = f(L)e1 
E>(L)xt = 4>(L)ui . 
(8.1) 
(8.2) 
There is a counterpart non-linear model, which is indeed more 
widely applicable and also used, but the points that I want to deal 
with in this chapter can be more conveniently dealt with in the 
linear framework, with closed form expressions. Non-linearities are 
very important for understanding the economy, but not necessarily 
for showing its interdisciplinary aspects. 
In the language of econometrics, the column vectors in equa-
tions (8.1) and (8.2) are defined as follows : Yt is the n-element 
column vector of endogenous (dependent) variables; Xt is the m-
element column vector of exogenous (independent) variables; and 
et and u1 are, respectively, then- and m-element column vectors of 
random disturbance affecting system performance. 
The matrices have elements that are polynomials in the opera-
tor L. For example, the typical element of A(L) is 
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The operator L is a lag displacement operator such that 
The matrix A(L) is square and lla•;oll is non-singular. The matrix 
E>(L) enjoys analogous properties. The matrix B(L) is rectangular 
(nxm); f(L) and <t>(L) are diagonal. 
The important aspect of equations (8.1) and (8.2) for the pur-
poses of this chapter is the block triangularity of the ( n + m) equa-
tion system. Implicitly, x 1 has influence on yi, but there is no 
feedback from Yt to x, ; this is the essence of the concept of exo-
geneity in economics. In some investigations it is assumed that e1 
and Ut are independent, but this is only a simplification and is not 
essential. 
The structure of equations (8.1) and (8.2), without feedback 
from Yt to xi, means that the economist pays less than complete 
attention to the process that generates x 1: weather and climate 
are left to the meteorologists; population dynamics are left to the 
demographers; crop yields are left to the agronomists; "animal spir-
its" are left to the social psychologists; etc. The intention of this 
chapter is to address the broadening of the economist's perspective 
in order to try to integrate their analyses more closely into those of 
related disciplines. 
In effect, the system defined by equations (8.1) and (8.2) can 
be broken down into a traditional economic model, given by equa-
tion (8.1 ), and "another" model for the treatment of the exogenous 
variables. The economist, in general, pays precious little attention 
to the latter, even to the point of neglecting some economic feed-
back that could have or should have been taken into account. The 
problem is one of defining an exogenous variable in the context of 
an economic system. 
The independence of elements of et and u, imply the corre-
sponding independence of elements of Xt and et, since 
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The serial covariances of u1 and e1 are also assumed to vanish. 
This is the strict definition of an exogenous variable, but under 
less restrictive conditions concerning the relationship between e1 
and u1 the Xt terms can be treated as though they, or variables 
closely related to them, are exogenous. There are other definitions 
of causality and exogeneity in econometrics, but I believe that the 
time-honored concept that I have described above is the most mean-
ingful one for the purpose of exploring the expansion of the domain 
of economic modeling and analysis. 
The unit of observation used in equations (8.1) and (8.2) is an 
undefined time period. Many other observation units - the firm, the 
household, the person, the political entity - could be used as well , 
but there are some important effects on the concept of exogeneity 
that are related to the length of the time period unit . The finer the 
time unit, the less interdependent are the components of y,, and 
the more recursive these components (of which there are several) 
become. This means that the A(L) matrix may also be triangular 
or block triangular. 
Economists often distinguish between two types of reasoning -
short-term and long-term. For many kinds of contemporary prob-
lems, especially in well-organized, efficient markets that are served 
by telecommunication devices, time variation is practically contin-
uous. Feed-forward dominates feedback in such situations. There is 
more exogeneity or "predeterminedness" in short-term systems, in 
units of days, weeks, or months, say, than in longer-term systems 
that deal with quarters, semesters, years, or decades. In longer 
periods of time, there is much greater scope for the appearance of 
feedback, particularly from the economy to phenomena from other 
disciplines. The broader the scope of interdependence becomes, the 
fewer the number of elements in x1• To a large extent, this chapter 
will be concerned with feedback effects over long time-periods of 
elements of y1 on what has been traditionally embodied in x,. 
These ideas do not rule out short-term feedback effects across 
disciplines, but such feedback will be less familiar and not easy to 
handle. In very short-term analysis in which economists are closely 
watching and monitoring the intricate twists and turns of the busi-
ness cycle, indexes of personal attitudes are used in order to gauge 
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the subjective feelings of consumers toward spending, income move-
ments, or price movements. These are useful indicators of behavior 
over short time-periods of a few weeks and are determined from 
responses to questions posed in replicated sample surveys. If, how-
ever, we economists should want to try to extend the useful life 
of such pieces of information, we must try to explain the subjec-
tive responses in terms of objective, measurable phenomena that 
lend themselves to extrapolation. This, in my opinion, is a fruit-
ful and constructive way to introduce subjective expectations into 
economics and to treat them as endogenous variables. Expectation 
concepts have a long history in economic analysis and in formal 
modeling, but their implementation requires careful attention to 
the techniques of survey sampling and to the associated disciplines 
of sociology and psychology. It is highly unlikely that such issues 
can be satisfactorily treated by economics alone. [1] 
For longer-term analysis, one of the most studied areas of in-
terdisciplinary research is in the relationship between economics 
and demography. The Reverend Thomas Malthus postulated the 
simplest kind of joint economic-demographic model, and its very 
simplicity made it very attractive, yet it pitifully fails to pass vali -
dation tests, except possibly in sub-Saharan Africa. Its main virtue 
is in calling attention to the need for a linkage between two disci-
plines and in showing how deeply one must go into the two subjects 
involved in order to obtain credible results, i.e., results that show 
promise of passing validation tests. 
Two examples of models that go significantly beyond Malthus' 
contribution, yet which are still far short of what is needed, can be 
found in the macroeconomics literature of the 1950s and 1960s. Ste-
fan Valavanis-Vail introduced endogenous population in a growth 
model of the United States based on quinquennial data (for over-
lapping decades) from the macroeconomic accounts of the 19th and 
20th centuries, prepared by Simon Kuznets. Valavanis-Vail relied 
on population size to capture the effects of population growth on 
long-term economic evolution, but he also tried to explain the com-
ponents of the identity[2] 
(8.3) 
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His definitions were as follows: Nt is the population (stock) at time 
t; bt is the average birth rate during period t; dt is the average death 
rate during period t; and Nit is the net immigration (flow) during 
period t. 
He then tried to establish estimation equations for bt as a func-
tion of national income per capita and its rate of change, and dt as 
either an exogenous variable or a declining function oft . He did not 
contribute toward the estimation of an equation for Nit, but many 
researchers have investigated such equations in terms of institu-
tional restraints and international income differentials. Obviously, 
one can go far in the study and development of usable equations 
for bi, dt , and Nit . However, at least Valavanis-Vail elevated the 
discussion to a new plane some 40 years ago. 
A second provocative paper that attracted a great deal of atten-
tion during the early 1960s was Richard Easterlin's consideration 
of the baby boom in terms of the macrodynamic economics un-
derlying Kuznets' ideas about long swings.[3] Easterlin deplored 
economists' treatment of demographic phenomena in the following 
words: 
At the risk of generalizing too freely, it would be fair to say 
that the typical treatment of population growth in economic 
theories is as an exogenous variable, whose movement is given 
by demographers. 
He showed how demographic projections can be invalidated by 
cyclical swings in birth rates when the projections are based on 
unchanging or monotonically changing birth rates, no matter how 
detailed the historical birth information may be. He argued that 
the baby boom could be interpreted in terms of Kuznets ' analysis of 
economic performance over relatively long periods of time. He did 
not build a formal mathematical- statistical model, but one could, 
of course, do that . 
Demographic modeling, when more carefully integrated with 
economic modeling, makes use of age, sex, and other distributional 
categories. Income distributions are one type of closely related dis-
tribution and they, in turn , use some of the demographic categories 
in more refined analysis. Income distributions can be graduated 
218 Lawrence R. Klein 
and studied, both descriptively and analytically, by economic vari-
ables alone, but good projections will certainly have to take in-
put from politics, sociology, and demographics . Average measures , 
such as Gini ratios or income class-cohort type measures, can be 
used in econometric models as endogenous variables. The move-
ment of microeconomic income distributions through time can be 
used, but a more manageable approach that could yield some useful 
results at a more aggregative level is to try to generate class (rela-
tive) frequencies of income as functions of demographic and various 
macroeconomic magnitudes through time.[4] 
The discussion so far has dealt largely, but not entirely, with 
national economies, without bringing in explicit international link-
ages among them. The economic side of national security opens up 
many possibilities for interdisciplinary research. Military or defense 
expenditure is usually assumed to be the most obvious of exogenous 
variables in economics, apart from weather or other natural forces. 
Non-military spending by government is also often assumed to be 
exogenous , but that classification is subject to doubt. There is less 
doubt, probably even no doubt among some economists, about the 
exogeneity of defense spending. President Reagan used to say, in 
response to critics who cited defense spending as a cause of the 
US federal deficit, that a country first decides how much defense is 
needed and then figures out how to pay for it and how to fit other 
government activities in line with it . 
That attitude would seem to make US defense spending exoge-
nous. However, the political strategist Lewis Richardson has put 
forward the action- reaction model of the arms race, in which any 
one country's defense spending (and entire military establishment) 
is chosen in response to partners' and adversaries' expenditures. On 
a world scale, such a system seemed to fit the international data 
set well when the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) 
countries were locked in an arms race.(5] In fact, such a model has 
been used in tandem with the world model of project LINK to en-
dogenize both military and non-military government spending up 
to the period of the disintegration of the WTO. According to the 
Richardson model, 
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(8.4) 
where identifying restrictions are selectively imposed on Oijk· On 
a somewhat cruder level, total government spending is made to 
depend on defense spending, so that 
(8.5) 
This crudely echoes the views of former President Reagan's crit-
ics that large-scale defense spending governed the size of total gov-
ernment spending on goods and services. Many transfer payments, 
however, that are not included in Gt also contribute significantly 
to the government budget and deficit. These are called the "en-
titlements". Some entitlements, however, are in Git · Careful con-
sideration of these and other non-defense outlays can do much to 
improve the estimation of Git and public transfers, but the political 
theorizing of Richardson and his followers has also led to interesting 
results for international model building. 
At a more technical level , defense strategists can contribute 
many ideas on the endogenous treatment of military spending which 
may be coordinated with an international model such as LINK. 
Another technical area is the interface between technology, en-
gineering, science, and economics, as in environmental protection 
and energy use. There are many actual and potential examples in 
this field, but one that is at present attracting much attention is 
the study of the "greenhouse effect" because of concern about C02 
emissions, largely from the burning of fossil fuels in energy delivery. 
In another combination with project LINK, an energy model 
(the Trace Gas Accounting System, TGAS) has been made math-
ematically compatible so that the two systems simultaneously gen-
erate estimates of prices of energy items, the production of energy, 
the emission of C02, and the feedback to the world economy in 79 
linked models for different countries or regional groupings.[6] En-
vironmental problems often cross borders. This is especially true of 
C02 emissions; so an international model that is not too simplistic 
at a global level, as are models couched in world aggregates, or 
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on too much of a regional plane, is needed in order to capture the 
international linkages among countries at the economic and envi-
ronmental levels simultaneously. This is the intention of the inter-
dependent combination of LINK and TGAS. The layout is depicted 
in Figure 8.1. 
The use of the two models in feedback interaction is of some 
interest in itself, but the system is put to a substantive use, namely 
to study the effects of a carbon tax that aims to reduce emissions. 
Carbon taxes varying from $28 to $42 (1988 prices) per ton of C02 
emissions in different industrial countries are assumed to be phased 
linearly over the period 1992-1995. The price increase quite natu-
rally translates into higher inflation and reduced GNP growth, with 
slightly higher unemployment. It is then shown, in further scenar-
ios, how some of these perverse effects can be mitigated through 
recycling tax revenues. At the expense of only a little more infla-
tion, the output losses can be eliminated through policies of mon-
etary accommodation. These results are worked out for individual 
countries and are also extended to an optimal control algorithm. 
This is a very flexible methodology that can be extended to 
many kinds of scenarios, but it is mainly of interest in the present 
context as an example of an effective combination of international 
macroeconomics with environmental engineering. There are many 
other possibilities for fruitful combinations of economics with, for 
example, technical studies of water delivery (presently under con-
sideration in the Middle East), energy, nuclear fallout, and other 
areas of collaboration. 
Mention has been made of the political analysis of variables that 
are often classified as exogenous. One of the frequently cited appli-
cations is associated with the introduction of reaction functions into 
macroeconometric models. Consider the implementation of mone-
tary policy. Conventional econometric models place key monetary 
variables in the exogenous category. These are such variables as, 
for example, the fixing of a central bank's discount rate, reserve re-
quirement ratios behind deposits, or open market operations that 
affect available reserves. These variables can either be assigned as-
sumed values on the basis of political judgment, or they can be 
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Figure 8.1. Layout of the combination of LINK and TGAS. (The 
K parameter is the increase in the price of fossil fuel (oil, coal, gas: 
averaged) resulting from a carbon tax.) 
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fixed by formulas that show the reactions of authorities to eco-
nomic performance indicators in relation to accepted targets such 
as full employment, non-accelerating inflation rates, ratios of trade 
or budget imbalances to GDP, or analogous magnitudes. When 
performance reports indicate clearly that the economy is missing 
its target, monetary reactions are set in motion, and the degree 
of reaction depends on the deviation of key variables from their 
targets. 
This treatment of politico-economic decision making is not un-
desirable per se, but the choice of a reaction function is arbitrary 
because it reflects the decision-making process of a small number 
of people. The choice must reflect what they want and are will-
ing to do. It cannot be made optimal in an objective sense by 
appealing to control-theory methods because that theory cannot 
tell us what the objective function is for central bankers or those 
people that they serve in the political hierarchy. Also, it cannot be 
sensibly estimated from historical data because it has little or no 
statistical basis. The observation of the behavior of a few people -
literally a handful - over a limited-duration political regime cannot 
give an acceptable statistical estimate of a relationship. One needs 
a large sample, transcending many political regimes and involving 
thousands (or more) of people replicating their decisions frequently. 
This kind of sample does not exist, nor can it legitimately be ex-
pected to exist. Nevertheless, for each political body a particular 
objective function can be put into a model to determine monetary 
decisions, either optimally or descriptively, and the results can be 
documented. This has some interest but does not really solve the 
politico-economic problem of setting monetary policy. 
A Generalized Model or Satellite System 
It is asking a great deal to expect an econometrician to supply an 
all-purpose model - one that can be used for whatever occasion 
may occur. Generality is not bad, in itself, and my rule is to con-
struct the largest model that can be adequately managed to cover 
a variety of problems. This is what has motivated the structure of 
the LINK model, which now has more than 25,000 equations that 
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must be solved simultaneously, and is supplied by enormous data 
files that are updated as quickly as possible - say monthly. More in-
dividual countries will be added on a regular basis. Some additions 
are being forced upon us by the break-up of the USSR; others are to 
incorporate neglected countries that are small or that are outside 
the normal orbits of economic discourse (Vietnam, for example). 
The commodity detail in the country-by-country trade matrix is 
being expanded; international capital flows and services are being 
introduced; debt accounting has already been introduced; etc. No 
matter how far we go in this direction, it will not be possible to be 
ready, without further work, to analyze atmospheric pollution, de-
livery of water to desert areas, the arms race, and other interesting 
important problems. 
A natural technique is to append satellite models that can be 
placed in full feedback mode with the LINK system. In the dis-
cussion about simulations of the effects of a carbon tax (in the 
previous section), the TGAS model is a satellite system to the gen-
eral LINK system. The satellite shows in some detail how C02 is 
generated by economic activity and also how prices or other valu-
ations are generated in this part of the economy. These variables 
from the satellite system are then related as directly as possible 
to corresponding variables in the general economic (LINK) system. 
The economic model (LINK) and the environmental satellite model 
(TGAS) are then solved as one large, interdependent system. This 
process works well, but is tedious in the sense that a fresh satel-
lite must be built for every essentially different investigation that 
is proposed. Not only is this tedious, but it also slows down the 
presentation of results. A question is posed, and then the research 
investigator says that the provision of an answer must await the 
construction of a satellite model, which can take several weeks or 
months. 
Some judicious mixture of large, general purpose models com-
bined with a satellite system is the practical approach, but models 
are getting ever larger in order to be able to cope with many fresh 
problems as they arise. The area of energy modeling is a case in 
point. At the time of the first oil shock, October 1973, practically 
no general economic model, covering the economy as a whole, had 
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a detailed enough model of energy supply and use to be able to 
respond fully to the oil embargo and immediate jump in prices. 
It so happened that those of us working with the large version 
of the Wharton Model, combining an input-output model with a 
macroeconometric model, had been warned repeatedly by oil com-
pany economists that the United States would have to resort to 
large-scale imports of oil in order to satisfy growing energy needs. 
We had the quantity aspect right , but not the price aspects, which 
were woefully pegged to price increases for crude oil of 5 cents per 
barrel , annually. 
By using the input-output structure, which had an explicit 
energy row /column, we were able to predict the onset of reces-
sion within three to four weeks of the imposition of the embargo. 
What is more important, we were able to extend this resul t to the 
onset of a synchronized world recession through use of the LINK 
system, which had an explicit energy level in the set of world trade 
matrices by commodity category. 
While we had judged the quantitative effects very well, we 
were too low on price. Once OPEC prices started to rise, we pro-
jected very high general price levels in documented gatherings of 
economists who were trying to decipher the unusual situation into 
which the world had been thrust, but even our high-estimate prices 
were too low. 
Before the onset of the second oil shock in 1979- 1980, we had 
built energy subsector models into our systems more fully so that 
we were prepared with a sufficiently detailed model to interpret the 
consequences of the Iranian Revolution within days of its taking 
place. 
While the problems of modeling the energy sector were met by 
incorporating more elaborate energy detail into macroeconometric 
models, we did not have enough detail to anticipate the effects of 
C02 emissions or other environmental problems before they were 
noticed. We had to rely on the construction of satellite models for 
dealing with environmental problems, and this is likely to be the 
case for most of the unforeseen problems that are yet to be visited 
upon us. 
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The combination of input-output systems with macroecono-
metric models is now a routine procedure, but the input-output 
model by itself, no matter how detailed its sectoral disaggregation, 
will not be able to make adequate projections of prices, stocks, 
trade flows, and effects on financial/credit markets. The combined 
model that covers all the accounts in the SNA framework is needed 
for meeting the tasks ahead.[7] It is important to have a good size 
input-output system in the full model of the SNA, but the point 
is that the input-output system cannot solve the whole problem; 
it can at best contribute to the improved treatment of the pro-
duction sector and to the understanding of price formation, but it 
is incomplete by itself. However, it does provide many entry or 
connecting points at which total macroeconometric systems can be 
introduced and at which satellite systems can be attached. When 
input-output systems were used alone to interpret the oil shock of 
1973 in the very early stages of analysis, they often overestimated 
the depressing effects on the economy because they did not depict 
the high degree of substitution of processes and inputs that were 
to accompany the wide swings in relative prices. In other words, 
such systems are necessary, but not sufficient, for the tasks in hand. 
They have the beneficial feature in the present context, however, of 
bringing together, in the best applications, both technologists and 
economists. 
Some Specific Interdisciplinary Investigations 
There are some recent studies, in addition to the carbon tax inves-
tigation described earlier, that point to the realization of interdis-
ciplinary research gains. First, let us consider a popular topic of 
current interest, namely, the aging of Japan. 
There is widespread admiration for Japan's economic perfor-
mance since 1950. Many countries, in both the developed and de-
veloping parts of the world, would like to emulate Japan's success. 
There are also many complaints about some of Japan's economic 
practices which seem unfair to outsiders. Japanese economists have 
pointed out that Japan did not have an easy time rising from the 
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ashes of World War II and Hiroshima/Nagasaki, that they worked 
hard to reach their present status, and that they face a difficult 
problem ahead. 
Birth rates were low in Japan after a baby-boom period, and 
population growth was very modest, contributing to the realization 
of extraordinary output growth - both total and per capita. Many 
years of low fertility and high longevity have finally resulted in a 
high fraction of elderly people. At present, the average number of 
children that a Japanese woman expects to have is 1.53 (a record 
low, realized in 1990). At the same time, Japan matched Iceland 
for the record of the highest life expectancy at birth (81 years for 
females and 76 years for males, in 1986). 
The conventional measures of dependency - total dependency 
and elderly dependency - are shown in Figures 8.2 to 8.11, us-
ing various UN population projections. Figures 8.2 and 8. 7 refer 
specifically to Japan. Economic dependency ratios for Japan are 
shown in Figure 8.12. In Japan, there was a period of quite low 
dependency from the early 1960s until the present time. This was 
a period of extraordinary economic progress for Japan. During this 
time, the total dependency ratio given by 
population 0 - 14 + 65 and over 
population 15 - 64 (8.6) 
had an average value which was lower than that of either Germany 
or the United States, for example. These are major economic com-
petitors. In the period ahead, however, Japan's dependency statis-
tics indicate a very sharp increase in dependency ratio and higher 
values for several years than in either Germany or the United States. 
Japanese statistics are now being refined to switch those esti-
mated to be at work from the numerator of equation (8.6) to the 
denominator, and those estimated to be not at work from the de-
nominator to the numerator, to get a better measure of the people 
not at work who must be supported by those at work. These re-
vised calculations show an entirely different dependency situation. 
The rise in the total dependency ratio becomes so moderate when 
labor-force participation is taken into account that it appears that 
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Japan will have to face dependency ratios that are no larger than 
those experienced and dealt with successfully in the recent past. 
There are interesting demographic consequences for Japan's 
economy during the next few decades. In order to investigate these 
consequences, econometric model building is becoming interdisci-
plinary, to the extent of including specific demographic variables. 
However, economic dependency may not be crucial. There is also 
a labor shortage, especially for certain skills and certain sectors. 
Some options for Japan are to: 
1. Permit immigration (not relied upon previously). 
2. Raise the retirement age. 
3. Encourage more women to enter the paid labor force. 
4. Try to raise productivity levels. 
All four, and others too, will be used to some extent. In model 
building, option two can be readily incorporated by redefining the 
dependency measures. The graphs are considerably altered, for 
example, if retirement is put at age 70 instead of 65. 
There are three main economic consequences of these demo-
graphic changes that have caused reformulations of econometric 
models in Japan. One effect of the aging process is to induce lower 
savings rates. These rates have played a key role in Japan's expan-
sion since the mid-1950s. They provided abundant financial capi-
tal to support large-scale, fixed investment. Secondly, aging tends 
to lower productivity, a factor that has also been instrumental in 
Japan's growth. Finally, the aging population requires significant 
benefit payments from the social insurance system, which could be 
an economic burden for the future. 
In an interesting econometric study supported by a Japanese in-
surance company, entitled The Econometric Analysis of the Pension 
System: Its Effect on the Japanese Economy, Drs. Yoshihisa Inada 
(Kobe-Gakuin University), Kazuo Ogawa (Kobe University) and 
Masayuki Tamaoka (Kobe University) explicitly introduced popu-
lation by age and sex, and labor force participation by age and sex, 
in their macroeconometric model of Japan.[8] Their objective was 
to simulate different scenarios for policy makers to study. 
The dependency ratios are not used as such in their model, 
but the solution provides estimates of both the numerator and the 
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denominator of equation (8.6), so the ratios can easily be estimated. 
Population is not made endogenous, but it could, in principle, be 
introduced in that way. However, the labor force figure is generated 
by explicit equations for age and sex. 
The principal features of this interdisciplinary model are that 
savings rate~ are inversely dependent on social insurance benefits 
per legitimate (older) recipient and on the population frequency of 
older persons. Specific expenditures, such as for housing, depend 
positively on the relative frequency of the population in young to 
medium working age groups. Social insurance benefits and medical 
costs depend positively on the population frequency of the elderly. 
As for productivity effects, the labor input variables in the technical 
production function are weighted by relative quality (wage) in the 
different age groups of labor input. 
The Japanese model, with many demographic measures, is an 
unusual case, but is indicative of what is now being done. Several 
of the exogenous demographic variables will eventually be made 
endogenous, but, at least , their detailed impact on the economy is 
carefully being taken into account . This is definitely a step forward 
and deals with a very significant problem which has demographic 
roots. 
The authors experimented with raising (by 10%) the pension 
level. This resulted in a decrease in private savings by as much as 
2.5-9.1 % along the 8-year time path of projection. This leads to 
investment and aggregate output declines. Any number of different 
scenarios may be implemented from their model. 
An entirely different kind of model is being prepared and dis-
cussed in order to deal with the changing political institutions in 
Moscow. An econometric model of the former Soviet Union was 
built and maintained for a number of years, starting in 1973, at the 
University of Pennsylvania.(9] This model performed workhorse 
service for many research organizations and forecasters until the 
downfall of the USSR, which was both a political and an economic 
event. The model did not foresee the downfall, but it did monitor 
the Soviet pattern of economic development as long as the system 
held together. Now that an entirely new system and new geograph-
ical entity is in place it is useful to consider a replacement model. 
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This involves both political science (or political environment) and 
economics. 
For many years the American Economic Association and the 
Economic Sections of the Academy of Science of the USSR con-
ducted exchange programs of mutual interest, alternating between 
meetings in the USA and in the USSR. After the political changes 
in the USSR (glasnost), the exchange program shifted its focus 
of attention - to the economic problems of the USSR. Between 
November 27 and 29, 1990, a meeting was held in the United States, 
the subject of which was one that was favored by the Soviet side, 
namely, a discussion of the meaning and working of a price sys-
tem. For this meeting, Herbert Scarf of Yale University prepared a 
special paper entitled "Economic Equilibrium and Soviet Economic 
Reform." 
The Scarf paper described an algorithm for computing general 
equilibrium prices, and the ensuing discussion prompted our Soviet 
colleagues into inquiring how a set of "shadow prices", generated 
by Scarf's algorithm, might serve the Soviet economy in realizing 
"perestroika". 
Accordingly, a second meeting was held in Moscow in March 
1992 on the problem of the valuation of wealth of the USSR, focused 
more narrowly on Russia with some attention, also, on other states 
in the former USSR, as a consequence of the political changes that 
had occurred since our previous meeting. 
Valery Makarov, inspired by the discussion on Herbert Scarf's 
paper, prepared a Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) 
of Russia, and also targeted it toward the former republics of the 
USSR, as an example of the form of model-building that would 
conform to the new political realities. The Makarov model was the 
first attempt by the Russians (Soviets) to try to carry out careful 
macroeconometric modeling of their own country for contemporary 
decision making. Actually, the goal of Makarov's effort is to de-
velop a sub-LINK system for the USSR, through the medium of 
linked republic models. This is an interdisciplinary model-building 
exercise in the sense that it tries to conform to the new political 
environment. 
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A conventional macroeconometric approach could not be used 
because a good data base is not readily available for the new polit-
ical entities. Economic theory and judgment, which are used to a 
great extent in CGE models to supplement econometric inference 
from observed samples, were used by Makarov to prepare a model 
of Russia and to initiate one for Armenia. From the solution of such 
a model, "shadow prices" (in the manner of Scarf) could be used 
as initial values, for example, in valuing assets for privatization. 
There are many other possibilities for introducing formal po-
litical considerations into macroeconometric models, but the CGE 
approach in terms of the present political realities in the former 
Soviet Union may be the choice required now. 
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PART V 
How to Disseminate the 
Knowledge that Will Create a 
Constituency for Sound Policies 

CHAPTER 9 
International Environmental 
Governance: Building Institu-
tions in an Anarchical Society 
Oran R. Young 
We have entered a period of profound changes in our understanding 
of governance in international society. Not only does this intellectual 
sea change offer an exciting new research agenda for students of in-
ternational affairs, but it also opens up an unparalleled opportunity 
to bridge the gap that has long separated the main streams of re-
search in the fields of international relations and political science. (1 J 
In this chapter, I explore the implications of this development, with 
particular reference to international environmental affairs, and pro-
pose a plan of action to bring our new understanding of interna-
tional governance to bear on environmental issues of current interest 
to policy makers, such as climate change and the loss of biological 
diversity.[2] However, the underlying argument is generic: it should 
attract the attention of those whose substantive concerns center on 
matters of peace and security, economics, and human rights, as well 
as those endeavoring to deal with environmental matters. 
Defining the Problem: Governance 
without Government 
Throughout much of the 20th century, a broad spectrum of stu-
dents of international affairs have joined forces in arguing that the 
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politically decentralized or anarchical character of international so-
ciety constitutes a profound defect to be remedied as quickly as 
possible through the initiation of processes intended to eventuate 
in the establishment of a world government.[3] Prescriptions for 
achieving this goal have varied widely, ranging from the contractar-
ian ideas of those who have advocated the achievement of "world 
peace through world law", to the incrementalism of those who pro-
pose to rely on the processes of spillover articulated in functionalist 
or neo-functionalist thinking.(4] However, all concur in conclud-
ing that we cannot hope to secure peace or achieve order, much 
less promote justice or other valued ends, at the international level 
in the absence of some form of government. A natural outgrowth 
of this way of thinking is a marked tendency among students of 
international affairs to look to experience with domestic systems 
as a source of inspiration, while students of domestic politics have 
seldom thought to turn to the study of international society as a 
source of helpful ideas about governance.[5] 
Changes affecting this line of thought, stimulated by a number 
of developments which have unfolded over the last decade, are now 
beginning to coalesce into an alternative picture of international 
governance. In part , this is a consequence of the growing realiza-
tion that domestic political systems, much like markets, often fail 
in ways that can, and do, lead to inefficiencies and to unfortunate 
outcomes measured in terms of other values. Under the rubric of 
government failure, for example, analysts are now exploring an ar-
ray of problems centering on institutional arthritis resulting from 
progressive bureaucratization, the capture of public agencies by spe-
cial interest groups, the impact of repressive measures carried out 
in the name of the state, and, ultimately, the breakdown of order 
eventuating in civil strife.[6] Simply establishing a government, we 
have learned from painful experience, offers no assurance that the 
function of governance will be fulfilled effectively, efficiently, and 
equitably: it may impose terrible costs at both the individual and 
the societal levels. 
Of equal importance is the emerging awareness that fulfilling 
the function of governance does not always require the creation of 
material entities or formal organizations of the sort we associate 
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with the concept of government. At the most general level, gov-
ernance is a matter of establishing social institutions (in the sense 
of rules of the game that give rise to and define social practices) 
capable of resolving conflicts, facilitating cooperation, and, more 
generally, alleviating collective-action problems in a world of in-
terdependent actors.[7] Nothing in this way of framing the issue 
presupposes a need to create material entities or organizations (that 
is, governments) to administer the rules of the game that arise to 
handle the function of governance. Once we set aside our preoccu-
pation with structures of government, in fact, it is readily apparent 
that governance is by no means lacking in international society, de-
spite the conspicuous absence of a material entity possessing the 
authority and the power to handle the functions of governance for 
this society as a whole.[8] 
The introduction of the idea of governance without government 
raises a host of new questions of interest to students of politics 
in general and to students of international relations more particu-
larly.[9] Granted that governance systems unencumbered with pub-
lic authorities sometimes suffice to circumvent or to solve specific 
collective-action problems (such as the tragedy of the commons) , 
is there nonetheless a price to be paid for relying on governance 
systems of this sort when it comes to values like maximizing social 
welfare or ensuring robustness in the sense of a capacity to adapt to 
changing social or material circumstances?(lO] Having articulated 
a clear distinction between governance systems in the sense of social 
institutions and governments in the sense of material entities or or-
ganizations, can we now begin to explore interactions and linkages 
between the two? Are there roles for organizations, for example, 
in establishing governance systems in a variety of issue areas?[ll] 
Can organizations that are issue specific and more modest in scope 
than what we think of as governments play constructive roles in 
the administration or operation of governance systems? Do gover-
nance systems go through recognizable lifecycles which are marked, 
among other things, by a tendency to rely increasingly on organi-
zations with the passage of time? Is it normal for the resultant 
organizations to build linkages among issue areas so that they even-
tually come to resemble our conventional idea of government? Are 
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the prospects for governance without government tied to particu-
lar characteristics of the social setting so that arrangements that 
are successful in some settings (for example, small-scale, traditional 
societies) are not likely to prove viable in others (for example, in-
ternational society)?[12] 
Identifying Environmental Problem Sets 
Given the recent preoccupation with global environmental issues 
(for instance, ozone depletion and climate change), it is important 
to preface an examination of environmental governance systems 
with a discussion of the range of environmental issues or problem 
sets now requiring attention at the international level. Many efforts 
to classify these issues are based on properties of the relevant phys-
ical or biological systems. Useful as the resultant classifications are 
for some purposes, there are good reasons to conclude that they are 
not well-suited to efforts to deepen our understanding of the theory 
and practice of international governance. Success in the formation 
and administration of environmental governance systems depends 
critically on the extent to which these arrangements are tailored to 
fit the juridical and political attributes (as well as the physical and 
biological properties) of the problems at hand. From this perspec-
tive, there is much to be said for distinguishing among international 
commons, shared resources, and transboundary externalities. 
International commons are physical or biological systems that 
lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction of any of the individ-
ual members of international society, but that are of interest to a 
number of actors as valued resources. Commons of current inter-
est include Antarctica, the oceans, deep seabed minerals, the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, the geostationary orbit, the stratospheric 
ozone layer, the global climate system, and outer space.[13] As 
these examples suggest, international commons may be geograph-
ically limited, as in the cases of Antarctica and deep seabed min-
erals, global in scope, as in the case of the climate system, or even 
more comprehensive, as in the case of outer space. The category of 
international commons has expanded over time as a result of the 
introduction of new technologies allowing humans to gain access to 
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previously inaccessible areas or to engage in previously infeasible 
activities: it has also shrunk as a consequence of efforts to extend 
the jurisdictional reach of the individual members of international 
society. The electromagnetic spectrum and the geostationary or-
bit, for instance, have come into focus as highly valued commons 
during this century, with the advent and diffusion of modern com-
munications systems.[14] Marine areas adjacent to the coastlines 
of states, on the other hand, have lost many of the attributes of 
commons as a result of the extension of the jurisdiction of coastal 
states to offshore areas and, especially, the recent establishment of 
exclusive economic zones in broad coastal belts. 
Three broad options are available to those endeavoring to devise 
governance systems for international commons: world government , 
extended national jurisdiction, and restricted common property. 
Those, like Garrett Hardin, who are preoccupied with the idea of 
the tragedy of the commons often prescribe mutual coercion mu-
tually agreed upon as the best means of avoiding or coming to 
terms with the dangers they associate with human use of the com-
mons.[15] At the international level, this would entail establishing a 
world government possessing the authority to make, and the power 
to ensure compliance with, rules relating to the use of commons ar-
eas. The idea of extending national jurisdictions, in contrast, flows 
from the premise that the tragedy of the commons is largely a con-
sequence of inappropriate assignments of property rights, a problem 
that can be avoided by engineering a shift from common property 
to some alternative under which property rights (or at least grants 
of management authority) are accorded to individual members of 
the group.[16] In international society, this would require extend-
ing the jurisdiction or management authority of individual states 
to areas previously treated as commons.[17] A system of restricted 
common property is a form of governance that features the reten-
tion of the essential features of common property, coupled with the 
establishment of systems of rules to guide the behavior of individ-
ual members of the ownership group who wish to make use of the 
property. 
Shared resources are physical or biological systems that ex-
tend into or across the jurisdictions of two or more members of 
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international society. They may involve non-renewable resources 
(for example, pools of oil that underlie areas subject to the ju-
risdiction of adjacent or opposite states), renewable resources (for 
example, straddling stocks of fish or migratory stocks of wild an-
imals), or complex ecosystems that transcend the boundaries of 
national jurisdictions (for example, regional seas or river basins). 
While it is natural to focus on shared resources of interest to ad-
jacent or neighboring states, such resources may also link together 
states that are far removed from each other geographically, as in 
the case of migratory birds that traverse long distances and pass 
through numerous jurisdictions in the course of their annual cy-
cles. Similarly, shared resources may impinge on the commons as 
well as the jurisdictional zones of more than two states, depending 
upon the attributes of the resources themselves and on the prevail-
ing pattern of jurisdictional boundaries. Many marine mammals, 
for example, move through waters under the jurisdiction of several 
coastal states as well as waters that remain part of the high seas, 
even with the creation of exclusive economic zones. As this observa-
tion makes clear, moreover, the groupings of actors concerned with 
shared resources may expand or contract with shifts in jurisdic-
tional boundaries in international society. While some fish stocks 
have dropped out of the category of shared resources as a result 
of the extension of national jurisdictions, for instance, others have 
moved into the category of straddling stocks as a consequence of 
the same jurisdictional changes. 
The obvious solution to problems of shared resources is the es-
tablishment of joint management arrangements, either in the form 
of simple coordination regimes under which all participants agree 
to adhere to common rules or in the form of more complex regimes 
involving the creation of supra-national management authorities. 
There is a considerable body of experience with management re-
gimes for renewable resources extending across jurisdictional bound-
aries (for example, the various regimes for migratory birds) and flow 
resources shared by two or more states (for example, the Great 
Lakes water quality regime in North America or the Rhine River 
regime in Europe).[18] Just as unitization has become a .well-known 
and richly nuanced practice used in domestic society to manage the 
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use of common pools of oil and other non-renewable resources ex-
tending across property boundaries, there is growing interest in 
creating joint development zones to handle analogous situations at 
the international level.(19] Yet this does not mean that the man-
agement of shared resources is a simple matter in international so-
ciety. As experience with a number of river basins makes clear, 
there are often sharp conflicts of interest among the relevant states 
which make it difficult to devise any regime that seems adequate 
to solve the underlying problem, much less to produce outcomes 
that all participants regard as equitable.[20] In cases where recent 
shifts in jurisdictional arrangements have given rise to shared re-
source problems, there are also legitimate questions concerning the 
extent to which other states can make use of the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind as a basis for claiming some residual 
right to share in any proceeds accruing from the exploitation of the 
resources at stake. 
Transboundary externalities arise when activities that occur 
wholly within the jurisdiction of individual states nevertheless pro-
duce results that affect the welfare of those residing in other juris-
dictions. Sometimes the externalities in question center on intan-
gible effects arising from moral interdependencies. The destruction 
of world heritage sites such as the temples at Angkor or the city of 
Dubrovnik, for example, detracts from the welfare of people every-
where, even if the benefits they derive from the existence of the sites 
are largely vicarious in nature.[21} Similarly, people everywhere 
now express genuine concern about the consequences of tragic en-
vironmental accidents (for example, Chernobyl or Bhopal), quite 
apart from any transboun~ary consequences of such incidents that 
are material in nature. In other cases, the externalities in question 
involve material interdependencies that affect the welfare of those 
located elsewhere in more tangible terms. A striking case that has 
now become a matter of widespread concern involves the stake of 
the rest of the world (measured in terms of values like the potential 
for the development of new drugs) in the loss of biological diversity 
caused by the destruction of moist tropical forests in Brazil and .a 
small number of other countries. As economists are fond of point-
ing out, externalities may have positive as well as negative effects 
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on the welfare of others: careful observers will no doubt be able 
to point to cases of positive externalities occurring at the level of 
international society. When it comes to problems of international 
environmental governance, however, it is apparent that the focus of 
attention is increasingly on the dangers of negative externalities. 
Dealing with transboundary externalities in international so-
ciety raises two issues of fundamental importance to those who 
analyze governance systems. Do the members of international so-
ciety, acting as a group, have the authority to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of individual states, regardless of the wishes of the 
governments of those states, when events occurring within their 
jurisdictions pose severe threats to the welfare of others or to in-
ternational society as a whole?[22] While we are often prepared to 
accept such interventions when the relevant activities pose a threat 
to international peace and security, an affirmative answer to this 
question in the case of environmental threats raises profound con-
cerns in the minds of those committed to traditional conceptions of 
state sovereignty.(23] Nevertheless, the threats to human welfare 
now arising in conjunction with environmental issues - from the 
geographically focused impact of the Bhopal disaster to the world-
wide impacts of climate change - are raising serious concerns about 
sovereignty that are destined to become more insistent with the 
passage of time. 
There are also important questions regarding liability of states 
for the impacts on outsiders of activities taking place within their 
jurisdictions. Basing their thinking on general precepts (for in-
stance, the "polluter pays" principle), some will undoubtedly argue 
that there is a need for the development of a more effective code 
of environmental liability rules in international society. But this 
approach cannot yield solutions for some of the most important 
problems arising in this area today. As many of those now strug-
gling to deal with the environmental problems of the developing 
countries and the former socialist states are discovering, the most 
effective way to enhance environmental protection for one's own 
citizens or ecosystems often requires joining forces with polluters 
to provide them with the financial resources and the technological 
capabilities needed to alter their polluting practices. 
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Beyond this, it is predictable that governance systems created 
to deal with environmental problems will interact and sometimes 
conflict with similar systems set up to deal with a variety of other 
issues in international society. Perhaps the most striking and po-
tentially controversial issues of this type that are rising to the top 
of the international agenda at this time involve, first, links between 
actions to protect the environment and efforts to promote economic 
development in the countries of the Third World, or, in other words, 
problems of sustainable development, and, second, connections be-
tween initiatives aimed at protecting or enhancing environmental 
quality and efforts to promote the growth of international trade.[24) 
Consider the following cases. Does the protection of the strato-
spheric ozone layer or the global climate system require developing 
countries to forego the use of products or resources (for instance, 
fossil fuels) that have played key roles in the development of the ad-
vanced, industrial societies? Does the maintenance of biological di-
versity compel states like Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia to eschew 
strategies that may seem attractive to advocates of rapid economic 
growth? Similarly, does participation in a free trade regime (for 
example, the proposed North American Free Trade Area) require 
member states to take steps to homogenize their environmental 
standards at the same time? Or are individual members at lib-
erty to persuade industries to locate within their jurisdictions with 
promises of less stringent environmental rules as well as cheaper 
labor? Are states free to impose restrictions on imports from other 
countries whose production involves practices they consider unac-
ceptable on environmental grounds (for example, catching tuna in 
nets that also kill dolphins)? Or do such actions amount to re-
straints on trade that are impermissible under the terms of the 
governance system articulated in the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)? 
In decentralized political systems, where governance without 
government is the order of the day, difficulties involving linkages 
of this sort are unavoidable. What is more, the higher the level of 
interdependence in the system, the more troublesome such issues 
are likely to become. No doubt, this fact constitutes an impor-
tant part of the rationale articulated in many social settings for the 
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establishment of governments, over and above the creation of gov-
ernance systems. However, even in this connection, caveats are in 
order. As innumerable painful experiences with intergovernmental 
relations and interagency coordination within governments attest , 
the creation of a government offers no assurance that these linkage 
problems will be resolved successfully. Nor can we simply assume 
that such problems will prove intractable when governance systems 
are not accompanied by the formal organizations of government. 
Current efforts to come to terms with the linkages between envi-
ronment and trade are particularly intriguing in this regard. While 
this set of problems has recently become a focus of considerable con-
troversy between environmentalists and advocates of free trade, it 
would certainly be premature to conclude that it will prove impossi-
ble to negotiate acceptable accommodations among the governance 
systems in question without establishing some form of government 
to handle the issues at stake. 
Analyzing International Governance Systems 
What do we know, and what do we need to know, about past , 
present, and future international governance systems in order to 
deal effectively with contemporary environmental issues? What 
are the prospects of applying our general knowledge of governance 
systems to environmental problems in a manner that will prove 
useful to practitioners responsible for establishing such systems or 
operating them on a daily basis? The following discussion makes 
use of distinctions that are analytic in nature in the sense that it is 
impossible to separate the phenomena under consideration in any 
simple or clear-cut fashion. For purposes of analysis, however, it 
is illuminating to divide the research agenda into issues involving: 
institutional bargaining; the administration of governance systems; 
the effectiveness of institutional arrangements; and robustness and 
change. 
The key provisions of governance systems, or, in other words, 
the rules of the game that serve to define social practices, are or-
dinarily articulated explicitly in constitutional contracts that are 
often, but not always, codified in legally binding instruments, like 
International Environmental Governance 255 
conventions or treaties.[25] Efforts to (re)form governance systems 
involve processes of institutional bargaining in which the partici-
pants seek to reach agreement on the terms of these constitutional 
contracts.[26) Unlike legislative bargaining, which typically centers 
on the building of winning coalitions to meet the requirements of a 
majoritarian rule, institutional bargaining in international society 
normally operates under a consensus rule that gives the partici-
pants an incentive to put together packages of provisions that will 
prove attractive to as many interests as possible. What saves the 
resultant bargaining from being doomed to certain failure or the 
negotiation of toothless agreements is the absence of perfect infor-
mation and the expectation that governance systems, once formed, 
will remain in place over indefinite periods of time. These fea-
tures of institutional bargaining introduce an element of "good" 
uncertainty in the sense that they give the participants incentives 
to engage in integrative rather than distributive bargaining and to 
deal with the resultant veil of uncertainty by settling on provisions 
that seem equitable to all. [27) 
Why do those engaged in institutional bargaining succeed in 
establishing governance systems to cope with some environmental 
problems but fail to do so in connection with other, seemingly simi-
lar, problems? Questions of this sort have given rise to a substantial 
body of theoretical ideas concerning the formation of international 
governance systems.[28) For the most part, these ideas accentu-
ate single factors , like material conditions (for example, hegemonic 
stability theory), institutional arrangements (for example, many 
game-theoretic analyses), or ideas (for example, arguments relating 
to epistemic communities) . But recent work suggests that single-
factor accounts are severely limited in efforts to account for the for-
mation of international governance systems. The challenge before 
us, then, is to devise a multi-variate model of the (re)formation of 
international institutions.[29) In the minimum case, such a model 
should make it possible to understand substitution effects in the 
sense of alternative pathways to the creation of governance sys-
tems, and interaction effects in the sense of multiple forces at work 
in the development of individual governance systems. 
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The preceding discussion has made use of a clear-cut distinction 
between institutions, treated as the rules of the game that define 
the character of social practices, and organizations, understood to 
be material entities possessing offices, personnel, equipment, bud-
gets, legal personality, and so forth.(30] However, it does not license 
the conclusion that we should turn the traditional study of inter-
national governance on its head by devoting all our attention to 
institutions (that is, governance systems) and ignoring organiza-
tions (that is, intergovernmental organizations) altogether. There 
is an important sense, on this account, in which governance systems 
take precedence over organizations. Since it is possible for gover-
nance systems to arise and operate in the absence of organizations, 
it falls to advocates of international organizations to demonstrate 
the importance of these organizations to the achievement of interna-
tional governance. When organizations are needed, moreover, it is 
important to tailor them to the requirements of specific governance 
systems, rather than changing institutions to achieve compatibility 
with pre-existing or preconceived organizations. Even so, one of the 
principal virtues of drawing a distinction between institutions and 
organizations is that it opens up a major research agenda concern-
ing interactions between the two. Thus, organizations not only play 
roles of some importance in the establishment of many governance 
systems in international society, but they also assume key roles in 
the day-to-day management or administration of many governance 
systems.[31] 
Why are some international governance systems more successful 
than others at solving the problems that motivate their establish-
ment? More modestly, why are some systems better than others 
at inducing their members (and other relevant actors) to act in 
conformity with the rules of the game? To ask these questions 
is to launch an enquiry into the effectiveness of institutional ar-
rangements in international society.(32] A governance system that 
channels behavior in such a way as to eliminate or substantially to 
ameliorate the problem that led to its creation is an effective system. 
A governance system that has little behavioral impact, in contrast, 
is an ineffective system. As these observations imply, the concept of 
effectiveness as applied to international governance systems defines 
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a continuous variable. Governance systems can and do range from 
ineffectual arrangements, which have few behavioral consequences, 
to highly effective arrangements, which produce quick and clear-
cut solutions to the problems at stake. Note also the distinction 
between effectiveness and the performance of governance systems 
measured in terms of normative criteria. A governance system may 
affect behavior dramatically, for example, without achieving great 
success in terms of criteria like efficiency, equity, or sustainability. 
While students of domestic politics generally take it for granted 
that institutions matter and set about analyzing the nature of their 
impact , there is a strong current of thought among students of in-
ternational affairs that dismisses institutions as epiphenomena. In 
this "realist" view, governance systems are surface phenomena, or 
epiphenomena, that reflect the underlying configuration of power in 
international society. Such arrangements come and go with shifts in 
the political fortunes of powerful actors and without affecting out-
comes much in their own right.[33] Yet others see institutions, along 
with material conditions and ideas, as one of the major clusters of 
factors that determine the course of international affairs. And it is 
surely inappropriate to dismiss international governance systems as 
ineffectual just because they are not linked together to form some 
sort of world government. The analytic challenge in this realm is to 
devise procedures to allow us to focus on the behavioral effects of 
international institutions, while holding other factors constant or 
controlling for their effects. Though this challenge is a tough one, 
research is now underway that should begin to illuminate this issue 
during the near future .[34] 
Nothing is static in the world of international governance sys-
tems. Existing arrangements evolve under pressure from a variety 
of forces. New institutions emerge, while old arrangements pass 
from the scene. This suggests a number of questions concerning 
the dynamics of international governance. Are some governance 
systems more robust than others in the sense that they are better 
at adapting to changing problems and shifting societal conditions? 
If so, what are the determinants of robustness? Do some gover-
nance systems exhibit a capacity to control the social environment 
in which they operate as a means of achieving robustness? Are 
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there feedback loops that set up interactive relationships between 
governance systems and the social environments in which they op-
erate? Does it make sense to think of such systems as passing 
through institutional lifecycles in the sense that they initially gain 
in robustness, achieve a measure of stability, and eventually run 
into problems that lead to their decline and even demise? 
As in the case of effectiveness, our current understanding of the 
dynamics of international governance systems is sharply limited.(35) 
To start, however, it makes sense to draw a distinction between in-
ternal factors and external factors in thinking about institutional 
dynamics. A study of internal factors leads us to focus on gover-
nance systems themselves in the interests of determining whether 
they encompass powerful equilibrating mechanisms, as many pro-
ponents believe is the case with competitive markets, or, alterna-
tively, harbor the seeds of their own destruction, as Marxists and 
other radical thinkers have always maintained is the case with cap-
italist systems. This perspective also leads us to ask whether the 
breakdown of governance systems is apt to be gradual in nature or 
to involve sudden and sharp non-linearities of the sort envisioned 
in chaos or catastrophe theory. External factors, in contrast, may 
range from changes in material conditions (for example, the intro-
duction of new technologies or a reconfiguration of power in in-
ternational society) to shifts in prevailing systems of thought (for 
example, the rise of the conservation movement in the 20th cen-
tury). [36) Of course, these internal and external forces are not mu-
tually exclusive. On the contrary, any serious study of robustness 
and change in international environmental governance systems will 
need to focus on links and interaction effects among these forces to 
account for the variety of patterns that are empirically observable. 
Building Intellectual Capital 
The preceding discussion makes it clear that the creation of ef-
fective environmental governance systems in international society 
poses a profound challenge, in intellectual terms as much as in 
policy terms. While knowledge of the relevant physical and bio-
logical systems is expanding rapidly, our current understanding of 
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international governance systems is inadequate to meet the rising 
demand for governance associated with the array of environmental 
problems that threaten to engulf us. We are increasingly in danger 
of being overtaken by environmental crises that unfold so rapidly 
that they leave little time for reflection, much less adaptation, once 
they are upon us. But our knowledge of international environmen-
tal governance still consists largely of ad hoc observations drawn 
from unsystematic readings of individual cases. 
Meeting the challenge before us will require new ways of think-
ing as well as new capacities to act. Specifically, we must: 
• Move beyond anecdotal accounts to the development of broader, 
well-tested propositions and principles relating to the (re)forma-
tion and operation of international environmental governance 
systems. 
• Initiate a mutually rewarding dialogue between those concerned 
with basic and applied issues pertaining to environmental gover-
nance. 
• Transcend the boundaries of existing disciplines and modes of 
thought in the search for new intellectual capital. 
• Bridge the gap among the cultures of science, policy making, 
and public administration with regard to matters of environ-
mental governance. 
• Enhance our ability to learn our way out of environmental crises 
by fostering social change rather than relying solely on technical 
solutions. 
To develop the intellectual capital needed to meet this chal-
lenge creatively, there is a need to establish a trans-national net-
work to foster communication among those working on issues of 
international environmental governance.[37] Such a network would 
benefit from having an administrative node located in a non-profit 
setting (probably at a major university), but it should also encom-
pass a sizable collection of participants working in different parts 
of the world and drawing on a variety of intellectual traditions. In 
essence, the network would endeavor to serve as a source of well-
founded ideas available to all those concerned with environmental 
governance at the international level, becoming, in the process, a 
powerful instrument for bringing new insights to bear on current 
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environmental concerns, monitoring the performance of existing en-
vironmental governance systems, and adding to our overall under-
standing of international governance.(38) 
More specifically, an international environmental governance 
network, operating on the basis of an agreed division of labor among 
its constituent members, should play five distinct, though obviously 
related , roles. 
• Information and data. The network should become the prin-
cipal repository of information and data pertaining to interna-
tional environmental governance systems operative in the past 
or in operation at the present time. These materials should 
encompass information concerning environmental problem sets 
(including players, interests, issues, and the state of knowledge 
about them), as well as information about the operation and 
evolution of governance systems designed to solve these prob-
lems. The materials would include information on the efforts 
of various players to alter existing governance systems and on 
the efforts of those responsible for administering governance 
systems to induce members to comply with their rules. They 
should be updated on a continuous basis and made available to 
practitioners and scholars alike at a nominal cost , both online 
and through more conventional procedures. 
• Research and analysis. The network should sponsor both basic 
and applied research on international environmental governance 
systems. Such research should encompass targeted analyses of 
interest to those responsible for designing and administering 
specific environmental regimes, as well as investigator-initiated 
research dealing with generic and theoretically significant is-
sues in this field of study. The network's administrative node 
should provide ongoing support for the research of longstanding 
network members: it should also make provisions for accom-
modating research associates who would spend varying lengths 
of time working on specific projects. A high priority should 
be accorded to initiatives designed to maximize communication 
between scholars seeking insights of a generic nature concern-
ing governance systems and practitioners possessing in-depth 
knowledge of specific cases. A particularly important goal in 
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this realm should be the development of a set of institutional 
indicators that could be used to monitor the performance of 
individual governance systems on a continuous basis.[39) 
• Advisory services. The members of the network should be able 
to draw on their collective resources to provide advisory ser-
vices to those responsible for the establishment and adminis-
tration of specific international environmental governance sys-
tems. In some cases, this may be a simple matter of making 
factual information accessible in an efficient manner. In other 
cases, advisory services will require sustained analysis to project 
the probable consequences of institutional options under con-
sideration or to diagnose problems arising in connection with 
governance systems currently in place. The members of the 
network should adopt a policy of offering advisory services to 
all those prepared to pay for them, including national govern-
ments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations. Some provision should be made to allow parties 
possessing legitimate interests in international environmental 
issues, but lacking resources, to obtain access to these advisory 
services. 
• Training. The network should offer training programs to those 
charged with both the establishment and the administration of 
international environmental governance systems. The network 
should be prepared to develop training courses of its own de-
sign and to make them available on a first-come, first-served 
basis. Additionally, it should work with interested parties to 
tailor training courses to the needs of specific groups. The re-
sultant programs, which would normally be intensive sessions 
lasting one to two weeks, should be portable in the sense that 
they could be put on at many locations with a minimum of 
administrative effort. 
• Dissemination. The network should seek to disseminate infor-
mation and ideas relating to international environmental gov-
ernance systems on a regular basis. This task might well en-
compass the publication of information bulletins concerning 
the activities and offerings of network members, research pa-
pers and conference reports, and monographs setting forth the 
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results of major scholarly studies. Every effort should be made 
to take advantage of modern communications technologies, like 
computer conferences available on electronic networks. This 
would make it possible to forge strong bonds among the net-
work's widely dispersed members and to contribute to the 
growth of an international environmental governance commu-
nity. It would also allow practitioners to access the ideas pro-
duced by network members quickly and inexpensively. 
In Conclusion 
We are in the midst of a sea change in our thinking about gover-
nance in international society. The essence of this change is a shift 
from a focus on organizations in the material sense, which em-
phasizes the role of government in domestic societies and the defi-
ciencies of international society in this regard, to a concern for 
governance systems, which directs attention to social institutions 
and the prospects of achieving governance without government. 
Nowhere is the potential of this shift to illuminate important issues 
greater than in the realm of international environmental affairs. 
Despite the energizing effect of this realization, however, there are 
no grounds for complacency about its value as a source of solu-
tions to the environmental problems confronting policy makers on 
a day-to-day basis. We are just beginning to understand the factors 
controlling the creation of environmental governance systems. We 
have barely scratched the surface in thinking about what makes 
some international institutions more effective than others. Above 
all, our capacity to design successful governance systems to deal 
with the specific environmental problems now confronting us at the 
international level is severely limited. These limitations do not con-
stitute grounds for pessimism; far from it. But they do present a 
challenge to our intellectual ingenuity. As part of a strategy for 
meeting this challenge, it would help to create an international en-
vironmental governance network, a mechanism that could serve as a 
flexible instrument for drawing together practitioners and scholars 
to extract lessons from prior experience with governance systems 
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and to apply these lessons creatively to the environmental problems 
now coming into focus in international society. 
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PART VI 
Population Growth and Aging: 
A Burden on Development 

CHAPTER 10 
Population Growth 
in the Third World 
Leon Tabah 
During the next 35 years the world will be the object of an unprece-
dented demographic evolution with considerable economic and so-
cial consequences, as well as impacts on the environmental resource 
base upon which sustainable development ultimately depends. 
According to the United Nations' (1989, 1991) and to the World 
Bank's (1991) demographic projections, we have started to witness 
a genuine change in the world with the beginning of what is called 
the demographic transition of the Third World countries, that is , 
their progression into a phase of declining fertility accompanying 
declining mortality. 
The generations born since the early 1960s will experience dur-
ing their young and adult life an upheaval in the world demographic 
map owing to the inevitable staggering of the entry of the Third 
World countries into the transition phase, which, obviously, will 
not happen at the same time and at the same pace in all countries. 
Some countries, notably those in Africa south of the Sahara, have 
scarcely begun the process, and it would indeed be superficial to 
view this as merely "historical backwardness", while in almost all 
other countries the transition is rushing ahead so fast that the end 
of the process will be reached two or three times quicker than for 
many developed countries in the 19th, and up to the beginning of 
the 20th, century. 
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This passage through the demographic transition signifies that 
quantitative changes in the population would occur with qualitative 
transformations that would entail extensive repercussions on the 
world economy and on the environment. One wonders whether, for 
the first time, population growth would be intimately associated in 
the Third World with more "affluence", and whether the theory of 
transition - a major demographic theory - should not be entirely 
revisited. Or, to phrase this basic question another way: to what 
extent will the demographic transition of the Third World bring 
about subsequent increased demand for energy, food, and water, 
and to what extent will it be linked with more stratospheric ozone 
depletion, greenhouse effects, and the global spread of air pollution? 
One argument which arouses skepticism about the application 
of the theory of demographic transition in the Third World is that 
for the industrialized countries the process was a "silent revolu-
tion", extremely slow, and induced by the progress of education 
and general well-being, while in many Third World countries the 
process is occurring very fast, impelled by policies at governmental 
level with considerable exhortation from the mass media and with-
out a significant advance in consumption. To take the example of 
China - one quarter of the entire Third World population - the 
abrupt decline in fertility has been accomplished essentially thanks 
to governmental measures and surveillance at the individual level. 
In all Asian countries, as well as in many Latin American countries, 
strong incentives toward family planning are playing a decisive role 
in fertility decline. If this reasoning is correct, the merit of popula-
tion policies and of family planning programs should be recognized 
as permitting not only the acceleration of the demographic transi-
tion, and therefore a way of obtaining more quickly a lower popula-
tion volume when the transition is complete, but also to accomplish 
this result with less industrialization and fewer detrimental effects 
in general on the environment. This is in contrast with the indus-
trialized countries whose life-styles are the source of the primary 
risks to our common future. These countries have been the main 
beneficiaries of the wealth accumulated through the processes of 
economic growth that have produced environmental degradation 
and resource depletion. 
Population Growth in the Third World 273 
It is not necessary to justify this assertion to consider that pop-
ulation growth is the only, or even the main, factor in the deteri-
oration of the environment. Other factors also have an influence, 
especially the technologies utilized since the last world war and 
unequitable development, both of which have resulted in the wors-
ening economic and social situation of the South, particularly since 
the 1970s. 
Let us consider the population aspect first. In the second part 
of this chapter we will discuss the demographic outlook and its 
environmental consequences. 
The Effects of the Population 
on the Environment 
The question of finding out to what extent population growth and 
distribution create a distinctive impact on the quality of the envi-
ronment has become extremely controversial. Surprisingly enough, 
the subject has not greatly attracted the scientific community of 
demographers. At the 1989 International Population Conference in 
New Delhi, there was no mention at all of the subject among the 89 
papers presented and discussed. Only recently has a Committee of 
the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population been 
set up under the chairmanship of Professor J.I. Clarke. This de-
ficiency in the demographic community is all the more regrettable 
as the global risks to the environment have their roots at the local 
level which would normally fall under the competence of local or na-
tional institutions. It is well known that the problems of managing 
local common property resources are closely linked with the prob-
lem of protecting the global commons, such as the atmosphere and 
the ocean. The survey made by the Preparatory Committee for the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development has 
shown that 70% of countries have identified environment and devel-
opment problems associated with their population dynamics (UN, 
unpublished). Today, almost all countries have ministries or agen-
cies for environmental policy design and implementation, backed 
by appropriate legislation (Sachs, unpublished). 
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An increasing number of economists consider that environmen-
tal consequences are not adequately recognized in economic ac-
counts, and they are becoming interested in the environment factor 
as they start envisaging environmental resources as economic goods. 
The evaluation of net national product should include environmen-
tal resource use in the same way that it includes other goods and 
services. Environmental resources are increasingly becoming part 
of the standard economic thinking in a broad ecological system 
whose carrying capacity is far from being infinite. See, for exam-
ple, Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Goran Maler (1990) and Nathan 
Keyfitz (1989). 
Before now, it has been difficult to assess the scope and scale of 
the linkages at work between population and the environment, and 
how they operate. One reason is that the necessary environmental 
data are generally absent, especially for developing countries. We 
have not reached the situation in which we are actually able to 
trace the causalities between population, environment, resources, 
and development. Therefore, it is not surprising that extreme views 
on the subject are rife. 
Some authors have concluded that population growth is an 
essential, and even dominant, factor in environmental deteriora-
tion: P.R. Ehrlich and A.H. Ehrlich (1990); National Academy 
of Sciences (forthcoming); N. Myers (1991, forthcoming); R.E. 
Bilsborrow (forthcoming); and others. According to these authors, 
population pressures constitute a determining factor among many 
others. The three factors of population, consumption, and tech-
nology interact on the environment in a multiplicative fashion with 
other factors such as socioeconomic inequities, cultural constraints, 
government policies, and the international political order. Each of 
the three factors reinforces the others' impacts, but the role of the 
population is bound to be significant, even when population growth 
is relatively restricted. 
N. Myers gave some illustrative examples in support of his as-
sertion. During the 1970s and the 1980s, the amount of per capita 
arable land declined by 1.9% a year due to population growth sur-
passing the expansion of arable land, and this led to the applica-
tion of fertilizers and pesticides to cope with the growing needs of 
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a growing population. Consequently, there was a deterioration in 
the resources base. 
Myers estimated that grain gained from the effects of the Green 
Revolution - the use of irrigation, fertilizers, and other inputs -
was worth 29 million tonnes a year, equivalent to the total world 
requirement needed to feed the increase in population (28 million 
tonnes at current nutritional levels), while the total loss from all 
forms of environmental degradation adds up to 14 million tonnes of 
grain output a year. The emission of carbon dioxide is estimated 
to have been 2.4 billion tonnes in 1950, and at least 6.8 billion 
tonnes in 1985, with an average increase of 3.1 % a year. As the 
rate of population growth was 1.9% annually, Myers drew from 
these figures the conclusion that population was responsible for 
two-thirds of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions, while the 
"affiuence" and technology factors were jointly responsible for only 
1.2% a year. 
According to a recent study by the OECD (1991), at present, 
30% of carbon dioxide emissions are produced by developing coun-
tries and 70% by industrialized countries. It is likely that these 
proportions will be reversed by the end of the first quarter of the 
next century, according to the US Office of Technology Assessment 
(1990), due to the population growth of the Third World on one 
side and the measures of environmental conservation taken by the 
industrialized countries on the other side. If this comes true, it 
signifies that environmental problems, mostly caused by today 's 
industrialized countries, will change to being essentially caused by 
today's Third World. 
Concerning the emission of methane, which cannot be as read-
ily reduced as carbon dioxide emissions, its production is bound 
to increase with population growth since it comes from rice pad-
dies, ruminant livestock, biomass burning, and natural gas, which 
are all expected to expand with the increased food needs of the 
growing population and dietary upgrading. To cater for increased 
food needs, land productivity should increase by 50% in developing 
countries by 2025 according to L.A. Paulino (1986), cited by My-
ers. Yet, in many parts of developing countries, especially Africa 
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as a whole, food productivity has been contracting because of land 
degradation and poor agricultural planning. 
The Third World currently produces 17% of global chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCs), one of the main ozone-depleting chemicals, but 
with the growing demand for refrigerators, one of the major prod-
ucts using CFCs, the Third World would expand CFC production 
ten-fold as a response to the effect of population growth and to 
ameliorate living conditions. Nonetheless, we might anticipate that 
the expected increase in the number of refrigerators in the Third 
World will be due more to reducing the backwardness of the level 
of consumption than to population growth. 
We have to acknowledge that the population factor is playing 
an important role in deforestation due to the need for cheap energy 
and the practice of slash-and-burn by landless farmers. According 
to J .C. Allen and D.F. Barnes (1985), an increase of 1% in popu-
lation is associated with an increase of 0.5% in deforestation in the 
Third World. If their econometric analysis is correct, it means that 
in all developing countries the deforestation rate is about 1 % a year, 
which is extremely high. As a matter of fact , this is only an aver-
age: in Africa the rates are much higher in countries such as Nigeria 
(14%) or Ivory Coast (15%). The two main proximate causes of 
deforestation in the Third World are new agricultural settlements 
on increasingly marginal lands and the high cost of energy leading 
to the use of fuelwood (R. Bilsborrow, 1992), while the ultimate 
causes are population growth and poverty. A study by the FAO 
(1991 ), based on a statistical analysis for 60 developing countries, 
concluded that population growth is significantly associated with 
deforestation. The future is not promising: according to UN de-
mographic projections almost 80% of the population in 2025, some 
6 billion inhabitants, are expected to be living in tropical areas of 
the world, putting pressure on the remaining forests . 
The impact of population growth and redistribution, especially 
the absolute increase in the number of people each year and mi-
gration to cities, are also playing a direct substantial part in water 
shortages. It is already estimated that as many as two billion peo-
ple live in areas with chronic shortages, where the water is often 
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contaminated by pollutants and pathogenic agents. Human con-
sumption of water has doubled this century, and it will at least 
double again with the population growth during the next three 
decades (Falkenmark, 1990; Commoner, 1991, forthcoming). If the 
analysis of the authors convinced of the responsibility of the popula-
tion factor in the deterioration of the environment were confirmed, 
the resolution of environmental degradation should rest, at least 
partly, with the control of population growth, therefore, essentially, 
in the Third World. 
Barry Commoner (1991, forthcoming), also in search of the 
respective influence on environmental quality of the three factors 
of population, consumption, and technology, reached the opposite 
conclusion. Discussing, through decomposition analysis, the num-
ber of automobiles as an indicator of the pollutants emitted in 65 
developing countries over the period 1970- 1980, he found that in 
the annual rates of change of the environment the population was 
responsible for 2.5%, affluence for 0.2%, and technology for 5.4%. 
In sharp contrast to the authors mentioned previously (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich (1990); National Academy of Sciences (forthcoming) ; Myers 
(1991, forthcoming); Bilsborrow (forthcoming)), Commoner con-
cluded that the influence of technology on the environmental im-
pact is more than twice as high as the influence of the population 
factor. He arrived at similar conclusions concerning the production 
of electricity (effect of population, 2. 7%; average annual change in 
GDP per capita, 0.7%; average annual change in electricity with 
respect to GDP, 8.1 %) and concerning the impact of nitrogen fer-
tilizer (population effect, 2.5%; agricultural production per capita, 
- 0.6%, nitrogen use per unit of agricultural production, 6.6%). In 
all these calculations, the effect of population seems in harmony 
with the rate of population growth, while the effects of the two 
other factors - consumption and technology - are essentially de-
pendent on the nature of the technology used. What is surprising 
in this analysis is the very low, or even negative, impact of the con-
sumption factor. We will see later that it might be very different 
in the future with the deployment of the population transition. 
Whatever the quantitative impact of the population on the envi-
ronment may be, two conclusions emerge from the literature. First, 
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population growth is not the sole force that undermines the envi-
ronmental resource base, but one among others, one particularly 
important factor being the technology used. What does vary ac-
cording to different studies is the respective share of responsibility 
each factor accounts for: we should recognize that the statistical 
tools available to deal with this basic question are extremely rudi-
mentary. Secondly, the three factors (population, consumption, 
and technology) interact in a multiplicative fashion, and it is these 
interactions that will matter in the future as the last two factors 
increase their influence. Environmental economics and population 
growth and distribution will be tied to each other in an intricate 
web. 
Let us turn now to the time horizon, as we can assume that the 
next four decades will definitely witness a different demographic 
path from the past. As the populations of most of the Third World, 
except the sub-Saharan area, are entering a period of lower fertility 
rates, with growth rates nonetheless extremely high by historical 
standards, the interactions of population and the two other fac-
tors will exercise their full strength, unless two conditions are met, 
jointly or independently. These two conditions are that: 
• The development of the Third World will be achieved in a differ-
ent way than for the industrialized countries, with alternative 
options using "clean technologies". 
• The decline in fertility will not be accompanied by much affiu-
ence, contrary to the theory of demographic transition, as was 
experienced in the past by the industrialized countries when 
concern for the environment was practically non-existent . 
Concerning the first condition, we should recognize that some 
growth in the use of energy by developing countries is inevitable, 
and, at present, development scenarios for these countries follow the 
same material-intensive patterns as the industrialized countries. As 
a matter of fact, the economies of Third World countries that are 
experiencing strong economic growth are all adopting an energy-
intensive, heavy industrialization phase. This is the case in Korea, 
Taiwan, the countries that belong to the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and, more recently, Turkey, Mexico, and 
Brazil. In 1950, there were 6,000 factories in Taiwan: the number 
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is now around 100,000. Last summer (1991 ), the standard index of 
pollution in the industrial center of Hsinchu reached a level which 
was twice as much as that during the worst days in Los Angeles. 
Bangkok, Peking, and Manila rival Taipei as regards pollution. 
Throughout the whole of Asia measures for safeguarding the envi-
ronment are absent or ignored. The decision makers consider that 
the costs of environmental protection are too high and that they are 
having constraining effects on their development strategies. In all 
developing countries, development concerns surpass environmental 
ones, at least for the time being. Preventing soil degradation at vil-
lage level has less priority than increasing food production to feed a 
growing population. Besides, the poor, in general , do not have the 
means to undertake soil conservation measures that would preserve 
their resources. Their first task is to meet immediate basic human 
needs. To do so, they are often compelled to overexploit the natural 
resources on which their long-term development depends. 
Preventing carbon dioxide emissions by restricting automobile 
transport in cities like Mexico, Cairo, Bangkok, Rio de Janeiro, or 
Sao Paulo is attempting the impossible. Exerting pressure on de-
veloping countries to shift to environmentally sound technologies 
is putting a burden on the economies of those countries. At the 
present time, the technologies of industry, agriculture, and trans-
portation are basically the same in developing countries as they are 
in rich countries, but developing countries do not have the necessary 
resources for the adoption of measures to protect the environment. 
It is very unrealistic to request developing countries to take pre-
ventive measures against environmental pollution by abandoning 
the production technologies that generate it. As the Brundtland 
Commission stated in 1987: "The industries most heavily reliant 
on environmental resources and most heavily polluting are growing 
most rapidly in the developing world where there is more urgency 
for growth and less capacity to minimize damaging side effects." 
It is therefore irresponsible to call for "environmental protection" 
without assessing what effects such protection will have on the eco-
nomic activities of the Third World. 
Besides, the industrialized countries themselves have not been 
able to make changes in technologies adopted since the 1950s: use of 
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inorganic nitrogen fertilizers, synthetic pesticides, synthetic petro-
chemical products, truck freight, etc. They are not ready to return 
to earlier, less productive technologies until new, safe technologies 
are devised. It is generally recognized that nuclear energy is cre-
ating problems, as a matter of fact not unexpected, and that the 
present nuclear plants are aging badly, thus requiring additional 
cost for their maintenance. There is growing concern about the 
costs of nuclear waste disposal: there is no real solution at present. 
It is estimated that 800,000 children have been affected by the Cher-
nobyl catastrophe. More than 600,000 hectares of land and forest 
in the region are unexploitable for a very long period. The demo-
graphic consequences of Chernobyl in the areas of the catastrophe 
have been discussed recently and openly by Rybakovsky (forthcom-
ing): these are a decline in fertility, concerns about a likely increase 
in morbidity and mortality, and desertification of large areas. It was 
a national disaster and any repetition could have an international 
dimension. 
If it is true that industrialized countries contribute more to en-
vironmental damage than the developing countries, then the latter 
also suffer more than the former. The Bhopal catastrophe is a 
case in point which, unfortunately, is bound to be repeated in de-
veloping countries if industrialization occurs without the necessary 
financial needs. The Brundtland Commission stated that the com-
mon need for global environmental security requires a substantial 
and sustained increase in the flow of financial resources to support 
the broad development needs of developing countries. 
The main question is: is the date for reaching the end of the 
population transition too close to permit most current technological 
constraints to be overcome? At this stage, is it likely that expansion 
of agricultural production will be feasible on a world scale without 
dire environmental effects if present technologies, such as those of 
the "green revolution", are modified? We should remember that, in 
Asia, an increase in agricultural production is possible only through 
increased productivity, rather than through an increase in arable 
areas. Is it likely that the industrialization of the world will be 
accomplished with clean energy technologies before long? 
Population Growth in the Third World 
The Demographic Outlook and its 
Environmental Implications: 
an Open-ended Demographic Future 
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The world's future in demographic terms would seem to be very 
open-ended, judging by the United Nations' projections, since the 
high and low population variants put the population in 2025 at 9.42 
and 7.59 billion respectively, i.e., a difference of 1.83 billion. The 
actual figure will probably lie somewhere between the two. How-
ever, it is obviously not a matter of indifference whether it will be 
closer to one or the other as far as resources and the environment 
are concerned, even if 91 % of this 1.83 billion difference were ac-
counted for by today's developing countries and only 9% by today's 
developed countries, which consume more raw material and cause 
more environmental pollution. It is true, on the other hand, that a 
large number of developing countries are also responsible for dam-
age to the environment as a result of poverty, and many of them will 
progressively experience a form of development, as we will comment 
on now. 
The growing diversification of the Third World 
Many of today's developing countries are and will be moving into 
the category of industrialized countries. We are witnessing a demo-
graphic diversification in the Third World. The simple two-speed 
pattern of population growth of 20 years ago has been superseded 
by one that is increasingly varied. All the signs are pointing to a 
world where demographic change takes place at several speeds and 
gives rise to a vastly different geographic distribution of its popu-
lation. The idea of a North-South demographic divide is no longer 
valid, as can be seen from both the United Nations' and World 
Bank projections. It is equally obvious that, at the same time, we 
are beginning to see the end of a pattern of economic development 
at two or three speeds. The world scene is becoming even more 
varied, and one where today's developing countries will move in 
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different directions, with some rapidly catching up on the indus-
trialized countries from both the demographic and the social and 
economic standpoints. 
The "old Third World" is split into diverse degrees of success-
ful developers and the rest: and, looking at this more closely, it is 
obvious that those countries which are quickest in accomplishing 
the demographic transition are the ones which are in the best po-
sition in terms of international competition. Take the example of 
the "four dragons" so often referred to: they are now well into the 
post-demographic transition phase and there is little or no differ-
ence between them and the countries of Western Europe in terms of 
both fertility and mortality. In the radical changes that are begin-
ning to occur within the hierarchy of world powers it is clear that 
countries that were for a long time considered as underdeveloped 
will soon be up among the leaders. It is equally clear that while 
accomplishing the demographic transition will not in itself ensure 
development, without this demographic transition development in 
the Third World is inconceivable, even in a soft form, as we will 
discuss later on. 
A persisting poverty 
Although the idea of an "ever-widening divide" , so widely accepted 
during the 1950s and 1960s, is by no means a thing of the past, 
the divide is no longer simply between the whole of the North and 
the whole of the South, but between the North plus a substantial 
part of the South on one side, leaving on the other side large black 
spots that are likely to persist for a good many years to come. 
These latter areas include almost all of sub-Saharan Africa, where 
under-exploitation of natural resources, compounded by totally un-
restrained population growth, political unrest, and environmental 
damage, is isolating this subcontinent from the world economy. 
In Asia, which comprises the most heterogeneous collection of 
countries from both the economic and demographic standpoints, 
the future of many populations looks scarcely more hopeful. Along-
side the dramatic success stories there are, according to the World 
Bank, 600 million people living in "absolute poverty". This means 
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not only low income and malnutrition, but also lack of access toed-
ucation, health care, housing, drinking water, and main drainage. 
This poverty is rife not only in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Cambodia, but also in countries where the over-
all situation is beginning to improve, as in the Philippines (where 
it is estimated that 35% of the total population live in poverty) 
and Sri Lanka. In India it is reckoned that 40% of the population, 
and, more particularly, the inhabitants of the northeastern states, 
are below the poverty line. In China 130 million people, mainly in 
rural areas, are known to be living in penury. 
In short, it can be said that a substantial proportion of the 
Third World's inhabitants, an estimated 1 billion at least, are un-
touched by the process of development and, since this vast popu-
lation has not yet gone through a process of genuine demographic 
transition, the number is likely to double by the year 2025. In 
1985 this proportion of the population accounted for 40% of the 
lowest income group (below $480 per head according to the World 
Bank), totaling an estimated 2.4 billion people. It is to be hoped, 
of course, that a proportion of this population will move out of "ab-
solute poverty" before the number in that category doubles. The 
way world demography evolves will, to a large extent, depend on 
what the future holds in store for this vast section of the world 
population, since it is destined to have the most prolonged and 
highest growth rate. Its magnitude, constantly renewed, has been 
singularly resistant to reduction in all parts of the world and its 
persistence is beyond our comprehension. 
Demographers, as well as environmentalists, are keeping a con-
stant eye on the poorest of the poor. Demographers for the reasons 
we have just mentioned: environmentalists are also maintaining 
a strong interest in this fraction of the population because they 
consider that poverty and environmental degradation are closely 
linked, as are the opulence of industrialized countries and the en-
vironment, with the difference that the poor bear the brunt of the 
environmental damage while the rich have the resources to try to 
counteract it. The poor living in absolute poverty are dependent 
for their survival upon the environmental resources of soil, water, 
forests, fisheries, and biotics that make up their main stocks of 
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economic capital. They have no alternative but to exploit their 
environmental reserve base at an unsustainable rate, causing irre-
versible injury, deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion on a 
wide scale. 
It is well recognized that poor people are forced into ways of liv-
ing which induce further destruction because of the complex cycles 
of poverty, inappropriate development, and environmental deteri-
oration. In many countries most domestic energy comes directly 
from biomass resources. In some sub-Saharan countries, such as 
Burkina-Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Tanzania, wood accounts for 90% of the national energy consump-
tion, even in rich, oil-producing countries such as Nigeria (Eckholm 
et al. , 1984). Urbanization is not mitigating the problem as urban 
consumption of wood is to be blamed as well as rural consump-
tion. Some studies describe the surroundings of sub-Saharan cities 
as deforested "rings of desolation". According to G. Barnard and 
L. Kristofersen (1985), as the energy crisis worsens, a considerable 
proportion of the world population will be forced , in the near fu-
ture, to consume wood faster than it is being grown, unless new 
sources of energy are made available to poor people. 
It is women who are most affected by the consequences of en-
vironmental deterioration. There is a growing amount of literature 
on the subject, well summarized by I. Dankelman and J. Davidson 
(1988). Once again, we have to recognize that women are playing 
a central role in both population and environment. 
The build-up of a momentum which will weigh 
heavy on the future 
During the 45 or so post-war years, the world has built up a sub-
stantial growth momentum within its demographic structures as 
the result of a high birth rate during this period, as evidenced by 
the fact that, despite the slower growth rate, the absolute figure 
for world population will continue to increase for several decades. 
From 2.5 billion in 1950, the world population had doubled by 1987, 
will exceed 8.5 billion in 2025, and, according to the World Bank, is 
likely to be over 11 billion by the end of the next century. Accord-
ing to the United Nations' medium variant, the annual mcrease, 
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47.2 million in 1950-1955, rose to 80.7 million in 1980-1985, and 
will continue to rise to a peak of 95.5 million. It will not be until 
2020-2025 that the annual increase will drop back to its 1980-1985 
level. According to the high variant, the annual increase is likely 
to climb to a figure of 126.3 million by 2020-2025 before it begins 
to drop back. 
In terms of individual countries a good example of this growth 
momentum is Kenya, which has one of the world's highest popula-
tion growth rates (4.04% between 1985 and 1990 according to the 
United Nations' figures). Half of this growth can be calculated as 
being due to current reproductive behavior and the other half to 
past reproductive behavior. 
As was said earlier, the UN projections are based on the as-
sumption that each country in turn will reach a situation of zero 
growth. The World Bank has worked out the figures for these sta-
tionary populations, which in many cases are substantial multiples 
of the 1985 figures. Take the case of Algeria: the 1985 popula-
tion was estimated at 21.9 million. The fertility rate is expected to 
fall from 5.9 for 1985-1990 to 2.1 for 2025-2030, with a population 
at that date of 57.8 million, but which would continue to increase 
up until 2100, by which time it would have reached the stage of a 
stationary population of 80.4 million. 
It is interesting to compare the projections for Algeria and 
Tunisia. Algeria, which until 1985 had not managed to formulate 
a family planning program that bad any real impact on fertility, 
is destined to see an almost four-fold increase in its population. 
In contrast, Tunisia, which as early as the mid-1960s adopted a 
policy that encouraged family planning, can expect its population 
to increase by "only" about two and a half times before reaching 
the stage of zero growth, which it will do over a shorter space of 
time (7.1 million in 1985 to 17.3 million in 2075). This is despite 
the fact that around the year 1960 these two countries bad fairly 
similar birth rates. Algeria has recently decided to adopt a pol-
icy of "maitrise de la croissance demograpbique" (control of demo-
graphic growth). However, a delay in adopting a population policy 
can cause insoluble problems, especially with a fragile environment 
characterized by insufficient water resources. 
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A relatively new phenomenon: migration due to 
environmental degradation 
In the future there is likely to be a far higher level of migration 
from regions in the world with high population growth and low de-
velopment into regions with the opposite characteristics, i.e., with 
a depressed demographic pattern but with very healthy economic 
development, particularly since, as recent years have shown, the 
former are in many cases politically unstable, thus prompting flows 
of workers and their families. The developed world will find itself 
with a diminishing and aging labor force and will be faced with 
a young and abundant labor supply in the Third World prepared 
to cross the ocean in search of work. Migration, in fact, is occur-
ring between countries which are increasingly further afield, facil-
itated by increasingly less expensive means of transport. This is 
particularly true as regards Europe and the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean, where for the moment no real center of development 
is emerging, unlike in Asia and, to a certain extent, in Latin Amer-
ica. With the intensification of migration, internal or international, 
the human environment of most inhabitants will change drastically. 
The combination of differential fertility and international migration 
will also change the ethnicity distribution of the population. 
In certain years, flows of migrants leave regions of the Third 
World depressed by environmental degradation and move toward 
other parts of the Third World, or of industrialized countries. More 
and more migration flows tend to ignore the borders of Third World 
or industrialized countries. Let us take one example, even if it might 
be considered as an extreme case: the Sahel region in Africa. In 
Mali, a demographic survey conducted in 1985 provided information 
on the causes of migration (Thiam, forthcoming): causes relating to 
drought accounted for 51.5%, compared with 45. 7% related to work 
or study, and 28% for family or other reasons. There are good rea-
sons to believe that the Mali case is only one among many others, 
one other case, in particular, being Brazil, and that with contin-
uous environmental deterioration in the Third World the exodus 
could grow considerably. S. Ricca {1989) estimated that in 1983, 
35 million Africans lived outside their countries of origin, i.e., 8% 
of the sub-Saharan African population, one of the highest figures 
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compared with other large regions of the world. There are mass 
migrations into tropical countries due in part to both population 
growth and deforestation. N. Myers cited the cases of Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Ivory Coast , Nigeria, India, Thailand, Viet-
nam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
It is true that international migration, or migration among 
African countries, has been part of the African way of life for gen-
erations, pastoral nomadism being a distinguishing cultural feature 
of the African population, but an increasing number of environ-
mental reasons are gaining significance. One of the most extreme 
and most striking cases is migration in the areas of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe. Rybakovsky (forthcoming) indicated that in the Kiev 
province, where the population got the information sooner than 
others, the positive balance of migration of 93,000 people in 1985 
was replaced by a negative one of 49,000 in 1986: and many more 
inhabitants want to leave the affected areas, especially in the Gomel 
area of Belorussia. The economic factor is no longer the main cause 
of migration flows and the environmental one could reach a sizable 
dimension in the future. 
The geographical distributions of populations within countries 
are far from optimal as regards resources and the environment. A 
percentage equal to 60% of the world population already live in 
coastal areas, and 65% of cities with populations above 2.5 mil-
lion are located by the coast. This growth in coastal populations 
is exerting strong pressure on the marine environment and its re-
sources, and this results in increasing sources of pollution, as sewage 
discharge effluent goes directly into near-coastal waters. As more 
than half humanity lives in coastal areas, the potential changes in 
sea level as a result of global warming should draw considerable 
attention, before they actually occur. Also, as a result of global 
warming intra-regional shifts in agricultural productivity, and con-
sequently in geographical distribution of population, will possibly 
take place, a factor which is beyond any forecasts at this time. 
Some adaptation of the population will have to take place. 
Ecological risks due to a combination of climatic changes, rapid 
urbanization, and high population density - and we will see that 
some densities in the Third World could reach high le·vels in the 
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future because of population growth - could jeopardize life in many 
parts of developing countries, should natural catastrophes occur. 
The prospect of demographic transition 
in the Third World 
What are the prospects for world demography during the next 
decades according to the United Nations' and World Bank pro-
jections? When will the demographic transition be completed in 
these projections? 
It can be reasonably assumed that the demographic transition 
will be completed, or approaching completion, when the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) is 2.1, since this generally corresponds to a life 
expectancy which permits population replacement. This does not, 
however, imply zero growth, because of the time lag in the adjust-
ment of the structure to fertility and mortality effects. For the 
world as a whole, the medium-variant United Nations ' projection 
extrapolated to the year 2030 gives an aggregate TFR of 2.1, a 
growth rate of 1 %, a 70-year life expectancy at birth (for both 
sexes), and a 70% rate of urbanization. At that time, the process 
of demographic transition would be almost completed in the Third 
World as a whole, the world would contain 7.1 billion inhabitants 
in the countries of today's Third World and 1.4 billion in today's 
industrialized countries. 
As an indicator that a country is well on the way to completing 
its demographic transition, we selected a TFR of 2.5, rather than 
2.1, because experience has shown that at that stage, although the 
country has not fully completed its transition, it is not far off, and 
it is well on its way along the path of economic, industrial, and 
social development. 
Table 10.1 indicates when different countries are expected to 
attain a total fertility rate below 2.5. Table 10.2 provides aggre-
gate populations for major world regions at various dates, divided 
into two groups depending on whether the TFRs of the populations 
will at that time be above or below 2.5. Both sets of calculations 
are based on the United Nations' medium-variant projections. All 
the columns in Table 10.2 concern today's developing countries, ex-
cept for the two right-hand ones which show aggregates for today's 
Table 10.1. The period during which a total fertility rate (TFR) below 2.5 will be reached for different 
countries. 
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990- 1995 1995- 2000 2000-2010 2010- 2020 2020- 2025 Beyond 2025 
Mauritius 
China 
Hong Kong 
Barbados 
Cuba 
Martinique 
Puerto Rico 
Reunion 
Korea 
Guadeloupe 
Uruguay 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Israel 
Surinam 
Trinidad 
Turkey 
Source: United Nations {1991), medium variant. 
Tunisia 
Indonesia 
Fidji 
Malaysia 
Vietnam 
Argentina 
C hile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Bahrain 
East Timo 
India 
Kuwait 
Myanmar 
Philippines 
Brazil 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Cape Verde 
Ghana 
S.Africa 
Cambodia 
Bangladesh 
Jordan 
Iran 
Laos 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Un.Ar.Emirates 
Angola 
Botswana 
Benin 
Burkina F. 
Burundi 
C.Afr.Rep. 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Congo 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Eq.Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Guinea Bi. 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Zaire 
Afghanistan 
Bhutan 
Iraq 
Mongolia 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Yemen 
Bolivia 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
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Table 10.2. Population projections (in millions). 
North South Latin Carib- Central Temperate Tropical 
Africa Africa Sahara America bean America America America Asia 
1985 TFR > 2.5 553 123 430 390 17 105 45 223 1649 
TFR < 2.5 2 0 2 14 14 0 0 0 1065 
Total 555 123 432 404 31 105 45 223 2714 
1990 TFR > 2.5 640 141 499 430 19 118 46 247 1780 
TFR < 2.5 2 0 2 18 15 0 3 0 1209 
Total 642 141 501 448 34 118 49 247 2989 
1995 TFR > 2.5 745 159 586 471 18 131 48 274 1911 
TFR < 2.5 2 0 2 22 18 0 3 0 1376 
Total 747 159 588 493 36 131 52 274 3287 
2000 TFR > 2.5 865 179 686 407 18 38 52 299 1810 
TFR < 2.5 2 0 2 131 21 107 3 0 1774 
Total 867 179 688 538 39 145 55 299 3584 
2010 TFR > 2.5 1135 209 926 366 21 40 0 305 764 
TFR < 2.5 13 11 2 262 22 133 61 46 3344 
Total 1148 220 928 628 43 173 61 351 4108 
2020 TFR > 2.5 1260 66 1194 158 25 49 0 84 848 
TFR < 2.5 192 190 2 559 23 151 66 319 3723 
Total 1452 257 1196 717 48 200 66 403 4571 
2025 TFR > 2.5 1291 73 1218 184 26 54 0 104 228 I::-< 
TFR < 2.5 306 201 105 573 24 159 70 320 4556 ~-:::;, 
Total 1597 274 1323 757 50 213 70 424 4784 ~ 
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Table 10.2. Continued. c 
-po 
East Southeast South West Developing Industrial .... 
-· 0 Asia Asia Asia Asia Oceania countries countries World t:s 
1985 TFR > 2.5 63 402 1070 115 4 2596 0 2596 ~ .., 
TFR < 2.5 1065 0 0 0 0 1081 1174 2255 0 ~ 
Total 1128 402 1070 115 4 3677 1174 4851 ..... :::r 
1990 TFR > 2.5 3 445 1201 132 5 2855 0 2855 -· t:s 
TFR < 2.5 1209 0 0 0 0 1229 1207 2436 ..... :::r 
Total 1212 445 1201 132 5 4084 1207 5291 Cb 
1995 TFR > 2.5 3 430 1328 151 5 3132 0 3132 ~ 
-· TFR < 2.5 1297 60 18 0 0 1400 1236 2636 .., Q.. 
Total 1300 490 1346 151 5 4532 1236 5768 ~ eooo TFR > 2.5 4 231 1477 105 5 3087 0 3194 ::?.. TFR < 2.5 1378 304 19 67 1 1908 1264 3065 Q.. 
Total 1382 535 1496 172 6 4995 1264 6259 
eo10 TFR > 2.5 4 83 546 132 6 2271 0 2271 
TFR < 2.5 1481 533 1245 85 1 3620 1310 4930 
Total 1485 616 1791 217 7 5891 1310 7201 
eoeo TFR > 2.5 6 25 649 169 7 2273 0 2273 
TFR < 2.5 1566 666 1395 95 1 4475 1342 5817 
Total 1572 691 2044 264 8 6748 1342 8090 
eoe5 TFR > 2.5 5 4 44 176 0 1703 0 1703 
TFR < 2.5 1604 722 2118 112 8 5443 1354 6797 
Total 1609 726 2162 288 8 7146 1354 8500 
Source: United Nations (1991), medium va.ria.nt . 
"" co 
...... 
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industrialized countries and for the whole world respectively. The 
regions are those used in the United Nations' projections. 
At the beginning of the projection period, in 1985, few Third 
World countries, other than China, had a TFR below 2.5 (as can 
be seen from Table 10.1). They were mostly countries with rela-
tively small populations, below 5 million: Mauritius, Hong Kong, 
Barbados, Cuba, Martinique, and Puerto Rico. Between 1985 and 
1990, the four countries which entered this group (apart from South 
Korea with 44 million inhabitants in 1990) are once again of limited 
population size, and the same can be said of those added between 
1990 and 1985: Sri Lanka, Guyana, Jamaica, and Thailand. It is 
toward the end of the century that countries with large popula-
tions - mostly in Asia - begin to appear in the low-fertility group: 
Turkey in 1995-2000, Tunisia, Indonesia, Fiji, Malaysia, Vietnam , 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama in 
2000- 2010. Then, between 2010 and 2020, many countries make 
their entry: countries from North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco), 
Latin America (Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru), or 
Asia (Bahrain, East Timor, India, Kuwait, the Philippines, Myan-
mar). At the end of the projection period (2020-2025) we find three 
African countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, South Africa), some from 
the Near East (Iran, Jordan, United Arab Emirates) , and, above 
all, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Cambodia. 
Nonetheless , by the year 2025 a long list of developing coun-
tries will still be a long way from completing their demographic 
transition: 40 African countries, 8 Latin American countries, and 
8 Asian ones (5 of them in the Near East). At the turn of the cen-
tury, almost all Asian countries and much of Latin America should 
consequently be well on the way to completing their demographic 
transition, while sub-Saharan Africa and part of the Near East will 
still be a long way off. According to the World Bank estimates, we 
cannot expect TFRs of around 2.5 for a large part of sub-Saharan 
Africa until the year 2050. Moreover, this is only an average, and a 
considerable number of African countries would still have TFRs ex-
ceeding three: Niger, Malawi, Rwanda, Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, 
and Sierra Leone. 
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What is striking is that between now and the year 2025 - a 
mere 35 years - the population of the countries which will have 
completed, or almost completed, their demographic transition will 
amount to almost 6.8 billion, or 5 times that of today's industri-
alized countries (Table 10.2). Thirty-five years is an excessively 
short period for a transformation of such amplitude, given that the 
countries concerned will also be by then somewhat industrialized 
and highly urbanized. A much longer time was necessary for to-
day's industrialized countries to come to the end of the demographic 
transition process, and become both industrialized and urbanized. 
It seems an impossible challenge for the Third World, and the world 
as a whole, if the international community does not fundamentally 
change its ways of reacting and thinking, in particular from the 
environmental standpoint. Production, whether industrial or agri-
cultural, should be conducted so as not to weaken or diminish our 
planet's capacity to sustain life, and to protect our environment in 
both the present and the future . 
Doubts about the demographic outlook 
Should the United Nations' and the World Bank projections be re-
alized, there will be many more areas of development and environ-
mental crises in the future. The crises could be such that they ca.st 
doubts on the materialization of the projections. Some distortions 
would necessarily occur, such as different trends in fertility, fewer 
improvements in health and mortality, and intensification of mi-
gration. One feature of these projections which leaves them open 
to doubt is that they are presented as if they were vectors unaf-
fected by any external factors, proceeding in a vacuum without any 
hindrance. They are not endogenized. It is this that makes them 
scarcely credible as soon as they go beyond one or two decades. 
One certainty is that each of the factors of population, environ-
ment, a.nd food and energy has assumed global significance and 
interacts closely with the others. 
The second reason for doubt is that it is not conceivable that 
some form of demographic equality will gradually emerge at the end 
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of the demographic transition, given that the end of the transition 
will apply not only to the world population as a whole, but also to 
that of each individual country. It is difficult to accept this idea 
since it would imply either that people will become equal in terms 
of economic and social conditions, or that differences in economic, 
social, and even cultural conditions will no longer have any effect on 
either fertility or mortality. So far, however, no hypothesis of any 
other kind has been put forward, and perhaps, therefore, for want of 
anything better, we can accept the idea, provided the calculations 
are not extended too far into the future, following the example set 
by the United Nations. 
A third serious doubt as regards these projections is t he seeming 
implausibility of many of the results. For example, is it conceivable 
that Africa, with its many ecological and economic problems, where 
school enrollment rates and the number of doctors are the lowest in 
the world, where industry is limited and where there is a growing 
division between vast urban conglomerations and immense tracts 
of derelict land, is likely to see its population increase seven-fold 
between 1950 and 2025, and thirteen-fold between 1950 and the 
end of the next century? The population of Africa, which repre-
sented less than 10% of the world population in 1950, would rise 
to a level where it formed over 25% of the world population. This 
would be the case unless, of course, it is assumed that there would 
be massive emigration, a hypothesis which demographers working 
in international organizations have not dared to put forward; or 
that mortality rates would cease to decline and would even rise as 
a result of the worsening of nutritional and economic conditions, 
the emergence of new diseases such as AIDS, or the resurgence of 
illnesses such as malaria or cholera; or that there would be a combi-
nation of all these adverse circumstances - something that cannot 
be ruled out, at least in certain regions. 
Is it likely that the Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Gam-
bia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal) will see their popula-
tions increase four-fold, on average, between 1985 and 2025, and by 
almost as much again between 2025 and the end of the next cen-
tury? The population of Ethiopia, which has been going through 
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one famine after another over the last 20 years, is forecasted to in-
crease three-fold between 1985 and 2025, and by as much again by 
the end of the century. Rwanda's population density is expected to 
rise from 232 per km2 in 1985 to 841 per km2 in 2025, and to double 
by the end of the century. In Nigeria, where (according to the FAO) 
the carrying capacity of the land is already very limited, the popu-
lation density is forecasted to triple between 1985 and 2025, when 
the population would be 300 million, that is to say, virtually, the 
same as the present population of western, southern and northern 
Europe combined. In Bangladesh, the population density already 
exceeds 800 per km2, but the figure is expected to reach 1,600 by 
2025 and close to 3,000 during the course of the next century. The 
population of Algeria, where there is concern about the available 
water resources and reserves, is forecasted to double between now 
and the year 2025, and to rise by at least a further 40% during 
the next century. There are many other examples which could be 
quoted that cast doubt on the projections, particularly when they 
are taken too far , but which nonetheless are valuable in demon-
strating that deviations in trajectories are bound to occur and that 
an attempt should be made to envisage these. 
The paradox with these projections is that the populat ions fore-
casted to expand most rapidly in the future are precisely those 
that are being subjected to the strongest demographic pressures, 
and which for a number of decades have been confronting problems 
that they are unable to solve and that are getting worse. Admi t-
tedly, it has been true that, until now, the poorer a population was, 
the faster its growth. However, tomorrow's world is unlikely to be 
a repetition of yesterday's, and it is very probable that populations 
facing difficulties, because of the deterioration of their environment, 
for example, will try to move into less hostile surroundings: in fact, 
we are already beginning to see migratory movements in Africa 
and Brazil caused by deterioration of the environment, as was said 
earlier. 
A fourth source of doubt regarding the population projections 
is just how quickly birth control will become widely practised in the 
poorest parts of the Third World, especially sub-Saharan countries, 
and it is this which leads us to believe that, for these countries, the 
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high rather than the low variant of the United Nations' projections 
is likely to be closer to the truth. 
The medium-variant projections forecast that the fertility in 
Africa between 1990-1995 and 2020-2025 will drop from 6.00 to 
. 3.05 - in other words a far sharper fall than occurred in India, 
despite persistent unsuccessful governmental dissemination of con-
traceptive methods over the last few decades. It seems likely that 
the more plausible hypothesis for Africa will be the high-variant 
projection which forecasts a drop in the fertility rate from 6.32 in 
1985-1990 to 3.96 in 2020-2025, rather than the medium-variant 
figure of 3.05. The low-variant projection of a drop in the fertility 
rate to 2.45 (the rate of the industrialized countries 20 years ago) 
would seem to be quite unrealistic. Unfortunately, for mortality 
the assumptions for Africa as a whole should also be taken to be at 
the high level. We will come to this point later. 
The United Nations' and World Bank projections for a rela-
tively steep decline in fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
poorest regions of the Third World are only likely to be proved 
correct if recourse to contraception were to change. So far, the use 
of contraceptive methods has been conditional on their acceptance, 
determined to a great extent by the improvement in women's status 
and level of education, and the more general improvement in living 
conditions. It is not inconceivable that we may see the development 
of what might be termed "contraception for poor people" . It is not 
inconceivable that a fertility transition may take place in response 
to economic hardship, as was suggested for sub-Saharan Africa by 
E. Boserup (1985), helped by large-scale campaigns to promote 
birth control using ever-more powerful and wide-reaching mass me-
dia. It is virtually certain that the future will see the introduction 
of cheap, modern methods of contraception which are within the 
reach of even the poorest members of society, and that the current 
inhibitions about their use will gradually disappear. Such public-
ity campaigns are already being waged vigorously in Asia, Latin 
America, and even in Africa north of the Sahara: in contrast, to 
the south of the Sahara they are still timorous or even non-existent. 
It should also be mentioned that governments have never been as 
convinced as they are now of the need to contain population growth 
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when it is unduly high. In this respect, considerable progress has 
been made since the first major policy conference on the subject , 
held in Bucharest in 1974, and even since the one held in Mexico 
in 1984. 
Concern about health and mortality, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
A fifth area of doubt and concern about the projections of the UN 
and the World Bank concerns the mortality trends, about which 
five points may be made: 
• It is suspected that there has been an increase in mortality 
rates in tropical countries. It is virtually certain that malaria 
is staging a strong comeback: there is a clear and steady rise in 
the incidence of this disease. The World Health Organization 
estimates that there are no less than 1. 7 billion inhabitants of 
tropical regions facing the threat of malaria, because the situa-
tion there is unstable and getting worse (WHO, 1990). The lat-
est estimates put the current number of malaria cases per year 
throughout the world at 100 million and the number of carriers 
of the parasite at 264 million, mostly on the African continent 
and in Central and South America, particularly Amazonia. In 
some countries where the disease is rife, such as Nigeria, Kenya, 
and Gambia, between 20 and 30% of the deaths of unweaned 
infants are due to malarial infection. The WHO also reports 
a recrudescence of venereal disease as a result of population 
movements or lack of health care facilities. 
• The extraordinary and dramatic appearance of AIDS on the 
world health scene is another increasing source of concern. It is 
more of a pandemic than an epidemic disease, and one which is 
liable to become a significant demographic factor. In J. Cald-
well's, P. Caldwell's, and P. Quiggin's (1989) views, the soci-
ological and family structures in Africa are likely to make the 
population of this continent particularly vulnerable to this pan-
demic. Unofficial figures for some sub-Saharan African coun-
tries put the number of infected adults as high as 20%, and 
the figure is even higher in urban areas in Western and Central 
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Africa. According to the last WHO report, 10 to 12 million 
people worldwide have already been infected, and in the year 
2000 the figure could reach 30 to 40 million. Heterosexuality 
is responsible for 903 of the infected people, including 103 for 
children infected by their mother. It is estimated that 8 to 10 
million children will be infected by the year 2000, most of them 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In fact, the virulence of the pandemic is related to a number 
of behavior patterns: these are not easily modified since they are 
rooted in the social fabric . It is in this context that J. Caldwell 
places the sexual and conjugal behavior of African populations. 
In regions with the highest incidence of AIDS, the death rate 
could double, which means that one out of two deaths would be 
attributable to AIDS. According to Heilig (1991) the progres-
sion of AIDS seems to be only a matter of time in industrialized 
countries, and it will have a significant effect on life expectancy, 
unless a cure and a vaccine were to slow down the pandemic. 
The same could be said for developing countries. 
• The third cloud on the horizon in the Third World as far as 
health is concerned stems from these countries' economic dif-
ficulties. These are causing cutbacks in expenditure on health 
care, which already represents a far from adequate proportion 
of their total budget - rarely more than 53. 
• Fourthly, environmental damage may make progress toward 
better health an illusion, or partly cancel out its effects. The 
extension of deserts diminishes food supplies. Pollution and 
lack of water encourage the spread of diseases transmitted by 
this medium. Water also represents a danger in those regions 
of the Third World which are subject to flooding, particularly 
in tropical America and Asia (e.g., Bangladesh). Traditional 
barriers to infection often give way with migration to overpopu-
lated and insalubrious cities, where health care facilities cannot 
keep up with population growth, especially given the economic 
restrictions. 
• A fifth point which may be made is that many Third World 
countries which are well along the path to development 
are rapidly joining the health and mortality levels of the 
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industrialized countries. Thus, there is now a widening gap in 
terms of health and mortality between the industrialized coun-
tries and those countries of the Third World which are making 
economic progress on the one side, and, on the other side, those 
Third World countries that are not managing to move into the 
stage of demographic transition and development. This brings 
us to the idea that the differences between countries in terms 
of health and life expectancy are not tending to disappear. 
Uncertainties about the rich countries 
There are, finally, as many question marks about the demographic 
future of the industrialized countries as about that of the Third 
World. The industrialized countries have entered into what is 
termed the "post-transition phase", for which there has been no 
precedent. Neither governments nor experts have any direct expe-
rience of this phenomenon whose causes are rooted in society itself 
and could be eliminated only as the result of radical change. 
As far as the demographic future of the developed countries is 
concerned, we are in the dark, as is evidenced by the vagueness of 
the term "post-transition phase" . All the alternatives outside the 
well-trodden paths are open. The industrialized countries no longer 
have the certainty of the transition theory that has been guiding 
them until now. The only certainty is that of an inevitable aging 
of the population, and of having become magnets for the poor and 
jobless of the South. The projections concerning these countries 
are more a matter of judgment than genuine science. 
Overview and Conclusions 
Environmental concern, and the costs of dealing with it, is an-
other factor widening the gap between industrialized countries and 
the Third World, as there is no doubt that population growth and 
its increasingly unbalanced distribution within different countries 
are playing a definitive role in the deterioration of the environ-
ment. Admittedly, true quantification of the relationship is subject 
to heated controversy, and many intervening factors are operating 
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with population in a complex web, such as poverty, modern tech-
nologies aimed at increasing production to keep up with population 
growth and the need to catch up to living conditions in the indus-
trialized countries, uneven income distribution, and so on. It might 
even be that these factors are more responsible for the environmen-
tal degradation than population. 
It is likely that, at present, the Third World is more respon-
sible for factors affecting the environment linked with population 
- deforestation and water shortage - whereas industrialized coun-
tries are more responsible for factors linked with industrialization. 
The relative impact could be approximately equal to a ratio of one 
to three. Nonetheless , with the process of population transition in 
the Third World, and some forms of "affluence" associated with it, 
the ratio could change drastically, and even reverse in the not too 
distant future. 
We have commented on the fact that many of today's devel-
oping countries are or will be moving into the category of indus-
trialized countries, and that there is a causal chain: demographic 
transition- development- industrialization-environmental problems. 
Never have we had so much evidence as we have today of the effect 
of demographic factors on development. If we take a close look at 
this, we see that it is those countries which are the quickest to reach 
the stage of demographic transition which have the best position 
on the international economic scene, and further ample evidence 
of this can be found in the contrasting examples of sub-Saharan 
Africa and some Asian countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
and Cambodia. It can also be said that it is those countries which 
are in the midst of this period of demographic transition that have 
the advantage as regards the development of their economy, bene-
fiting as they do from a steady influx of plentiful and cheap labor. 
The newly industrializing economies of Asia possess the three pre-
requisites for success, i.e., an emphasis on agriculture, a process of 
industrialization focused from the outset on exports, and a demo-
graphic policy designed to curb population growth. 
A major issue is whether the countries that have completed 
their transition, or are getting closer to that stage, will have 
the technological and financial resources to remedy environmental 
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damage. An estimate based on the United Nations' medium variant 
indicates that, by about the year 2025, the size of the population 
that will have completed the phase of demographic transition, and 
thus have achieved some form of industrialization, will be 6.8 billion, 
of which 1.4 billion will be in today's industrialized countries and 
5.4 billion in today's developing countries. We can imagine what 
this means in terms of consumption of natural resources and efforts 
to prevent deterioration of the environment. What will the air we 
breathe and the water we drink be like if this population of about 
6.8 billion human beings also manages to industrialize, as is hoped, 
and as the 1.2 billion inhabitants of today's "rich" countries are do-
ing? Going from 1.2 billion to almost 6.8 billion "post-transition" 
inhabitants in the space of only 35 years will create enormous prob-
lems of adjustment. The source of these problems will not be the 
size of this population, but its propensity to damage or, on the 
contrary, to preserve the environment. 
Is the theory of demographic transition to be revised, since 
fertility may turn downward sharply without real development, and 
therefore without strong industrialization? This is what China's 
case might suggest. However, China is an exception, and its rapid 
fertility decline was the result of a vigorous, unprecedented policy. 
Furthermore, China can be expected to reach an advanced stage of 
development and industrialization by the year 2025, or shortly after. 
It will be in a good position to recover during the next century the 
dominant position it occupied during the first millenium, thanks to 
its massive population. 
One of the basic questions raised is whether those countries 
which will be going through the phase of demographic transition 
will have the ability to develop in a manner different from that 
of today's industrialized countries, that is to say, with less energy 
than is required for development by today's industrialized coun-
tries. The question is well discussed by Keyfitz (1992): "If a tight 
relation exists between energy use and income, and for unalterable 
physical reasons the correlation is as high as it is in the world to-
day, then there is no way that the LDCs can attain the incomes of 
the developed countries .... " In this connection, the rich coun-
tries' pleas for good behavior are likely to fall on deaf ears, as long 
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as they themselves are not setting an example for "clean industri-
alization", or transmitting their "environment-cleaning" technolo-
gies, and, most importantly, the resources needed to apply them in 
developing countries. 
There are indications that the United Nations' high-variant pro-
jections are more plausible than the medium-variant projections for 
the poorer countries of the Third World, at least as regards fertility. 
For sub-Saharan African or other very poor countries, the assump-
tions of both fertility and mortality decline on which the projections 
are based seem highly unrealistic. The health problems encoun-
tered by the poorer countries, such as the AIDS pandemic and the 
resurgence of malaria and (more recently) cholera, translate into the 
catastrophic health conditions prevailing in many of these countries, 
which could put a brake on population growth, as commented on 
by Caldwell ( 1991). Under the most pessimistic scenario, the de-
cline in both fertility and mortality would slow down, delaying the 
end of the demographic transition. The medium-variant projection 
would only be accurate because of errors in both variables which 
would cancel one another out in the final rate of growth. 
Whatever the case, these calculations show that there is some-
thing contradictory about a Third World policy which consists 
of accelerating the demographic transition by encouraging family 
planning, while taking no, or very few, steps to preserve the en-
vironment. The nearer a country draws to the end of the demo-
graphic transition, the more urgently action is required to protect 
its environment. The two policies - family planning and environ-
mental protection - should be closely associated if the balance of 
the ecosystem is not to be severely disrupted, and the association 
must be a very long-term one. It may be said that to support fam-
ily planning in the Third World without providing the necessary 
means of protecting the environment is to be guilty of disrupting 
this balance. In population and environmental policy alike, the 
rich countries are responsible to the developing ones, as they are 
to themselves, for transmitting the necessary technologies and re-
sources for implementing them. 
Clearly, it is first and foremost to the one billion inhabitants 
lagging behind as regards demographic transition and development 
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that the information and educational campaigns on contraception 
should be directed in order to slow population growth over the long 
term. During the second half of the next century, the growth in 
world population is likely to come almost entirely from sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Finally, the hypothesis of a move toward a certain degree of 
demographic homogeneity, with the scenario of stationary popula-
tions in almost every case by about the end of the next century, 
as forecast by the projections, is unconvincing. As Paul Demeny 
(1989a, 1989b) writes, "the idea of a trend toward a stationary 
population may be justifiable from a normative standpoint , but it 
lacks support from the theoretical, empirical and historical stand-
points." There is no objective necessity for a stationary population 
and there is no historical basis for it. Future demographic trends 
are not programmed, and a stationary population is not their au-
tomatic outcome. In fact, differences in fertility and mortality have 
never been as marked as they are today: the ratio of the fertility 
rate of Germany or Italy to that of many sub-Saharan countries is 
one to five. These differences have grown over time, instead of di-
minishing. Differential demography will continue to affect all sorts 
of relationships among countries. 
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Conclusion 
Peter E. de J anosi 
This selection of papers presented at the conference celebrating 
IIASA 's first 20 years and reproduced in the preceding pages are 
a source of stimulating and productive ideas. They reflect the fact 
that the world of 1992 is vastly different from the one that existed 
when IIASA was founded two decades ago. Certainly the economic 
and political context in Central and Eastern Europe has changed 
dramatically, but there have also been notable developments in the 
West, as well as in the Third World. The changes in both the 
political and economic spheres have been dramatic. There is a 
growing awareness of environmental degradation at all levels - local, 
national, regional, and global. Our societies have become sensitized 
to the need to give greater attention to environmental matters, 
and to the linkages among environmental, economic, and social 
developments. 
In addition, we have become more conscious of the fundamental 
and complex ways in which technology affects our lives - mostly 
positively, but alas frequently also with negative consequences. We 
are starting to regard technology not only as the sole solution to all 
of our problems, but at times also as the cause of further problems 
itself. 
Many of these changes, especially those under the environmen-
tal rubric, have been subsumed under the title 'global change' . 
They are fundamental and well recognized. However, a few ad-
ditional developments have begun to trouble the scientific commu-
nity. One of these is the relationship between scientists and society. 
The public increasingly questions or doubts science and its findings. 
There is a curious love/hate relationship between our societies and 
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scientists - the importance of which we must not underestimate or 
ignore. 
Another development in the scientific community - a healthy 
one on the whole - is the growing recognition of the complex inter-
relationship among phenomena, interrelationships that are uncer-
tain, dynamic, and non-linear. Experience has taught us that many 
of our most urgent problems cannot be dealt with in isolation, or 
from a single disciplinary perspective, and that simple linear anal-
yses will not amount to much. Yet our body of knowledge and 
our teaching and research institutions are organized in ways that 
create hurdles for those wishing to analyze complex phenomena, 
and our analytical tools cannot adequately grapple with them. We 
at IIASA have stressed the need for interdisciplinary research, and 
can point with some pride to successful projects in which previous 
disciplinary perspectives failed . 
These changes around us have already given, and will to an even 
greater extent in the future continue to give, a reconceptualized 
IIASA a special role. It is this role that is described in some detail 
in our Strategic Plan for the Nineties, entitled Agenda for the Third 
Decade. The Agenda is the culmination of an intensive year-long 
review by the Council of IIASA 's strategic goals for the coming 
decade in the light of recent developments. 
IIASA 's strategic goal will be to continue to conduct interna-
tional and interdisciplinary scientific studies to provide information 
and options addressing critical issues of global environmental, eco-
nomic, and social change. Our intention is to make a contribution 
to the body of scientific literature, and also to say something rel-
evant to policy makers and the public. Doing so will be a great 
challenge, for scientists rarely present their findings in ways ac-
cessible to policy makers, nor do they always address the sort of 
questions policy makers are confronted with. 
IIASA 's work in the 1990s will cluster around three broad in-
terrelated themes: 
1. Global Environmental Change. The primary goal will be to 
advance understanding of and develop the means to assess the 
interactions between human development and the environment. 
The environmental interdependence of nations has brought to 
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the fore a new appreciation of the significance of global envi-
ronmental change. In general, attention will he given to the 
state of selected ecosystems of the atmosphere and climate, the 
ocean, aspects of the soil, and the complex interactions among 
them and with human activities. 
Specific areas of concern will include the emission, transfor-
mation, and transport of toxic materials and pollution; changes 
in water resource availability and quality; the degradation of 
soils, biological resources, and ecosystems; and implications for 
managed agricultural ecosystems. These will he related to the 
principal human forces driving global environmental change, 
which include population growth, land use, development and 
industrialization, and energy production and utilization. The 
impacts of environmental change on many dimensions of society 
and the economy, such as industry, agriculture, land use, and 
living standards, will he assessed. Technological opportunities, 
regional strategies, and environmental policies that can poten-
tially arrest environmental deterioration, and the economic and 
social implications of these strategies, will he examined with the 
aim of developing feasible options. 
2. Global Economic and Technological Transitions. The world 
socioeconomic system is undergoing massive changes in the 
1990s. This is related to the increasing economic interdepen-
dence of nations, rapid technological change, and the transi-
tions of economic systems from central control to markets. Such 
processes are inextricably linked to the broad issues of global 
change. IIASA researchers will study these changes, transi-
tions, and trends, explore quantitatively their implications, and 
assess policy options. Special attention will he given to issues 
arising from the transition from centrally planned economies 
to market economies, the integration of these economies into 
world markets, the impact of technological developments on all 
economies, and the complex relationships between the economy 
and the environment. 
3. Systems Methods for the Analysis of Global Issues. Rigorous 
analysis and projection of these problem areas require a systems 
approach uniting mathematical modeling and other methods 
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that can deal with complexity, coupling of diverse processes, 
uncertainty, and non-linearity. IIASA will maintain a balanced 
research program in this area, with the emphasis on applying 
methodological expertise to practical problems in its central 
areas of concern. 
In all of our work we intend to concentrate on interactions, that 
is, systems analytic aspects of these themes. IIASA 's research pro-
gram of interdisciplinary and international teams of researchers has 
been and will continue to be well received. The need for unbiased 
analyses of this nature has never been greater. Our connections to 
scientific communities and policy makers in many countries, cou-
pled with our non-governmental status, place us in a favorable po-
sition to meet our goals. 
One special area in which we hope IIASA can make a con-
tribution is in building bridges between environmentalists and 
economists. There is something of a 'cold war' between these two 
groups, and while the consequences of this particular cold war will 
not lead to anything as devastating as a nuclear war, the inability of 
environmentalists and economists to find common ground creates 
serious hurdles. We intend to provide a home for research collabo-
ration, an exchange of views, and neutral ground where perhaps a 
bridge or two will be erected. After all, IIASA succeeded in build-
ing East- West bridges when they were needed. Why can we not 
build economics-ecology bridges? 
More generally, the fact that we are a functioning international, 
interdisciplinary institution may provide us with very special oppor-
tunities in the growing and widely dispersed global change research 
field. IIASA 's governing Council is reviewing these possibilities, 
and, depending on the substantive and financial interests of gov-
ernments, IIASA may turn out to have a special role in what some 
people refer to as the 'Global Change Enterprise', the collection of 
numerous inadequately connected efforts dealing with global change 
issues. 
We are very much aware of the fact that many international 
scientific efforts consist of networks without a center . . IIASA, on 
the other hand, is an institution with a staff that is not permanent, 
but nevertheless spends several years here on average. We too rely 
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on many networks and collaborating institutions, but we are also 
able to contribute a core staff to that effort. 
If IIASA is to realize this ambitious agenda, we at the Institute 
and our National Member Organizations must marshal the neces-
sary intellectual and financial resources. The need for institutions 
to carry out systematic research on the broad range of global change 
issues is clearly recognized by many governments and, in a few 
cases, government~ have translated this recognition into funding. 
However, there is also reason for concern about the adequacy 
and management of these newly established national funds for 
global change research. National funding agencies are fully aware 
that many of the most important aspects of such research are truly 
international in scope, that they do not respect national borders, 
and that they cannot be dealt with by national actions alone. Un-
fortunately, this awareness is still not translated into adequate fund-
ing. The proportion of global change research resources that go to 
international research groups is far too small. This is not surprising 
since, by and large, the organizations that fund global change re-
search receive their money from national taxpayers. These taxpay-
ers are often reluctant to see their money sent outside their national 
borders, and for most national science-funding agencies the main 
objective is to strengthen domestic scientific efforts. International 
efforts, therefore, will always receive a lower priority. 
Unfortunately this chauvinistic, though perfectly reasonable, 
practice will severely hamper international research efforts, of which 
IIASA is only a small part. International scientific efforts are nec-
essary in order for international understanding and policies to be 
forged. In order to support international, interdisciplinary scientific 
efforts, a super-fund, an international science foundation for global 
change research, ought to be created. Each of the major coun-
tries with science foundations or equivalent agencies would make 
a contribution. The fund would then disburse its resources to the 
best international collaborative efforts. Only when international re-
search networks and institutions have a well-defined funding body 
whose interest is international, not national, and whose agenda is 
dictated by international science policy concerns, not domestic con-
cerns, will the global change enterprise flourish. 
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We at IIASA are relatively fortunate compared with many other 
international science efforts. We have sponsors from 15 rather like-
minded countries who have assured us of their support. We are 
grateful to them for their effective articulation of IIASA 's case in 
their own countries. However, we too would be further helped by 
the existence of an international science foundation. 
The reconceptualized IIASA is now in a strong position to take 
a growing role within global change research efforts. Our plans for 
this decade are responsive to the needs of our societies, and we 
have the strong backing of our 15 sponsors to move forward. We 
look forward to playing a constructive role in addressing the many 
critical problems facing mankind. 
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